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Introduction
How do voters and politicians react at changes in their surroundings? This
dynamic approach is interesting because politics does not take place in
a vacuum and the society keeps evolving. The question has been most
thoroughly studied in terms of how voters react at adverse economic events
in terms of turnout, incumbency popularity or policy preferences (for recent
evidence see e.g. Brunner et al. (2011), Charles (2013), Margalit (2013),
Bechtel et al. (2014)).
While voter reactions have been more thoroughly studied, the main con-
tribution of this thesis is to investigate whether politicians react at changes
in their environment. To this end, it is very helpful to have access to an
exceptional policy position data that includes repeated policy positions in
two consecutive elections, between which the unemployment rate clearly in-
creases. An unusual feature of the data is that it contains policy positions
also from losing candidates, unlike the usual policy position data that only
has observations on the winners, and this feature is important for the both
second and especially the third essay.
The source for this data is the voting aid application of the Finnish pub-
lic broadcasting service, Yle, and the purpose of a voting aid application is
to provide voters with detailed information on the positions of the candi-
dates. Finland has an open-list system in which voters must always choose
an individual to vote for and in which the ballot order is alphabetical, not
party-determined. Such a system incentivizes voters to familiarize them-
selves with the candidates.
The ﬁrst essay focuses on the electorate. I study if establishing an asylum
center for asylum seekers in a municipality is associated with changes in the
voting results in Finland. My hypothesis is that the popularity of the two
parties which have taken a stand on immigration, the Finns Party and
the Greens, might change. Of these parties, the Finns Party has a negative
stance against immigration while the Greens view it positively. Importantly,
the asylum center placements are not under the jurisdiction of the municipal
councils and their consent is not required for setting up one. A caveat is
that the statistical power is not very strong due to the low number of the
asylum centers set up.
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The popularity of neither party seems to change once an asylum center is
established. I also do a robustness check focusing on the sub-municipality
voting results whereby I compare neighboring polling areas. Now the results
are less conclusive for the Greens while I still fail to ﬁnd an eﬀect for the
Finns Party. This approach complements the one focusing on the entire
municipality: since the Finnish municipalities are very homogenous, the
polling areas of a municipality share several common features, especially
the adjacent ones. Finally, changes do not diﬀer by the degree of cultural
homogeneity or by the population size.
The focus of the second essay lies in how politicians react at the changes in
the municipal unemployment rate. When the unemployment rate increases,
candidates running in the municipal elections become more prone to pri-
oritize employment over environmental protection. The impact is not very
large but the result is robust to using alternative measures of unemployment
and to controlling for candidates’ own unemployment risk and holds across
the political spectrum, even for the Greens. I also ﬁnd that politicians who
become less environmentally friendly are not electorally punished.
The result is in line with the survey evidence that shows that unem-
ployment and weight given to environment by the electorate are negatively
correlated in Finland. It also contributes to the evidence supporting the ex-
istence of an environmental business cycle (cf. Kahn and Kotchen (2010)).
Then, I investigate the existence of strategic behavior by assuming that
the marginal candidates, who have the strongest incentive to respond to the
electorate preferences, should target the predicted optimal policy position
more closely. I use a pre-treatment variable, a candidate’s popularity in the
previous elections, in order to predict her election probability and ﬁnd that
my prediction for this probability is strongly correlated with the realized
electoral outcome. However, I ﬁnd that marginal candidates’ responses do
not diﬀer from sure losers or sure winners, which is consistent with all of
them being policy-motivated and sincerely changing their mind together
with the rest of the population.
Finally, I check if the candidates respond more strongly to the unemploy-
ment rates of their own gender or own educational group as the evidence
for possible catering to group interests. Here, I only ﬁnd an eﬀect for the
candidates without a university degree who react more strongly to the un-
employment rates of their own subgroup.
In the third essay, I investigate if political experience as a municipal
councilor or a council deputy inﬂuences policy positions in the following
elections utilizing a regression discontinuity design set-up. I compare the
policy positions of close winners and close losers of the previous elections and
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the main outcome variables consist of a redistribution index and a public
sector size index. In addition, I consider the share of extreme positions as
well as the distances from the national party average positions, the regional
general average positions and the regional party average positions.
The approach is rather agnostic because, to the best of my knowledge,
the impact of political experience has not been studied earlier, absent career
concern models such as in the term limit literature. My ad hoc hypothesis
is that being in oﬃce could make a politician more ﬁscally conservative (due
to a better understanding of the ﬁscal constraints) or more moderate.
My running variable is the distance from the within-party vote share
threshold. The research design is very cleanly identiﬁed especially for the
2012 policy outcomes. This is because not only am I able to check the
balance of the usual observable pre-determined variables, such as the party
aﬃliation, the gender and the age, but also the balance of the policy posi-
tions in the 2008 elections.
Generally, I fail to ﬁnd an eﬀect for any outcome variable and am able to
rule out an impact larger than 20% of the standard deviation in the main
estimations. Next, I consider eﬀects by earlier political experience. There is
some indication that deputy councilors without earlier experience become
more aligned with average policy positions. However, this result is not fully
robust as they become more aligned with general regional average positions
in 2008 and with national party average positions in 2012 while other coeﬃ-
cients are positive but statistically insigniﬁcant. Finally, councilors without
earlier political experience support a smaller public sector size in 2012 but
there is no eﬀect in 2008. This result could tentatively be related to the fact
that the municipal ﬁscal constraints deteriorated over the term 2008-2012
due to the increasing unemployment rate but not over the term 2004-2008.
I also study if the eﬀects diﬀer by the evolution of the municipal ﬁscal po-
sition as proxied by the municipal unemployment rate as I hypothesize that
the learning experience could diﬀer by the constraints faced by a munici-
pality. In addition, I consider the diﬀerences by the size of the municipality
since the degree to which an ordinary resident is familiar with how the mu-
nicipality works could be correlated with the size. As for the heterogenous
eﬀects, I ﬁnd that councilors in the municipalities under a ﬁscal stress be-
come more aligned with the average positions of their party and of their
region but I fail to ﬁnd other eﬀects.
My conclusion is that, generally, political experience does not inﬂuence
the policy positions, though there may be some context-dependence. The
interpretation of the results is further complicated by the multiple-testing
concerns since using a certain statistical signiﬁcance level may result in some
3
false positives and a coeﬃcient is erroneously thought be diﬀerent from zero.
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1 How Policies Inﬂuence Voter
Sentiments: Evidence from
Asylum Center Placements
Riikka Savolainen, Aalto University School of Business1
Abstract:
I study whether establishing an asylum center for refugees in a municipal-
ity is associated with voting result changes in Finland. My contribution is to
investigate the political reactions to immigrants at a very early stage of an
immigration process. There seems to be no impact on voting shares of the
anti-immigration party on the municipality level or on the sub-municipality
level but the results for the pro-immigrant party are less conclusive. I do
not ﬁnd evidence on the heterogenous eﬀects related to the cultural homo-
geneity.
JEL codes: J15, D72
Key words: asylum seekers, immigration, voting behavior
email: riikka.savolainen@aalto.ﬁ
1.1 Introduction
Immigration has increasingly gained salience in politics. The growing em-
phasis could be due to economic factors, such as a heightened labor market
competition or an impact on public ﬁnances, or to non-economic factors,
1I would like to thank Manuel Bagues, Pamela Campa, Ruixue Jia, Hannes Malm-
berg, Torsten Persson, Bei Qin, Tuukka Saarimaa, Matti Sarvimäki, David Ström-
berg, Janne Tukiainen, and participants in the 7th Nordic Econometric Meeting, the
Finnish Economic Association Annual Meeting and the IIES brownbag for comments,
and Veikko Pyykkönen from Finnish Immigration Service for sharing the data. Fi-
nancial support from OP-Pohjola Group Research Foundation and Helsinki School of
Economics Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. All the remaining errors are mine.
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such as xenophobia, diﬀering social norms or security concerns. It is hard
to separate economic and non-economic factors once the immigrant stock is
large enough that immigrants may have an impact on public ﬁnances and/or
on labor market. Relative to many other Western countries, Finland has a
modest amount of immigrants. Thus, the context I examine is particularly
informative because I can document the political reactions to immigrants
at a very early stage when large-scale immigration has not taken yet place.
This paper investigates if the popularity of pro- or anti-immigration par-
ties changes when an asylum center for refugees is set-up in a municipality in
Finland in 1990-2011. At the municipal level, I do not ﬁnd evidence for any
impact for the anti-immigration Finns Party nor for the pro-immigration
Greens and am able to rule out an eﬀect larger than 30% of the standard
deviation. A limitation is that the statistical power is not very strong due
to a small number of the asylum centers established. I also consider ex-
treme right-wing niche parties and again fail to ﬁnd an eﬀect. Moreover,
the extremist right-wing niche parties only existed since 2003 so the power
is even weaker and the results are very imprecise.
As a robustness check, I redo the estimations at the sub-municipality
level. There is still no impact on the Finns Party while the impact on the
Greens is more mixed. Nevertheless, the coeﬃcients are small even for the
Greens.
An asylum center hosts asylum applicants who wait for an asylum deci-
sion. Asylum applicants are not allowed to vote while waiting. They are
allowed to work with certain limitations but only about 2-4% of them have
been working. Thus, there is no impact on the labor market equilibrium in
practice. Because of the full state compensation, an asylum center does not
incur expenses on the host municipality so there are no local public ﬁnance
impacts. On the national scale, the marginal tax burden caused by the asy-
lum applicants is small and spread evenly. Therefore, their economic impact
should be so small that any impact of an asylum center establishment pro-
vides tentative evidence on the importance of non-economic reasons for the
attitudes towards the humanitarian immigrants2.
The Ministry of Interior Aﬀairs is in charge of placing asylum centers. The
main factor in determining the location of an asylum center is the availabil-
ity of suitable vacant facilities. Importantly, the municipality consent is not
necessary for establishing an asylum center, neither is it obligatory for an
asylum center be run by a municipality. This fact should alleviate to some
degree the concern that the asylum centers are endogenously placed in a
2Cf. Card et al. (2012) who ﬁnd that compositional amenities of immigration are 2-5
times more important than the usually modest economic impacts.
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way that is correlated with political attitudes, which is a common concern
in studies dealing with the impact of immigration attitudes.
However, as a robustness test, I also study the sub-municipality impact,
comparing polling areas within a municipality. The polling areas of the
same municipality share the municipal council and most other factors, due
to the high within-municipality homogeneity in Finland, so, in eﬀect, the
neighboring polling areas in the same municipality act as a control group.
Once the Ministry of Interior Aﬀairs has settled on a municipality, the exact
ﬁnal location should depend on the existence of suitable, vacant facilities.
Because there is no abundance of such facilities, the within-municipality
location seems exogenous to the political process.
I add to the growing literature that has examined political attitudes re-
garding immigration. In addition to descriptive survey evidence on the
correlates of the immigration preferences (e.g. Mayda (2006), O’Rourke
and Sinnott (2006)), there is evidence that a larger amount of immigrants
can strengthen anti-immigration vote (Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008), Halla
et al. 2012, Barone et al. 2014, Harmon 2014). A similar phenomenon
appears also in the surveys (e.g. Dahlberg et al. (2012) or Crawley et al.
(2013)). In comparison to the earlier literature that has focused on coun-
tries with a larger immigration stock, such as Italy (Barone et al. 2014)
or Denmark (Harmon 2014) or, indeed, most Western European countries,
my paper focuses on documenting political reactions at the earliest possible
phase of an immigration process.
1.2 Institutional background
1.2.1 Finnish politics and immigration
Finland has four major parties. Over the past two decades, three main
parties dominated: the leftist SDP, the conservative Center Party, and the
conservative National Coalition Party, while, since 2008, the populist, anti-
immigration Finns Party has increased in size remarkably. In addition, there
are four smaller parties, the liberal Swedish People’s Party, the conservative
Christian Democrats, the liberal Greens, and the far left Left Alliance.
Finally, short-lived niche parties have sprung up before several elections.
Of the Finnish established parties, the Greens can be considered most pro-
immigration while the Finns Party is most anti-immigration (Klingemann
et. al. 2006). However, both parties do have other themes as well, which
makes them imperfect proxies for the immigration sentiment. Extremist
right-wing niche parties have been campaigning since 2003 so they exist in
7
ﬁve elections out of eleven elections included in the panel.
Immigration became a salient topic in the Finnish debate in 1990. That
year was the ﬁrst time since the 1920s that saw an increased number of
foreign refugees. Moreover, it was the ﬁrst time in the history of Finland for
the country to receive visibly diﬀerent refugees, Somalis ﬂeeing the collapse
of the Soviet Union3. The ﬁrst half of the 1990s saw also refugees from the
former Yugoslavia while Iraqis, Kurds, and Afghanis joined in later.
1.2.2 Setting up an asylum center
An asylum applicant travels to a state independently and applies for an
asylum at the border or at a police station. While an asylum application is
pending, the Ministry of Interior Aﬀairs places the applicant in an asylum
reception center or in public housing. Usually, he is placed in the center
with the largest number of vacant rooms and he is not allowed to choose
the center himself. Due to the backlog in the asylum investigation, the wait
for a decision may last more than one year. Those asylum applicants who
get a residence permit often stay in the asylum center for some time until
they ﬁnd regular housing. Usually, they will move to urban municipalities,
even if they would have initially been placed in an asylum center in a rural
municipality. (Finnish Immigration Service)
Because asylum inﬂows are not state-controlled, in contrast to the quota
refugee take-up, they may ﬂuctuate heavily, as illustrated by Figure 1.1.
Changes in the number of asylum centers depend on the changes in the
asylum inﬂows. Thus, the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs may have to act very
rapidly, which makes the existence of suitable, readily vacant facilities an
especially important determinant of the asylum center location. Further-
more, not all the buildings are equally suitable: a typical asylum center has
been a hotel or a boarding house or some other facility which is relatively
easy to convert into a residential center4.
Importantly, setting up an asylum center does not require a permission
from the municipality as it is the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs that decides
upon the location5. Furthermore, asylum centers are run by the state, by
municipalities or by organizations (usually by the Finnish Red Cross) so it
is not obligatory for an asylum center to be run by a municipality. The
state compensates the party running the asylum center for all the expenses
incurred.
3The ﬁrst wave consisted of the Somalis who had been studying in Moscow during the
Soviet regime while the later waves came directly from Somalia.
4Real examples include also former hospitals, prisons and holiday camps.
5The set-up contrasts with Folke (2014) who focuses on the quota refugee take-up,
which is explicitly determined by the municipal council.
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There are reported cases in which the establishment of an asylum center
has taken the residents by surprise and there have even been considerable
local protests and hostility. For example, a local village association and
the Finnish Red Cross managing the Kontioniemi asylum center agreed to
recommend the asylum seekers to stay away from the village football ﬁeld
in order to avoid conﬂicts (Helsingin Sanomat 2009).
Once an asylum center is established in a central location in an urban
municipality, it is rarely closed. The peaks in the applicant inﬂow are
levelled by establishing and closing asylum centers in more remote locations.
Thus, most of the variation in the number of asylum center establishments
comes from rural municipalities. This should sharpen the conclusions as the
establishment of an asylum center in a rural municipality increases at once
the percentage of immigrants much more than an equivalent center would
do in an urban municipality. In addition, residents of rural municipalities
are less accustomed to foreigners than those of urban municipalities.
The concentration of asylum centers on the urban municipalities might
possibly be explained by the logistical convenience and by the larger avail-
ability of the suitable facilities. The main entry routes of the humanitarian
immigrants are the Helsinki airport, the Helsinki port, and the Turku port6
(for the locations see Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3). The logistical convenience
refers also to the location of the interpreters and of the migration oﬃcials
who investigate the asylum application. However, as far as I know, the
Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs does not have an organized plan for locating
the asylum centers.
Thus, the municipalities with an asylum center are not identical to ones
without. The main diﬀerences are the size and the language structure,
which are consistent with the fact that urban asylum centers are seldom
closed down and that peaks are levelled with rural asylum centers. As a
result, urban municipalities are overrepresented so the municipalities with
an asylum center are much larger and have more residents with a foreign
citizenship or a foreign language as their native language, and their residents
have a higher educational level.
Also the political composition reﬂects the concentration of the asylum
centers in the urban municipalities. The conservative, markedly rural Cen-
ter Party is much less popular in the municipalities with asylum centers
than in general. In contrast, the typical urban parties, the liberal Greens
and the conservative National Coalition Party, as well as and the liberal
Swedish People’s Party are much more popular in those municipalities. Im-
portantly, there is no correlation between the asylum center set-ups and the
6Both Helsinki and Turku are cities in the most densely populated part of Finland.
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vote share of the anti-immigration Finns Party (Table 1.1). Of the two main
parties which should channel the immigration-related vote, the Greens are
markedly urban while the Finns Party does not have a clear bias towards
urban or rural municipalities.
I also investigate associations with various demographic variables, such
as the age structure, educational achievement of the municipality, native
languages of the municipality residents, the number of foreign citizens (a
stock variable), and various migration variables (ﬂow variables). The only
variable that had a substantial and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in
all the speciﬁcations was the number of immigrants, which is most likely
related to the correlation in the number of immigrants and the urban status
of municipalities.
A typical asylum center has capacity for 150-200 residents with 10-15
employees. I have no data on the variation in the asylum applicant ﬁgures
or exact capacities but, assuming each center always hosts 175 residents, in
the municipalities with an asylum center, the population share of asylum
applicants is, on average, 0.0106, with the standard deviation of 0.0137.
According to the data from the Finnish Immigration Service, there were
46 asylum centers established in 1990-2011. The number of asylum centers
in Finland has increased from 9 in 1990 to 20 in 2011 (for the evolution see
Figure 1.4). On average, there have been 15 asylum centers each year. The
share of municipalities with an asylum center ranges from 2.8% (1990) to
6.25% (1999 and 2009-2011). The average share has been 4.6%.
1.2.3 Asylum application system
Asylum applicants are allowed to work after a three months’ stay if they
have a passport. If they do not have one, they are allowed to work after a
six months’ stay. No statistics have been systematically compiled about the
asylum applicant labor market participation. According to a Finnish Im-
migration Service survey, only 2.8% of the asylum applicants were working
in 2010. The labor market participation of the asylum applicants is limited
by the lack of country-speciﬁc human capital, especially the language skills,
and possibly also by the lack of education. The unemployment rate of hu-
manitarian immigrants is high even after they have obtained the residence
permit so it seems reasonable to assume that their labor market participa-
tion is too limited to inﬂuence the local labor market equilibrium. Asylum
applicants are not allowed to vote.
The Ministry of Education and Culture compensates the municipalities
for the expenses for the schooling for asylum applicant children. Any other
incurred costs are paid by the state to the organization in charge of the
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asylum center, whether a municipality or another organization. Thus, an
asylum center should not burden the municipal ﬁnances in any case.
Asylum applicants are entitled to the income support, which is not paid
by the municipality but by the state. As the income support level diﬀers
according to the family type and the number of children, it is hard to say
something conclusive about how much a given asylum center generates extra
revenue to the shops of the municipality. With the 2010 support levels,
the total income support to all the residents of an asylum center should be
bounded between 140,000 and 530,000 euros annually (Finnish Immigration
Service). I argue that, even if we assume that all of the income support is
spent in the local shops and none is saved or sent as remittances, the impact
of this sum on the local aggregated economy is likely to remain small.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Electoral data
The municipal-level election data comes from Statistics Finland. The data
contains information on the votes received by each party, on the municipality-
level electorate size7 and on the number of the cast votes. This data covers
the municipal elections in 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 and the
parliamentary elections in 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011.8
A municipality may contain several polling areas, up to 159 in Helsinki,
the capital city of Finland. The polling-area-level election data comes from
the Ministry of Justice and the public database of the Statistics Finland.
The data covers the municipal elections in 2000, 2004, and 2008 and the
parliamentary elections in 2003, 2007, and 2011.
In 2000-2011, about two hundred municipalities changed the number of
their polling areas and, in some cases, also the polling area borders. I
contacted all the municipalities with any polling area changes during this
period in order to ﬁnd out how the polling areas were changed9. Usually,
two or more polling areas have been merged together because of a decreasing
population.
Next, I formed an artiﬁcial panel in which the former real polling areas
are considered to have belonged to this artiﬁcial polling area since the ﬁrst
7Asylum applicants are not allowed to vote and, even after obtaining the residence
permit, must wait for some years in order to be able to vote in the municipal elections.
Only citizens are allowed to vote in the parliamentary elections.
8I exclude the 16 municipalities of the autonomous Åland because its political system is
not fully commensurable to the rest of Finland and no asylum center has been placed
there.
9GIS data on the polling area limits is not available.
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year of the panel, 2000. The polling area changes have not been clear-cut in
all cases in the sense of merging two or more polling areas into one. Instead,
some polling areas have been divided between the neighboring ones. If a
polling area was divided equally between two neighboring polling areas, I
randomly chose which of these two neighboring areas it belongs to when
constructing the artiﬁcial polling area. If a larger part of a polling area was
merged into a certain neighboring area, I consider all of the divided polling
area to have belonged to that neighboring area. In a few cases, the changes
were so fuzzy that I created a large artiﬁcial polling area including all the
concerned polling areas.
1.3.2 Asylum reception center data
I have the municipal-level data on asylum reception centers from the Finnish
Immigration Service since 1990 when a medium-scale asylum inﬂow began.
The data contains information on which municipality a center is or was
located in, on the organization in charge of the center and on the opening
date and, if the center has been closed since, on its closing date.
In the municipality-level data, there is a dummy variable which equals
one if an asylum center had been set up in a municipality within two years
from the elections. In the polling-area level data, there is a dummy variable
which equals one if an asylum center was established in the municipality
since the previous elections.
1.3.3 Demographic and unemployment data
The municipal-level data on demographic variables comes from Statistics
Finland and includes the population and the number of the municipality
residents who have a domestic or foreign language as their native language.
The data on the educational achievement classiﬁes the municipality resi-
dents according to the highest degree achieved. The data on the age struc-
ture divides the municipality residents into people who are younger than 15
years, people who are older than 64 years, and people who are 15-64 years
old. These data consist mostly of stock variables
The migration data consists of ﬂow variables. There is data on the
between-country immigration into a municipality. These immigration ﬁg-
ures include also people whose previous oﬃcial residence was abroad but
who may have, in fact, been living in Finland for a while, such as asylum
applicants. As long as an asylum applicant’s case is pending and he does
not have an oﬃcial residence in Finland, he is not included in the data.
The speed of obtaining the residence has varied depending on the process-
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ing backlog. In addition, there is data on the within-country migration into
and out from a municipality.
The municipal-level unemployment rate data is calculated by dividing the
number of the unemployed with the number of the municipality residents
aged 15-64 years10. I use the age-based data as the municipal-level data
on the labor force size exists only since 2005. I use the number of the
municipality residents aged 15-64 years even from 2005 onwards in order to
maintain comparability across the years.
1.4 Results
First, I consider if setting up a new asylum center is associated with changes
in voting results at the municipal level. I do the estimations only for the
parties which have taken some stand with respect to immigration and es-
pecially humanitarian immigration. The Finns Party is anti-immigration
while the Greens are pro-immigration.
I estimate the following equation:
votesharepmt = α + βpNEWASY LUMmt + γt + δm + pjt (1.1)
in which the dependent variable is the vote share of party p in the munic-
ipality m in the year t. NEWASY LUMmt equals one if an asylum center
is established in the municipality within two years before the elections.
I do the estimations only for the parliamentary elections because there
is not enough variation for estimating the eﬀect on the municipal elections
as only a few asylum centers were established within two years before the
municipal elections. However, I believe that the parliamentary elections
provide more interesting results because it is the parliament that decides
on the general immigration policy, which may inﬂuence the total number
of asylum applicants. In contrast, a municipality council has much less
authority as it can only inﬂuence the local reception policies for integrating
the asylum seekers.
When an asylum center is established, neither the Greens nor the Finns
Party become more popular (Table 1.6). The coeﬃcient on the impact on
the extreme right-wing niche parties was insigniﬁcant in all cases (Table 1.7).
However, they have existed only since 2003 so there is not very much data
to base the estimations on. All the results are similar when accounting for
an existing asylum center.
10This deﬁnition corresponds to the one used by Statistics Finland for the working age
population.
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There could be heterogenous eﬀects related to diﬀering preferences for cul-
tural heterogeneity. Urban residents could have a more pronounced taste
for cultural heterogeneity11 so the municipality size is a proxy to the pref-
erences. Therefore, I include interactions to see if the eﬀect diﬀers with
respect to the municipality size or to the ethnic homogeneity. A munici-
pality is considered to be small if it has less than 10,000 residents, while
the mean population is 16,100. A secondary proxy for the preferences is
the existing cultural heterogeneity. An ethnically homogenous municipality
stands for a municipality with less than 0.84% residents having a foreign
citizenship12.
In no speciﬁcation do I ﬁnd an eﬀect on the vote share of Finns Party
or Greens (Table 1.8), which provides tentative evidence for the lack of
heterogenous eﬀects. However, the evidence is not very conclusive because
a large majority of the Finnish municipalities is small and, even at the time
of writing, almost all of Finland is ethnically very homogenous.
1.4.1 Robustness tests
Even though the consent of the municipal council is not required for set-
ting up an asylum center, the Ministry of Interior Aﬀairs might still locate
asylum centers in the municipalities in a way that is correlated with the
change of the sentiment towards the immigrants. In addition, the earlier
results might be weak because any impact might be salient only in a small
area. The Finnish municipalities usually cover a large area and have a low
population density and quite a poor public transportation system. Hence,
even a strong local impact may not be felt in the more distant areas of a
municipality.
The sub-municipality-level data enables me to compare polling areas
within a municipality, which should alleviate the two concerns discussed
in the previous paragraph. All the polling areas share the same municipal
council. Moreover, there is little within-municipality heterogeneity in the
Finnish municipalities in terms of socio-economic characteristics so also the
other factors are generally common to the entire municipality.
The baseline estimating equation is as follows:
votesharepit = αp + βpNEWASY LUMjt + γt + δm + pit (1.2)
11Cf. Mayda (2006) who ﬁnds that living in a rural area is associated with a more
anti-immigration stance.
12The mean share of foreign citizens is 0.84%
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in which the dependent variable is the vote share of party p in the polling
area i in the elections in year t. Here, NEWASY LUMjt groups together
a polling area i containing a newly established asylum center as well as all
the adjacent polling areas in order to increase the power. It equals one if
an asylum center has been set up between the elections in year t and the
preceding elections.
With more observations, I can now do the estimations even for the munic-
ipal elections but still ﬁnd no eﬀect for the Finns Party and the same result
holds at the parliamentary level. After the asylum center establishment,
the popularity of the Greens in the parliamentary elections increases with
1.5 percentage points while it decreases it in the municipal elections with
1.2 percentage points (Table 1.9).
Additional estimations consider separately the impact of a new asylum
center in the same and neighboring polling areas:
votesharepit = αp+βpNEWASY LUMit+δpNEWASY LUMnt+γt+δm+pit
(1.3)
Now, NEWASY LUMit equals one if an asylum center has been set up in a
polling area while NEWASY LUMnt is the dummy variable for an asylum
center establishment in a neighboring polling area, both since the previous
elections.
Again, there is no impact on the Finns Party or the Greens (Table 1.10).
Moreover, the Wald test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the equality of
βp and δp, which holds both for the Finns Party and the Greens. The lack
of a diﬀerential impact is consistent with the interpretation that there is no
overall eﬀect.
An alternative way to study robustness is to investigate if there is a
placebo treatment so that the outcome is inﬂuenced by something that is
not supposed to inﬂuence it. To be more precise, I study if a future asylum
center establishment can be used to predict past vote shares:
votesharepmt = α + βpNEWASY LUMm,t+1 + γt + δm + pjt (1.4)
which is otherwise identical to (1) except that NEWASY LUMm,t+1 equals
one if an asylum center has been set up within two years after the elections.
In the main speciﬁcation, I consider the placebo treatment in the par-
liamentary elections at the municipal level and I ﬁnd no placebo eﬀect. A
new asylum center established after the parliamentary elections is not as-
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sociated with the higher popularity of the anti-immigration party in the
preceding elections (column (1) in Table 1.11) but there is a small nega-
tive association with the popularity of the pro-immigration party (column
(2) in Table 1.11). However, it is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level and no
such association exists in the additional speciﬁcation at the municipal level
(column (4) in Table 1.11).
In this additional speciﬁcation I also study the placebo treatment in the
municipal elections even though the earlier results in which I estimate (1)
only contain the parliamentary elections. My purpose is to address the
concern that the municipal-speciﬁc party popularity might inﬂuence the
asylum center locations but I ﬁnd no placebo eﬀect (columns (3)-(4) in
Table 1.11).
At the sub-municipality level, the coeﬃcients of a placebo treatment are
insigniﬁcant for the Finns Party but signiﬁcant for the Greens (Table 1.12).
A caveat is that this result is driven by a single election, the municipal
election in 2008, as almost all of the variation comes from the asylum centers
set up between the 2008 municipal elections and the 2011 parliamentary
ones.
Finally, even though asylum applicants do not burden the municipal ﬁ-
nances due to the state support, they might be perceived to do so13. In
order to study the robustness of the results to this perception, I divide the
municipalities into those with the constrained ﬁscal resources and others.
I use the change in the municipal unemployment rate as a proxy for the
evolution of municipal ﬁnances. There is no other variable describing the
evolution of the local economy that would be comparable across all the years
in the panel because a big reform in the regulatory framework in mid-1990s
makes the ﬁscal data before and after extremely hard to compare.
The unemployment rate seems to be a reasonable measure for the state
of municipal ﬁnances because the income tax is the most important revenue
source of the municipalities. Furthermore, it should not be confounded
by the labor market competition by the humanitarian immigrants because,
even after obtaining the work permit, their unemployment rate is very high.
I deﬁne a substantial increase in the unemployment rate as 2.5%, which
approximately equals the mean plus one standard deviation.
Including the interaction term with the unemployment rate change still
does not change the results (Table 1.13). Hence, I conclude that the results
are not driven by the ﬁscal burden concerns.
13Cf. Malchow-Møller et al. (2008) who ﬁnd that it is the perception of the economic
consequences of immigration rather than the actual economic position that predicts
the attitudes towards immigration.
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1.5 Conclusions
The results suggest that establishing an asylum center is not associated
with the vote share changes of the anti-immigration party, the Finns Party,
at the municipality or sub-municipality level. The results are more mixed
for the Greens as there are some speciﬁcations with statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients, even though their political signiﬁcance is small. There do not
seem to be heterogenous eﬀects with respect to the cultural homogeneity
either. However, the statistical power is not very large due to the low
number of asylum centers caused by a small number of asylum seekers.
In such an early phase, the local positive or negative economic are so small
that any impact should be caused by non-economic factors. With this small
amount of humanitarian immigrants, they do not seem to matter.
A limitation is that, besides immigration, both the Finns Party and the
Greens have other salient policy themes as well. Further research could
utilize the emergence of the candidates with the immigration as their main
theme since the 2011 parliamentary elections, which would sharpen the
analysis. In addition, the Finnish Migration Oﬃce data becomes much
more extensive since 2010, including the data on the total number of the
asylum seekers and their nationalities on the daily basis. This data could
be used to document the future evolution of the immigration attitudes.
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Figure 1.1: The number of all asylum applications, including positive, neg-
ative and annulled in Finland
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Figure 1.2: The asylum centers established in 1990-1998
©
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Figure 1.3: The asylum centers established in 1999-2011
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Figure 1.4: The number of asylum reception centers in Finland
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Table 1.1: The marginal eﬀects from the probit estimation of the proba-
bility of a new asylum center on all parties
Dep. var. Prob. of new asylum center
Finns Party 0.0195
(0.013)
Greens -0.052
(0.027)
Swedish People’s Party -0.013
(0.010)
Center Party -0.037**
(0.014)
SDP -0.009
(0.011)
National Coalition 0.002
(0.011)
Left Alliance -0.015
(0.013)
Christian Democrats -0.055
(0.036)
Observations 7040
Note: The Social Democrats are leftist, the National Coalition
is conservative, the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party are
liberal, the Christian Democrats are conservative, the Left Alliance
is far left, and the Finns Party is populist. The explaining variables
are the votes of the selected parties in the elections preceding the
establishment of an asylum center. The marginal eﬀects are at the
median. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.2: Descriptive demographic statistics
Municipalities With an asylum center Without an asylum center
Population 93723.56 12506.56
(136286.1) (21761.74)
Unemployment rate 0.1263 0.1275
(0.0504) (0.0587)
Secondary school 0.3262 0.3156
(0.0281) (0.0308)
Low tertiary 0.0775 0.0603
(0.0304) (0.0296)
Middle tertiary 0.0427 0.0276
(0.0238) (0.0185)
High tertiary 0.0441 0.0229
(0.0249) (0.0161)
Ph.D. 0.0046 0.0016
(0.0043) (0.0023)
Age < 15 yrs. 0.1764 0.1852
(0.0293) (0.0359)
15-64 yrs. 0.6606 0.6325
(0.0367) (0.0297)
Age > 65 yrs. 0.1630 0.1822
(0.0424) (0.0493)
Net internal migration -0.0019 -0.0032
(0.0085) (0.0094)
Internal migration gain 0.0479 0.0406
(0.0145) (0.0151)
Internal migration loss 0.0498 0.0439
(0.0124) (0.0122)
Observations 328 7032
5Note: Secondary school, low tertiary, middle tertiary, and high tertiary refer to the highest
achieved degree. Internal migration is a ﬂow variable and describes the migration within the
country. All the other variables except population are shares of the residents. An observation
is a municipality-year pair.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive ethnicity statistics
Municipalities With an asylum center Without an asylum center
Foreign citizens 0.0204 0.0078
(0.0146) (0.0071)
Immigration 0.0059 0.0020
(0.0048) (0.0017)
Foreign language speakers 0.0229 0.0078
(0.0196) (0.0084)
Observations 328 7032
Note: Foreign citizens is a stock variable while immigration is a ﬂow variable. Speakers
of other languages refer to people with a foreign native language. An observation is a
municipality-year pair.
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Table 1.4: Vote shares of the main parties on the municipality level
Municipalities With an asylum center Without an asylum center
Nat. Coalition Party 0.1845 0.1471
(0.0819) (0.0872)
SDP 0.2263 0.1890
(0.0907) (0.0960)
Finns Party 0.0418 0.0455
(0.0682) (0.0688)
Center Party 0.2028 0.3777
(0.1540) (0.1826)
Greens 0.0661 0.0302
(0.0487) (0.0300)
Swedish People’s Party 0.1009 0.0408
(0.2169) (0.1458)
Christian Democrats 0.0307 0.0379
(0.0197) (0.0380)
Left Alliance 0.0988 0.0918
(0.0628) (0.0763)
Observations 169 3351
Note: An observation is a municipality - election year pair. The Social Democrats are leftist,
the National Coalition is conservative, the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party are liberal,
the Christian Democrats are conservative, the Left Alliance is far left, and the Finns Party
is populist.
27
Table
1.5:Vote
shares
ofthe
m
ain
parties
on
the
polling
area
level
A
sylum
center
in
the
polling
area
A
sylum
center
in
the
polling
area
N
o
asylum
center
or
neighboring
area
N
at.
C
oalition
Party
0.1797
0.1864
0.1751
(0.0725)
(0.0834)
(0.1106)
SD
P
0.2463
0.2294
0.2006
(0.0793)
(0.113)
(0.1086)
Finns
Party
0.0716
0.0697
0.0535
(0.0982)
(0.0921)
(0.0782)
C
enter
Party
0.2036
0.2225
0.2751
(0.1647)
(0.1816)
(0.2188)
G
reens
0.0914
0.0926
0.0609
(0.0782)
(0.0931)
(0.0642)
Swedish
People’s
Party
0.0167
0.0258
0.0683
(0.0451)
(0.0844)
(0.1861)
C
hristian
D
em
ocrats
0.0343
0.0325
0.0418
(0.0258)
(0.0306)
(0.04)
Left
A
lliance
0.1161
0.1071
0.0886
(0.0806)
(0.0688)
(0.0772)
R
ight-w
ing
niche
parties
0.0091
0.0047
0.0019
(0.0231)
(0.0142)
(0.005)
O
bservations
62
329
13369
N
ote:
T
he
SocialD
em
ocrats
are
leftist,the
N
ationalC
oalition
is
conservative,the
G
reens
and
the
Swedish
People’s
Party
are
liberal,the
C
hristian
D
em
ocrats
are
conservative,the
Left
A
lliance
is
far
left,and
the
Finns
Party
is
populist.
Because
there
were
no
right-w
ing
niche
parties
running
in
the
elections
in
2000
and
2008,the
respective
observation
num
bers
for
them
are
43,224,and
8911.
A
n
observation
is
a
polling
area
-election
year
pair.
28
Table 1.6: The main results: vote shares in the parliamentary elections
Dependent variable Finns Party Greens
New asylum center within -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.001
2 years before the elections (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls X X
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.79 0.80
Note: The Finns Party is anti-immigration. The Greens are pro-immigration.
Other control variables are share of municipality residents with a foreign native
languages, the share of immigration into the municipality in the given year, the
unemployment rate, age structure variables, and variables on the educational
achievement. All the speciﬁcations control for municipality and year eﬀects. An
observation is a municipality - election year pair. The standard errors clustered
at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.7: The pooled parliamentary and municipal elections for right-
wing niche parties
Dep. var. vote share of right-wing niche parties
ASYLUMt-1 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.002)
Year eﬀects No Yes
Observations 1280 1280
R-squared 0.58 0.67
Note: Right-wing niche parties existed only in elections 2003,
2004, 2007, 2008 and 2011. An observation is a municipality -
election year pair. All the speciﬁcations control for municipality
eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.10: The pooled parliamentary and municipal elections in 2000-
2011, polling area level
Dep. var. Finns Party Greens
New asylum 0.004 -0.001
(0.006) (0.003)
New asylumi 0.014 0.002
(0.019) (0.008)
New asylumn 0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.004)
Observations 13431 13431 13431 13431
R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.5 0.5
Note: The Finns Party is anti-immigration. The Greens are
pro-immigration. “New asylum” equals 1 if an asylum center
was established in a polling area or to a neighboring polling
after the previous elections. “New asylumi” equals 1 if an
asylum center was established in a polling area after the pre-
vious elections. “New asylumn” equals 1 if an asylum center
was established in a neighboring polling area after the previ-
ous elections. All the speciﬁcations control for polling area
and year eﬀects. An observation is a polling area - election
year pair. The standard deviations are in parentheses and are
clustered at the polling area level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 1.11: The placebo test at the municipal level
(1) (2)
Dep. var.: Vote shares of Finns Party Greens
Parl. elections Parl. elections
Center established less than 0.002 -0.006*
2 years after the election (0.006) (0.003)
Observations 1,920 1,920
R-squared 0.889 0.792
(3) (4)
Munic. elections Munic. elections
Center established less than -0.004 -0.005
2 years after the election (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 1,600 1,600
R-squared 0.798 0.807
Note: The Finns Party is anti-immigration. The Greens are pro-immigration. Both
speciﬁcations control for municipality and year eﬀects. An observation is a municipality
- election year pair. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
33
Table 1.12: The placebo test at the polling area level
Dependent variable: Finns Partyt Greenst
New asylum center 0.002 0.014**
after the elections (0.004) (0.007)
Observations 11,192 11,192
R-squared 0.590 0.734
Note: The Finns Party is anti-immigration. The
Greens are pro-immigration. Both speciﬁcations
control for municipality and year eﬀects. An ob-
servation is a polling area - election year pair.
Standard errors clustered at the polling area
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.13: The interaction eﬀects and the impact on Finns Party’ and
Greens’ vote shares in the parliamentary elections
Dependent variable Finns Party Greens
New asylum center within 2 years before the elections -0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.004)
New asylum center within 2 years before the elections 0.004 0.001
* increasing unemployment rate (0.021) (0.011)
Observations 1920 1920
R-squared 0.89 0.80
Note: The Finns Party is anti-immigration. The Greens are pro-immigration. The increasing
unemployment rate dummy refers to an increase in the unemployment rate of at least 2.5
percentage points. Both speciﬁcations control for municipality and year ﬁxed eﬀects, the
high unemployment rate change dummy as well as for the age structure, educational achieve-
ment, immigration into the municipality, and the number of foreign language speakers. An
observation is a municipality - election year pair. The standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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I study whether a change in the local unemployment rate is associated
with changes in candidate positioning in Finnish municipal elections. I ﬁnd
that when the unemployment rate is higher, politicians become more willing
to prioritize employment over environmental protection, which is consistent
with the existence of an environmental business cycle. The results are robust
to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of unemployment and are not driven by any single
party.
JEL Codes: D72, H41, Q58
Key words: candidate positioning, economic voting, environmental poli-
tics
email: riikka.savolainen@aalto.ﬁ
1I would like to thank Manuel Bagues, James Corbishley, Pekka Ilmakunnas, Jaakko
Meriläinen, Ruixue Jia, Matti Sarvimäki, Markku Siikanen, Marko Terviö, Janne
Tukiainen, Juuso Välimäki and the participants at Annual Congress of the European
Economic Association in 2015, IFN research seminar, HECER Labor and Public
Economics Seminar, HECER Lunch Seminar, FDPE Public Economics workshop,
and DSG study group for comments. Financial support from OP-Pohjola Group
Research Foundation, HSE Foundation, and Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.
35
2.1 Introduction
How do politicians and citizens react at deteriorating economic conditions?
I document that politicians become more prone to prioritize employment
over environmental protection when their constituencies are hit by increas-
ing unemployment. This result is robust to various deﬁnitions of an un-
employment increase and holds across the political spectrum. My research
design builds on unemployment shocks experienced by Finnish municipali-
ties in 2008-2012.
As for the channels, I investigate if the politicians who should stand
to gain the most from changing their policy positions respond diﬀerently
from the others. I hypothesize that the electorate starts to prioritize the
economy over environmental protection if unemployment increases. Then,
I predict politicians’ electoral success based on a pre-treatment variable
and divide them into three groups: sure losers, sure winners and marginal
candidates. I also assume that if politicians only care about winning a seat,
the marginal candidates should have the strongest incentives to adapt to the
preferences of the electorate. However, I ﬁnd that the marginal candidates
do not behave diﬀerently from the others, which suggests that politicians
are policy-motivated.
Finally, I consider catering to group interests by checking if politicians
react diﬀerently to gender- or education-speciﬁc unemployment rates, de-
pending on their own gender or educational achievement. I ﬁnd mixed
evidence as catering to group interests seems to hold only for the candi-
dates without a university degree with respect to the unemployment rate of
non-university graduates.
The earlier work on politicians’ positions has generally been limited by
data that only include elected politicians (e.g. the ADA scores in the United
States or councilor surveys as in Ågren et al. (2006) or Fiva et al. (2013)).
The policy position data comes from the online voting aid applications used
in two consecutive elections. The purpose of a voting aid application is to
provide voters with information. This data is exceptional because it in-
cludes policy positions also from losing candidates. In addition, the public
and pre-electoral nature of this data makes it a better proxy for the cam-
paign platforms than the policy positions once in oﬃce. In addition to the
interesting data, Finland provides a useful setting to study candidate moti-
vation because voters must always vote for an individual candidate. Thus,
winning a seat depends on each candidate’s individual behavior.
Voting aid applications are organized by the Finnish non-partisan media
before the elections, and the candidates’ positions can be seen by any user
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free of charge. Filling in policy positions in a voting aid application is
voluntary, but the popularity of voting aid applications among the voters
and the free publicity that these applications provide are incentives for
politicians to participate.
The voting aid application data includes the policy positions of 20,060
candidates and 20,734 candidates who provided them in the run-up to the
Finnish municipal elections in 2008 and in 2012, respectively. I focus on an
identical question related to a trade-oﬀ between employment and environ-
mental protection asked in both years2. This question provides information
on the relative weights of employment and environment during a period of
increasing unemployment and a mining boom.
The time dimension allows me also to use the panel data of 7,844 re-
spondents who replied to the questionnaire in both years. This panel data
enables controlling for the candidate ﬁxed eﬀects, which should capture sta-
ble personality disposition and political skill, so that, in this subsample, I
can see if politicians genuinely change their policy positions.
I contribute to the ample literature on economic voting and on the con-
sequences of economic downturns by considering if adverse local economic
conditions change politicians’ electoral platforms. There is evidence that
personal ﬁnances and economic conditions are related to the strength of
environmental concern (Kahn and Kotchen (2010), Scruggs and Benegal
(2012)), the support for redistributive policies (Brunner et al. (2011), Mar-
galit (2013)) and the incumbent (Wolfers (2002)) as well as other political
preferences (Fisman et al. (2014), Bechtel et al. (2014)).
My approach diﬀers from a typical economic voting model that focuses
on how voters react to economic ﬂuctuations. Instead of political demand,
I focus on political supply and document that politicians’ platforms change
as a response to an increase in the municipal unemployment rate.
In addition, the paper speaks to the empirical literature on environmental
politics that mainly focuses on lobbying (e.g. Fredriksson et al. (2005)) or
rent-seeking by politicians (Burgess et al. (2012), Jia (2014)) and abstracts
from the electoral incentives (for the exceptions see List and Sturm (2006)
and Fredriksson et al. (2011)). My focus lies on the context of diﬀerential
electoral incentives in a mature democracy and I ﬁnd evidence for a trade-oﬀ
between environmental protection and economic growth even in the absence
of lobbying or rent-seeking.
The paper also contributes to the literature on politician motivation in
which politicians are typically motivated either by winning oﬃce or by pol-
icy outcomes. Oﬃce-motivated politicians are prepared to adapt to any
2“We should compromise on environmental protection if it increases employment.”
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preferences of the electorate in order to gain a seat (the seminal papers are
Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957)), while policy-motivated ones are inﬂex-
ible in terms of their policy positions (for the reference papers see Besley
and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996)).
Empirically, it has been documented in a wide variety of settings that
parties are motivated by policy outcomes (e.g. Lee et al. (2004), Meyersson
(2014); see Folke (2014) for an analysis of party eﬀects in a proportional rep-
resentation system). However, the empirical evidence on whether individual
politicians are policy-motivated is mostly conﬁned to those circumstances in
which a politician can quite independently decide upon a policy. Moreover,
all the politicians belonging to a group are assumed to have the same ideal
policy imputed from their gender, minority status etc., e.g. Washington
(2008), Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2004) or Pande (2003), see however Fer-
reira and Gyourko (2014) who document no diﬀerential policy eﬀect for U.S.
mayors and hypothesize that the result is due to the intensity of electoral
pressure.
An alternative way to study the motivation of individual politicians is to
investigate if oﬃceholders’ behavior changes once they are no longer eligible
for re-election and, hence, electoral pressure to adapt to the preferences of
the electorate is gone (e.g. Besley and Case (1995)). This literature on term
limits has a similar ﬂavor to what I do, as it compares politicians who have
stronger and weaker incentives to modify their platforms. My approach
complements the literature on term limits by allowing for a continuous dis-
tribution of electoral incentives.
I investigate politicians’ motivation in a novel way, examining if politi-
cians running in the elections modify their policy positions diﬀerentially
according to their predicted probability of being elected3. I assume that
an increase in unemployment makes voters re-optimize their ideal degree of
environmental protection by hardening their attitudes4. I assume that the
politicians re-optimize, too, but diﬀerentially, depending on their electoral
incentives. I hypothesize that policy-motivated candidates are drawn from
the general electorate so they change the positions out of a conviction. In
contrast, oﬃce-motivated candidates should not care about the policies per
se but, rather, about gaining an electoral advantage, which I assume creates
an incentive for them to consciously target the most popular policy position.
3Judging from politicians’ campaigning behavior, their expectations of their election
probability are consistent with my prediction.
4The unemployed survey respondents are more likely to prioritize the economy over
environmental protection (Table 2.1). During the period studied in this paper, the
Finnish national unemployment rate starts to increase in 2008 and is then closely
followed by hardening attitudes, as seen in Figure 2.1, suggesting the existence of an
environmental business cycle.
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My hypothesis is that the predicted marginal candidates should target
the predicted new most popular policy position more precisely than others.
This is because such targeting may increase their chances with an order of
magnitude, in contrast to the predicted sure winners or the predicted sure
losers. In addition, I study the robustness of the results to the hypothesis
that the sure winners may also have an incentive to behave strategically
in order to access the most inﬂuential positions, either at the municipal or
national level.
2.2 Institutional background
2.2.1 Political system
Finland uses the D’Hondt method and has open lists. Hence, the ballot
order is not party-determined but, instead, the electoral success of each
candidate depends on the total amount of the votes garnered by a list as
well as her own rank in the list.5 I utilize this structure when I predict the
candidates’ election probability in 2.6.2 Strategic behavior.
There are four major parties at the national level: the leftist Social Demo-
cratic Party, the conservative Center Party, and the conservative National
Coalition Party, and the populist Finns’ Party. In addition, there are four
smaller parties, including the liberal Greens which are the only party for
which the environmental issues are a major policy topic (Table 2.2 shows
the correlates of the environmental policy positions and the party aﬃlia-
tions, see also Table A.1). The national government usually includes 3-6
parties all across the political spectrum.
There were 304 municipalities in Finland in 20126, each governed by a
municipal council, the average size of which was 32 councilors in 2013 (Kun-
taliitto)7. Since being a councilor is a position of trust, the councilors do
not quit their jobs.
The monetary returns to Finnish municipal politics are small as the mean
fee per session paid to municipal councilors was 70 euros in 2013 (Kuntali-
itto). Kotakorpi et al. (2014) have documented that becoming a municipal
5The seat allocation depends on the candidates’ comparative indices, which are cal-
culated as follows: the candidate with the most votes within a list gets the total
number votes of the list as her comparative index. The candidate with the second
most votes gets one half of the most successful candidate’s comparative index. The
candidate with the third most votes gets one third of the most successful candidate’s
comparative index and so on. Finally, the seats are allocated to all the candidates of
an electoral district in the descending order according to their comparative indices.
The ballot order has no impact on the comparative indices.
6Excluding 16 municipalities of the autonomous area of Åland.
7http://www.kunnat.net/ﬁ/tietopankit/tilastot/kuntavaali-ja-
demokratiatilastot/valtuustokoko_2013/Sivut/default.aspx
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councilor results in an increase of 1000€ in the subsequent annual earnings.
Also campaigning expenditure seems to be very small in municipal politics8.
Municipal politics is the main point of entry into national and European
politics, as illustrated by the fact that only 21 out of the 200 members of
parliament during the term 2011-2015 had not been municipal councilors
before entering the parliament.
2.2.2 Voting aid applications
Voting aid applications are interactive questionnaires provided online by the
non-partisan main media before the elections. The purpose of a voting aid
application is to assist voters in choosing a candidate with similar policy
preferences. Using them is free of charge for both candidates and voters.
The use of open lists in all the Finnish elections, which focuses the at-
tention on individuals, makes the country a fertile ground for online voting
aid applications9. Furthermore, Internet usage is widespread. For example,
both in 2008 and in 2012, the voting aid application of the Finnish public
broadcasting company, Yle, was visited about 700,000 times (Naalisvaara
(2013)) while the Finnish population is about ﬁve millions.
Filling in a voting aid application questionnaire is not obligatory. The
municipal-level median response rate in 2008 was 47.8 % of the candidates
and, on average, the candidates who did ﬁll in a voting aid application
questionnaire received in total 56.2% of the votes of the municipality. The
equivalent ﬁgures for 2012 were 47.2% of the candidates and 54.3% of the
votes.
The candidates replying to voting aid application questions are more
likely to be female and younger. They are probably more skilled and more
ambitious politicians, as their total vote shares, within-party vote shares,
and winning probabilities are higher. Incumbent councilors and members
of parliament are slightly over-represented. Candidates from the conserva-
tive National Coalition and the liberal Greens are over-represented while
candidates from the leftist Social Democrats, the Left Alliance, and the
populist Finns Party are under-represented, which suggests that higher-
income candidates may be over-represented. (See Table A.2-Table A.4 for
the descriptive statistics.)
8According to the self-reported campaign expenditure ﬁgures provided by the voting aid
application respondents, 82% of them spent 0-500€ in their campaign and only 771
respondents chose the industry as their most important source of external funding.
9When asked in surveys whether the voting decision is based on choosing a party or a
candidate, the share of maintaining the focus on candidates has ﬂuctuated between
42% and 56% since 1983 (Suomen vaalitutkimusportaali). Such survey data provides
some tentative evidence that there is a non-negligible number of voters focusing on
individual candidates.
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The Yle voting aid application that is my data source is open only to the
candidates for approximately three weeks during the pre-electoral period.
During this period, the candidates may reply to closed-ended questions
focusing on current policy issues and their replies are saved in a data base.
While the response period is pending, each candidate has access only to her
own replies, which can be modiﬁed during this time but not afterwards.10
(Naalisvaara (2013))
Once the candidates’ response period is over, the voting aid applications
become publicly available. A voter can ﬁll in the same questionnaire online
and compare his replies to those of the candidates. If the voter ﬁnds more
matches to his answers, he may infer the information that the candidates
have similar views on speciﬁc policy issues. (Suojanen (2007))
In practice, most voters do not read every reply of every candidate because
it would be too time-consuming11. Instead, they usually focus on the vote
recommendations provided by the voting aid application algorithms and,
at most, study the replies of their best matches in more detail. In essence,
these recommendation algorithms match a voter to those candidates whose
positions are most similar to his, making some assumptions on the voter
utility function in order to deﬁne what accounts as similar.
2.2.3 Environmental politics and municipalities
The focus of this paper lies on the municipal-level trade-oﬀ between envi-
ronmental protection and local employment. A municipal politician has a
two-fold incentive to increase employment: it is an end in itself as well as
a means to increase the municipal tax revenue by raising the income of the
municipal residents. This is because almost all of the municipal tax revenue
consists of the municipal income tax (Majoinen et al. (2008)).
The municipal decision-making power with respect to environmental is-
sues is quite limited and is most notable in zoning (Mäkinen (2007)). Mu-
nicipalities are signiﬁcant land owners and can inﬂuence local business ac-
tivities by deciding to whom they sell municipality-owned land plots and by
being in charge of building the infrastructure needed by a plant or a mine.12
10The candidate-speciﬁc user names and passwords are passed on to the candidates via
the parties’ campaign oﬃces while Yle also seeks to contact independent candidates.
Yle provided technical assistance both in 2008 and in 2012, while the detailed in-
structions, the solutions to the most common technical problems, and the helpdesk
contact information were attached to the user name and the password. (Naalisvaara
(2013))
11The municipal-level median number of voting aid application repliers is 38 while the Yle
2008 voting aid application included 20 questions and that of 2012 had 30 questions.
Thus, voters in a median municipality would have needed to read through 760 and
1140 policy positions in total, respectively.
12A municipality is tasked with granting the local environmental permits, mainly for
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While a national organization, the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency,
is in charge of granting a mining permit, municipalities may facilitate or
complicate the process with less or more stringent zoning regulations. In
addition, the relevant municipality must be consulted while a mining per-
mit is being processed and it also has a right of appeal over the mining
permits granted. (Pölönen (2012)) Several mines have been set up in recent
years and they have created employment especially in high-unemployment
municipalities (Paatsola (2010)). For example, there was at least one func-
tioning mine in 36 municipalities in 2011. On the other hand, this mining
boom has intensiﬁed discussion on the environmental risks of mining, such
the water system pollution caused by the Talvivaara mine in the Northern
Finland from 2013 onwards.
In the voting aid application that is my data source, besides choosing a
policy position from the scale, candidates may also give free-form comments
on their positions and I have access to these comments for the 2012 data.
Typical comments on the environmental policy positions are related to the
optimal size of local natural reserves, suitable stringency of environmental
permits, desirability of establishing a mine or, in some cases, a nuclear power
plant in the municipality, and permits provided for peat extraction.
The employment-ﬁrst candidates tend to justify their stance by arguing
that, at present, environmental protection is excessive, that tax revenue
and employment are necessary for the well-being, or that the strong econ-
omy is a necessary prerequisite for environmental protection. However, few
candidates explicitly refer to the municipal unemployment rate.
The candidates prioritizing environmental protection invoke the irrevoca-
bility of the environmental damage, especially with respect to the climate
change. They may also justify their argument by appealing to the economic
logic. Examples include statements that no trade-oﬀ between environmen-
tal protection and employment really exists or that the good quality of the
local environment actually increases employment (e.g. through eco-tourism
or renewable energy) or attracts tourists and migrants to the municipality.
An additional way to promote environmental protection is to refer to an
existing case of environmental damage.
The ambiguous comments argue that the technology will eliminate the
trade-oﬀ or that the trade-oﬀ has to be settled on a case-by-case basis. Both
sides invoke the rule of law. The employment-ﬁrst candidates state that no
extra eﬀort is needed as long as the relevant laws are observed. In con-
animal shelters, crushing or rock excavation, and notiﬁcations that usually apply
to gas stations in groundwater areas, small energy production plants and asphalt
mixing plants. The national and regional environmental authorities are in charge of
the remaining environmental permits. (Salminen (2014))
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trast, the environmentalist candidates interpret the voting aid application
statement in a way that implies a violation of existing environmental laws
and argue that the legislation forbids any environmental damage anyway.
In either case, however, using a legal argument to support one’s case can
be considered as an ambiguous justiﬁcation because the environmental leg-
islation does allow for some potential environmental damage as long as it is
suﬃciently limited and improbable.
2.3 Credibility of policy positions
The core assumption of the citizen candidate model is that the politicians
cannot commit to their electoral promises. This is why politicians’ own pol-
icy preferences are interesting since the preferences of the winner completely
determine the policy outcome in the model. Would there be a full commit-
ment, the electoral pressure would cause even policy-motivated politicians
to choose the favorite policy position of the general population as their
electoral platform and to adhere to that platform once in oﬃce. Thus,
policy-motivated politicians with the full commitment and oﬃce-motivated
politicians are observationally equivalent. How credible, then, are voting
aid application policy positions? Why do the candidates spend time an-
swering voting aid application questionnaires and why do the voters study
the candidates’ replies to the voting aid questions?
One solution is to assume that lying is so costly that most candidates do
tell their true policy positions, as in Banks (1990). This interpretation is
favored by the small median size of the Finnish municipalities where it is
not uncommon for the voters to know many of the candidates in person. In
addition, in larger municipalities, there have been cases in which the media
has used voting aid applications as a source for stories about politicians’
views (Hatakka (2009)). Furthermore, at least the voting applications of
the Finnish public broadcasting company, which are my data source, are
kept online at least until any next elections (Naalisvaara (2014)).
On the other hand, the costs of lying in Banks (1990) are driven by the
voters following closely both the campaign platforms and the conduct in
oﬃce and imposing a cost for a diﬀerence between the two. With propor-
tional representation, accountability is not as strong as in a majoritarian
system. Moreover, Banks’ model places heavy informational requirements
that probably hold only for the extremely salient policy topics.
Then, politicians could use the electoral platforms in order to ﬁnd out
how popular a policy position is, as in Harrington (1992). The crucial as-
sumptions of Harrington’s model are that the preferences of electorate are
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not known and that a politician announcement does not change them. In
the equilibrium, elections function as a gallup so it is reasonable to announce
one’s policy preferences truthfully. While parties no doubt study the popu-
larity of politicians in order to learn more about the voters’ preferences, this
assumption is not attractive from a point of view of an individual politi-
cian because proportional representation complicates pursuing her favored
policy position.
Finally, one can assume a varying degree of eﬀort in oﬃce and full commit-
ment, which results in credible electoral platforms, as in Callander (2008).
His is a realistic model in the sense that it allows both policy- and oﬃce-
motivated politicians to exist within the same framework. Oﬃce-motivated
politicians are willing to adjust their positions in order to adapt to voters’
preferences. In contrast, policy-motivated ones are more inﬂexible in terms
of policies but work harder. In the Finnish context, the policy-motivated
politicians would be interpreted as those who do not have further aspira-
tions to enter national politics while the oﬃce-motivated ones would run in
the municipal elections mainly in order to enhance their careers in national
politics.
In Finland, being a municipal councilor is not a job but a position of
trust. As a result, the optimal strategy for an average candidate may well
be to reply to at least one voting aid application questionnaire in order to
get free publicity but not to spend too much time on it, which suggests
sincere positioning.13 Thus, a full commitment and varying eﬀort seem the
most realistic assumptions in the present context.
2.4 Data
I use the data on the candidates’ and parties’ electoral results and the
candidate-speciﬁc policy positions in the municipal elections 2008 and 2012
and combine these data sets to the municipality-level labor market and
retirement data. Finally, I have a representative survey data, which is
repeated cross-sections. I use this survey data in order to explore the voters’
views as citizen replies to the voting aid questionnaires are not available.
The data on the candidates’ policy positions consists of the replies of the
13For the most strategically thinking candidates, this strategy is further supported by the
fact that voters mostly content themselves with the vote recommendation list provided
by the voting aid application algorithm. Because the algorithms are trade secrets,
they are not trivial to game. In fact, even the service providers have noted that the
algorithms occasionally come up with strange ﬁnal recommendations. (Kauppinen
(2007)) The strategic behavior is further complicated by the fact that voter responses
are not available, even afterwards. In addition, politician responses are ﬁxed after the
response period is over so that candidates cannot react at other candidates’ responses.
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municipal elections candidates to the voting aid application questionnaires
of the Finnish public broadcasting company, Yle, and I use these replies as a
proxy for their electoral platforms. The Yle voting aid applications include
questions on various current topics relevant at the municipal level, almost
all of them diﬀerent in 2008 and in 2012. Only four questions were identical
in 2008 and 2012, and two of these questions were country-speciﬁc14.
I focus on a question which was identical in the municipal elections 2008
and 2012: “We should compromise on environmental protection if it in-
creases employment.”. I focus on this question because it is of interest
beyond Finland.15
The response choices are “agree strongly”, “agree somewhat”, “disagree
somewhat”, and ”disagree strongly”. In addition, the option “don’t know”
was introduced in 2012. Since the voting aid application algorithm considers
leaving a position empty and choosing “don’t know” equivalent, I code the
empty responses as if the candidate would have chosen “don’t know”. The
response distributions were very similar in the two elections (Figure 2.2).
Most of 7,844 candidates who reply twice do not change their environmental
policy position across the years but, among those that do change, it is
slightly more common to increasingly prioritize employment (Figure 2.3).
The data on the 2008 voting aid application is provided by the Finnish
Social Science Data Archive while Yle provides the data on the 2012 voting
aid application as an open data in its web site (Yle 2012). The electoral
results containing the parties’ vote shares in each municipality and the can-
didates’ vote shares are provided by Statistics Finland.
In order to explore the voters’ preferences, I use a nationally represen-
tative survey data, which is also provided by the Finnish Social Science
Data Archive and originally collected by a Finnish think tank, Eva. This
repeated cross-sections data is available at the provincial level. These sur-
veys are conducted approximately at the biannual basis and are available
since 1992.
The consecutive rounds of the survey data contain a time-invariant state-
ment “I am willing to compromise on standard of living in order to alleviate
pollution and environmental problems.”. The respondents are asked whether
they agree with the statement on a four-step scale, making the scale sim-
ilar to the voting aid application scale. Since the statement focuses on a
14“Municipal user fees should be more progressive with respect to the income.” and “If
one of the parents is a homemaker, the family should not have a universal access to
the municipal kindergarten.”
15The other identical question that is not country-speciﬁc reads as: “The social welfare is
too easily accessible nowadays.” I ﬁnd that unemployment increases are not associated
with changes in the social welfare policy positions, possibly because the question is
not related to an explicit trade-oﬀ involving employment.
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trade-oﬀ between the economic and environmental beneﬁts, it is compara-
ble to the voting aid application statement on the trade-oﬀ between local
employment and environmental protection.
The unemployment rate data is municipality-speciﬁc and provided by the
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. It is based on the number of
jobseekers, most of whom are unemployed, registered at the government
employment and economic development oﬃces. I deﬁne the unemployment
rate as an average of the monthly unemployment rates of 12 months pre-
ceding the elections, October 2007 - September 2008 and October 2011 -
September 2012, respectively. The municipal-speciﬁc unemployment rates
clearly peak in 2009, right after the 2008 elections, and then start decreas-
ing again but do not reach the level of 2008 (Figure 2.4, for the descriptive
statistics see Table 2.3).
The more detailed data on unemployment is based on the Finnish Longi-
tudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED). It is a linked employer-employee
data for research purposes and is provided by Statistics Finland. It consists
of a random sample of one third of 15-70 years old people living in Fin-
land. Each year’s sample has ca. 1,280,000 persons and I utilize the years
2007-2012.
Based on the FLEED data, I construct the following municipality-speciﬁc
unemployment variables: the share of the male unemployed relative to the
male labor force, the share of the female unemployed relative to the female
labor force, the share of the unemployed with a university degree relative
to the labor force with a university degree, the share of the unemployed
without a university degree relative to the labor force without a university
degree, and, ﬁnally, the share on the unemployment pension16 and the share
of entries to the unemployment pension relative to the municipal population.
The data source for the unemployment ﬁgures of FLEED is the same
as for the data of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, that is,
the number of the jobseekers registered at the employment and economic
development oﬃces. The data on retirement is based on the registry data
from the pension funds.
I also do a robustness test using the share of laid-oﬀ workers relative
to the municipal labor force. The lay-oﬀ data is available at the annual
level for each municipality since 2006 and is provided by the Ministry of
16The unemployment pension means continuing to draw an unemployment allowance
until the old-age retirement age, even after the maximum eligibility period of 500
days is over. At present, this type of pension is available only to persons born in
1949 or earlier and is being phased out. An entry into unemployment retirement
has been a favored method of laying oﬀ older personnel so an unemployment shock
could credibly take this form as well, especially in those municipalities with a large
proportion of older residents (for some evidence see Kyyrä and Wilke (2007)).
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Employment and the Economy.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Unemployment rate and environmental policy
positions
First, I investigate if higher municipal unemployment is systematically as-
sociated with changes in the environmental policy positions and regress the
policy positions on the municipal unemployment rate. The policy posi-
tions are scaled from zero to four17 and a higher number implies a stronger
willingness to prioritize employment over environmental protection. As the
panel is of two elections only, nonlinear ﬁxed eﬀect estimation is challenging
because of the incidental parameters problem. On the other hand, people
with a certain kind of ideologies might be self-selected into a municipality
and ideologies are rather time-invariant. Thus, it is safer to include ﬁxed
eﬀects in order to better isolate the impact of the increasing unemployment
rate, which is why my main speciﬁcations use a linear probability model.
For the descriptive purposes, I start by accounting only for the municipality-
party and election year eﬀects:
policy positionimpt = α + γumt + ηmp + βt + εimpt (2.1)
in which i is a candidate, m stands for a municipality, p represents a party,
and t refers to an election year. The unemployment rate of the pre-electoral
12-month period is umt. A one-percentage-point rise in the unemployment
rate is associated with an increase of the employment-ﬁrst replies with 0.05
standard deviations (column (1) in Table 2.4)18. For comparison, the me-
dian municipal unemployment rate rose from 8.1 percentage points to 9.5
percentage points from 2008 to 2012. This result provides some descriptive
evidence for an increasing weight placed on employment at the expense of
environmental protection.
The increasing overall emphasis on employment in those municipalities
with higher unemployment might come about through a composition change
so that the employment-ﬁrst candidates are more likely to run or to use a
voting aid application. Alternatively, it could be due to a policy position
shift among the politicians so that, for a ﬁxed set of the candidates, their
170 = “disagree strongly”, 1 = “disagree somewhat”, 2 = “don’t know” or empty, 3 =
“agree somewhat”, 4 = “agree strongly”.
18One standard deviation in the policy positions is 1.17.
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policy position does depend on the local unemployment rate.
In order to examine policy position shifts, I focus next on 7,844 candidates
who replied to the voting aid application both in 2008 and in 2012. In this
subgroup, I can study if a higher municipal unemployment rate changes the
policy positions by controlling even for the candidate eﬀects, which should
cancel out the stable personality disposition and the time-invariant political
skill19. Thus, I redo the estimation equation (1) for this subset, now con-
trolling for the candidate eﬀects, δim, instead of municipality-party eﬀects,
and regress the candidates’ policy positions on the municipal unemployment
rate, umt:
policy positionimpt = α + γumt + δim + βt + εimpt (2.2)
Now, a one-percentage-point unemployment rate increase makes the employment-
ﬁrst replies more popular by 0.07 standard deviations (column (2) in Table 2.4).
Thus, if anything, the eﬀect is stronger than when considering all the respon-
dents so the mere composition change does not explain the earlier result.
There is a real policy position shift in favor of a greater weight placed in
employment at the expense of environment.
The result is not driven by any single party as it is robust to consider-
ing separately conservative, leftist or Green candidates, though the eﬀect
is weaker and less precise for the Greens (columns (3)-(5) in Table 2.4).
The results are qualitatively similar and precise when considering alterna-
tive measures of the unemployment shock, such as the logarithm of the
unemployment rate, any new unemployment spells, layoﬀs or entries into
the unemployment pension (Table A.5)20. The results are also robust to
dropping out empty responses and “don’t know” responses.
Finally, in order to assess the quantitative importance of the position
change, I investigate if there are more respondents who agree strongly or
somewhat with the statement “We should compromise on environmental
protection if it increases employment.” when municipal unemployment rises.
Thus, I regress their relative share on the municipal unemployment rate:
number of employment-ﬁrst respondents
number of all respondents mt
= α+γumt+δm+βt+εmt (2.3)
19I merge the candidate data by matching names, ages, and municipalities across the
years because I do not have the candidates’ social security numbers. By deﬁnition,
I can match only the candidates who did not switch municipality in between the
elections so the candidate eﬀects are perfectly collinear with the municipality eﬀects
and I cannot control for both the candidate and municipality eﬀects separately.
20The share on the unemployment pension does not inﬂuence the policy positions.
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in which m refers to a municipality and t stands for an election year in this
municipality-level estimation equation. A one-percentage-point unemploy-
ment rate increase implies that the share of employment-ﬁrst candidates
increases 2.5% (column (1) in Table 2.5).
Looking more closely at the party aﬃliations, the share of employment-
ﬁrst candidates increases among the two large conservative parties, the Cen-
ter Party or the National Coalition as much as it does among all the candi-
dates, 2.4% (column (2) in Table 2.5). This result is interesting because the
Center Party is the most common dominant party in the municipal coun-
cils, even commanding an absolute majority in various municipalities. The
main result is driven by the conservative candidates as there is no statis-
tically signiﬁcant eﬀect on leftist or Green candidates (columns (3)-(4) in
Table 2.5).
2.5.2 Robustness checks
The previous results on how higher unemployment makes politicians less
prone to support environmental protection might be biased because of re-
verse causality or omitted variables. Reverse causality from a candidate’s
employment-ﬁrst policy position to the municipal unemployment rate is
highly improbable. This is because a municipality has a limited means of
inﬂuencing employment substantially with a more strict or lax environmen-
tal policy, even if the municipal council were to act in unison. Then, an
individual candidate has an even more limited means of bringing about large
employment changes.
As for the omitted variables, the most plausible case is an unemployment
shock or a fear of an unemployment shock experienced by a candidate21 if
it is positively correlated with the municipal unemployment rate increase.
The possible municipality-level omitted variables include industrial activi-
ties aﬀecting both environmental attitudes and employment or the public
sector responses that are correlated with environmental attitudes.
Finally, given that not all the candidates do reply to voting aid application
questions and that the replier shares are heterogenous across the munici-
palities, I study robustness of the previous results to weighting them with
the number of repliers from each municipality. I also regress the probability
of a policy position change on the change in the municipal unemployment
rate using a non-linear speciﬁcation.
21Cf. Geishecker and Siedler (2012) who ﬁnd that mere job loss fears are enough to in-
crease support for the far right. In the oﬃcial candidate lists, 0.2% of the candidates
announced that they were unemployed either in 2008 or 2012. There is no informa-
tion if being unemployed is underreported or if there were really so few unemployed
candidates.
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2.5.2.1 Personal unemployment shock
First, I study the robustness of the results to the own unemployment risk
of the politicians. After all, being a municipal councilor is not a job and is
not suﬃciently well-paid in order to compensate for the loss of a job.
I construct a pre-treatment variable based on the candidates’ announce-
ments on their occupation and/or degree in the oﬃcial candidate lists in
the 2008 elections. I divide the candidates into occupational categories and
allocate these categories as having a high or low unemployment risk accord-
ing to their probable exposure to business cycles. I deﬁne manufacturing,
engineering, construction, agriculture, forestry, and various private service
industries22 and being unemployed as risky occupational categories while
excluding those candidates who are municipal employees.
Then, I consider the interaction of the pre-treatment occupational status
and the municipal unemployment rate:
policy positionimpt = α + γumt + ζumt ∗ riskoccupationi,2008
+δim + βt + εimpt (2.4)
The variable riskoccupationi,2008 refers to the exposure of the pre-treatment
occupational status to economic ﬂuctuations. I ﬁnd that the results are
robust to including the occupational status (column (1) in Table A.6), which
suggests that the policy position change is not driven by the candidates’ own
unemployment risk.23
While the data on the occupation and/or degree is self-reported, it is
obligatory to announce. In addition, it is public because it is seen in any
voting booth and in the oﬃcial elections ads under the name of a candidate.
The most plausible concern is that a candidate chooses a degree or an
occupation that she believes to enhance her election prospects most.24
2.5.2.2 Polluting mass-employment activities
Some municipality-speciﬁc events could inﬂuence both employment and en-
vironmental attitudes over time. Potential events include polluting mass-
employment activities with time-varying employment, such as mines, plants,
22Transport, logistics, cleaning, janitors, guards, sales, media (through advertisement
income), hospitality industry, mail delivery, and beauty care.
23I also check the robustness to a wider deﬁnition that includes the occupations in the
narrower one as well as clerical work, self-employed, and teachers. The results do not
change if using the wider deﬁnition of the unemployment risk.
24For example, a candidate could announce her university degree if she is unemployed
or working in an occupation that could be considered as having a low status.
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and the construction site of the Olkiluoto nuclear plant.
Launches and expansions of mines or plants obviously increase employ-
ment while closures and contractions decrease it. However, I would need
more information on the preferences in order to determine if these events are
correlated with the change of the environmental preferences and in order to
ﬁnd out the sign of correlation. The comments of the candidates attached
to their 2012 policy positions provide no conclusive evidence to either di-
rection. There are candidates who argue that a mine or a plant has already
caused so much environmental damage that it should not be given any ad-
ditional leeway but also those who argue that environmental protection has
taken excessive proportions, harming employment and industry.
Local environmental problems caused by a mine or a plant should increase
the support for environmental protection but they probably do not inﬂuence
employment too much, except in extreme cases. During the term 2008-
2012, there were no so severe environmental incidents that they would have
increased unemployment.
However, the establishment of the Talvivaara mine in 2008 increased lo-
cal employment substantially while it also was frequently emitting sulfate
pollution, aﬀecting the Sotkamo municipality and two neighboring munici-
palities during 2010-2012 (Hellsten 2014). As a robustness check, I redo the
estimations excluding the candidates from the three aﬀected municipalities,
which does not change the earlier results (column (2) in Table A.6).
I also redo the estimations excluding the candidates from the Eurajoki
municipality, where a large nuclear power plant construction site is located,
and from the surrounding municipalities, 15 municipalities in total. The
purpose of this exercise is to guard against the spurious correlation between
the possible local employment changes and the potential changes in the local
nuclear power attitudes after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. The
results are robust to excluding the candidates from these 15 municipalities
(column (3) in Table A.6).
As for the public sector responses, the municipalities are generally ﬁscally
constrained, to the degree that they are providing only a minimal amount
of municipal services (Moisio et al. (2010)). Thus, they are unlikely to
have substantial ﬁnancial resources in order to subsidize failing ﬁrms. The
national government has a weak incentive to target some municipalities
with a business subsidy with the goal of a municipal elections victory for
a single government party. This is because, in any Finnish government,
there are 3-6 parties all across the ideological spectrum and very few swing
municipalities.
In addition, the Greens is the only party for which environmental protec-
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tion is a primary issue and the party is insigniﬁcant in most municipalities.
While it was in the government through 2008-2012, it governed as a ju-
nior partner together with other parties. In addition, its constituencies
are concentrated in a few, mainly urban municipalities while the polluting
mass-employment activities, such as mines and plants, are mainly located
outside the cities. Thus, it seems far-fetched that the public sector support
would be targeted in order to sway the political opinion with respect to the
environmental policies.
2.5.2.3 Weighting
Solon et al. (2013) note that the need for weighting depends on whether
the sampling probability is endogenous. As the proportion of the candidates
replying to the voting aid application questions is heterogenous across the
municipalities, the sampling probability corresponds in the present context
to the likelihood that there is a respondent from a municipality m with a
time-varying municipality-speciﬁc unemployment rate umt.
I ﬁnd that a change in the unemployment rate is not correlated with
the share of repliers once controlling for the municipality and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. Hence, it seems plausible that the sampling probability is exoge-
nous so weighting is not needed for consistency and may make estimates
more imprecise. Thus, I do not weight the regressions with the share of
the candidates replying to the voting aid application questions in the main
speciﬁcations. However, the robustness checks include also a weighted es-
timation, which does not diﬀer from the unweighted one (column (7) in
Table A.5).
2.5.2.4 Non-linear speciﬁcations
I estimate the following equation with ordered logit and ordered probit:
Pr(policy position changeimpt = j) = Pr(κj−1 <
γ(um,2012 − um,2008) + εimpt ≤ κj)(2.5
in which i represents a candidate, m stands for a municipality, p is a party,
and t refers to an election year. The possible policy position changes run
from -4 (from very employment-ﬁrst to very environmental) to +4 (from
very environmental to very employment-ﬁrst) while 0 indicates no change.
A caveat is that this approach treats similarly a change of one step in
the extremes and in the middle of the distribution. Then again, as shown
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in Figure 2.2, most candidates are located in the middle of the distribu-
tion. Usually, candidates adjust their policy positions at most with one
step (Figure 2.3).
The results are qualitatively similar to the OLS speciﬁcation (Figure 2.5
and Figure 2.6 show the results for ordered logit while the results do not
change when using ordered probit). When the municipal unemployment
rate increases, politicians are more likely to adjust their policy positions
towards the employment-ﬁrst direction and less likely not to change their
policy positions and less likely to change them towards the environmentally
friendly direction.
2.6 Channels
It seems now robust to conclude that, when municipal unemployment in-
creases, the candidates do change their mind and start to prioritize envi-
ronmental protection less, also when taking their personal unemployment
risk into account, and the result holds even for Greens. Do the candidates
genuinely think diﬀerently or are they competing for the votes? After all,
municipal politics is the main point of entry into national politics. Thus,
I study next if strategic behavior could explain this change of heart. An-
other channel which I consider is catering to the group interests. To be
more precise, I investigate if the candidates are more sensitive towards un-
employment of their gender or educational group.
2.6.1 Electoral incentives
First, I consider the electoral beneﬁts of changing the policy position by
studying if the popularity of the employment-ﬁrst respondents increases
with a higher municipal unemployment rate. Such candidates are the ones
who agree strongly or somewhat with the statement “We should compromise
on environmental protection if it increases employment.”
To be more precise, I regress the vote share of the employment-ﬁrst re-
spondents on the municipal unemployment rate.25 A one-percentage-point
increase in the unemployment rate raises the number of such candidates by
2.5% (Table 2.5) and their vote share by 3% (Table 2.6).
On the other hand, as the candidates are more prone to prioritize em-
ployment over environmental protection when unemployment rises, the vote
25The equivalent estimations with the individual vote shares are not shown because, in
the equilibrium, all the other candidates would have re-optimized, too. As a result,
it is not clear how to interpret the coeﬃcient of such an estimation since the ceteris
paribus assumption of the other candidates holding their views ﬁxed does not hold.
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share of the employment-ﬁrst candidates could increase mechanically, even
if voters do not reward them for their policy position change, simply be-
cause there are more employment-ﬁrst respondents. This is why I scale the
vote share with the share of such respondents26:
employment-ﬁrst respondents’ vote share
share of employment-ﬁrst respondents mt
= α+γumt+δm+βt+εmt (2.6)
In this municipality-level estimation equation, m stands for a municipality
while t represents an election year and the unemployment rate of the pre-
electoral 12-month period is umt. Once regressing the scaled vote share on
the municipal unemployment rate, the coeﬃcient is positive but there is no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the relative vote share when the municipal
unemployment rate increases (Table 2.7). A similar result holds when doing
an equivalent analysis to rightist or Green candidates separately while the
coeﬃcient is zero and statistically insigniﬁcant for leftist candidates.
To conclude, there is no strong evidence for a change in the relative
popularity of the employment-ﬁrst candidates in the municipalities with
higher unemployment as the estimates are so imprecise. Moreover, both
the political demand and supply have moved to a new equilibrium but at
least politicians are not punished for becoming less environmentally friendly.
2.6.2 Strategic behavior
An alternative way to investigate the role of the electoral incentives focuses
on political supply. I study if the candidates’ reactions at the local unem-
ployment rate diﬀer by the strength of their electoral incentives. As the
electorate decreases its support for environmental protection, both policy
and oﬃce-motivated politicians should decrease their support, too, but in
diﬀerent ways. Since policies are only a means to an end rather than the
end itself to oﬃce-motivated politicians, I expect them to target the most
popular policy position more precisely than the policy-motivated politicians.
As there is evidence for the electorate changing its mind about the impor-
tance of environment in the face of an economic downturn, policy-motivated
politicians who are essentially just draws from the general electorate can
be expected to change their mind, too. The key diﬀerence is, then, that
oﬃce-motivated politicians should be more precise in targeting their policy
26The employment-ﬁrst respondents’ vote share is their votes tally relative to the votes
tally of all the voting aid application respondents
(
employment-ﬁrst respondents’ votes
all respondents’ votes mt
)
.
Their share is deﬁned as their total number relative to the number of all the voting
aid application respondents
(
number of employment-ﬁrst respondents
number of all respondents mt
)
.
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position changes, which results in a testable prediction that the variance of
policy positions should be lower for oﬃce-motivated politicians.
I hypothesize that sure losers are all policy-motivated and care only about
the success of their party, not of their personal success, since, otherwise,
there is no reason why they should run in the ﬁrst place. In contrast,
marginal candidates may also be oﬃce-motivated because they have a pos-
itive probability of winning. I consider also the possibility that the sure
winners may act strategically in order to enhance their chances of being
elected to the most inﬂuential positions in the municipality, such as the
position of a municipal council chairman, or of attracting more votes in the
next parliamentary elections.
I proxy electoral strength by predicting the election probability based
on a pre-treatment variable: the popularity in the previous elections. In
the Finnish electoral system, the election probability depends on the total
votes garnered by the party as well as a candidate’s rank within the party,
which, in turn, is a function of the within-party votes. Hence, I ﬁrst esti-
mate the probability of being elected to the municipal council in 2008 or
in 2012, utilizing the candidate-speciﬁc electoral results of 2004 or 2008,
respectively. I use the candidate’s within-party popularity in the previous
elections
(
own votes
party’s votes ip,t−4
)
to estimate her election probability at t, taking
into account her party’s popularity in the municipality m at t27.
I predict the within-party rank in the following elections with the pre-
treatment variable
(
own votes
party’s votes ip,t−4
)
and estimate:
Pr (electedimpt = 1) = Φ
(
α
own votes
party’s votes i,t−4
+ μmp
+β ∗ own votesparty’s votes i,t−4
∗ μmp
)
(2.7)
in which i refers to a candidate, m is a municipality, t stands for an election
while p represents a party. Then, I predict candidate i’s election probabil-
ity at t, using the estimated parameters αˆ and βˆ, and proxy her electoral
strength with this predicted election probability. I do the prediction for
10293 candidates who ran in 2004, in 2008 and in 2012. The resulting
bimodal distribution has two mass points at zero and one (Figure 2.7).
Next, I deﬁne the candidates with a less than 10% probability of winning
as sure losers and those with a more than 90% winning probability as sure
winners while the remaining candidates are marginal. According to this
27I control for the municipality-party eﬀects because the popularity of each party tends
to be stable over time in the Finnish municipalities but the results do not change if
using the municipality-party-year eﬀects instead.
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deﬁnition, 97% of the sure winners were elected while 95% of the sure losers
were not elected. In contrast, 42% of the marginal candidates were elected.
The percentages are similar across the parties, with 96-99% of the sure
winners elected, 35-46% of the marginal candidates elected and 93-98% of
the sure losers not elected (Table A.7).
The predicted sure winners are elected more often, get more total votes
and get more within-party votes than the predicted marginal candidates.
The same goes for the marginal candidates relative to the predicted sure
losers (columns (1)-(3) in Table 2.8). I also check if the perceptions of
the candidates and their parties are consistent with my prediction of the
electoral strength. The campaigning behavior provides indirect evidence
that this is really the case: a larger winning probability is correlated with
more campaign expenditure and a higher likelihood of being funded by the
party28 (columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.9). On the other hand, sure winners
get more votes for a given expenditure category, which suggests that it is
rational for them spend money in campaign expenditure (column (3) in
Table 2.9).
As for how the policy positions are chosen, I assume that the policy
position of the electorate and of policy-motivated politicians is formed as
follows:
policy positionjmpt = α + γumt + βt + δj + λp + εjmpt (2.8)
in which j represents an individual, p represents a party (or an ideological
leaning in a case of an individual not aﬃliated with any single party), m
stands for a municipality, while t is time. The year eﬀects capture the
impact of the national business cycles, the individual eﬀects capture the
permanent idiosyncratic position, while γ represents the average eﬀect of
the municipal unemployment. Finally, εjmpt is an idiosyncratic time-variant
individual element.
In contrast, an oﬃce-motivated politician i aims for a policy position that
is, on average, the most popular one in her party in her region:
policy positionimt = α + γumt + βt + αr + λp + εimpt (2.9)
28Given that every candidate’s election probability depends also on the total votes of
the party, campaign expenditure by strong candidates creates a positive externality
for the other candidates in the same list and increases the total number of seats won
by a party. As a result, it is rational for a party to support its strong candidates
ﬁnancially.
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given the municipal unemployment rate umt and the business cycle eﬀect βt.
The individual component, δj, is replaced with a regional eﬀect describing
the permanent attitudes typical in that region, αr.29 While εimpt is again
an idiosyncratic time-variant individual element, I assume that it is likely
to be smaller for a strategic politician than for an average citizen j.
I would like to have municipality-level panel data on how the electorate
views the tradeoﬀ between environment and employment in order to esti-
mate γ but now I approximate it by estimating (9) for the sub-sample of
the candidates who do not belong to the panel. In this subset, γˆ is 0.017.
Next, I use the estimated γˆ together with region, party and year eﬀects to
predict the reaction for each municipality and party:
ˆreactionmpt = αˆ + γˆumt + βˆt + αˆr + λˆp (2.10)
I deduct the reaction from candidates’ policy positions and, assuming a
symmetric loss function around it, regress the squared residuals on dummy
variables describing the strength of the electoral incentives. If marginal
candidates or sure winners behave strategically, δ and ζ, respectively, should
be negative, implying a smaller variance.
(policy positionimpt − ˆreactionmpt)2 = α + δ ∗ marginal candidateimpt
+ζ*sure winnerimpt
+δim + βt + εimpt (2.11)
The coeﬃcient for the interaction term of the marginal candidates and the
municipal unemployment rate, δ, is zero, which implies that the marginal
candidates do not react diﬀerently at the change of the unemployment rate
from the others (Table 2.10). The equivalent interaction term for the sure
winners, ζ, is also zero so neither do they react diﬀerently. When considering
rightist, leftist and Green candidates separately, the interaction terms are
still insigniﬁcant.
For the previous results, I divided the candidates into three categories by
using 10% and 90% as the cut-oﬀ values for the electoral strength but the
results are robust to the cut-oﬀ values of 5% and 95% as well as of 20% and
80%, respectively. Neither do the results change when using the continuous
variable describing the electoral strength or when predicting the electoral
strength with logit instead of probit. Finally, the results stay similar when
29Ideally, I would control for the municipality eﬀects instead of the regional eﬀects but
because there are eight large or smaller parties in Finland I lack power to do that.
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using the absolute value of the residuals instead of the squared residuals
(Table A.8).
Candidates with stronger electoral incentives do not behave diﬀerently
in terms of targeting the popular opinion30. This result is consistent with
them genuinely changing their mind with respect to the importance of en-
vironmental protection when municipal unemployment rises.
2.6.3 Group interests
Finally, I study if the candidates respond more strongly to unemployment of
people with the same gender or the same level of educational achievement.
The literature on gender has documented that politicians may be more
sensitive to the needs of their own gender (see e.g. Chattopadhyay and
Duﬂo (2004)). A similar process might hold with respect to other group
aﬃliations, such as educational achievement (for some evidence on the policy
impact of the group aﬃliations see Pande (2003)). In this literature, the
preferences are imputed from a group aﬃliation and are assumed to be same
for all the group members.
The subgroup unemployment categories I consider are men, women as well
as people with and without a university degree. Now I regress the policy
positions on the municipality-speciﬁc unemployment rate of the relevant
subgroups for a subset of the candidates (for example, regressing the policy
positions of female candidates on the share of the unemployed men relative
to the male labor force and on the share of the unemployed women relative
to the female labor force):
policy positionigmpt = α + γ1ugmt + γ2u−g,mt + δim + βt + εimpt (2.12)
whereby g stands for a gender aﬃliation or an education achievement group,
m is a municipality, t represents an election year, and i is a candidate, while
ugmt is the annual unemployment rate of the own group and u−g,mt is that
of the opposite group.
The responses to the municipal unemployment rates of each subgroup
are clearly weaker than the responses towards the general unemployment
rate in the municipality, probably due to the fact that the latter rate is
more salient. Both male and female candidates react more strongly at
the female unemployment rates (columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.11). For
the male candidates, the Wald test on the diﬀerences between γ1 and γ2
30As Table 2.10 shows, variances do not diﬀer but neither do the means diﬀer by the
electoral strength (Table A.9).
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is signiﬁcant at the 10% level while it is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for
the female candidates. In unreported regressions, I redo the estimations
and the Wald tests for the logarithms of the gender-speciﬁc unemployment
rates. Now, the coeﬃcients no longer diﬀer in a statistically signiﬁcant way,
even though both men and women still react more strongly at the female
unemployment.
Irrespective of the level of educational achievement, candidates react only
at the unemployment rate of non-university graduates (columns (3) and (4)
in Table 2.11). According to the Wald test, γ1 and γ2 diﬀer at the 1%
signiﬁcance level for the non-university graduates while they diﬀer at the
5% signiﬁcance level for the university graduates. Moreover, the results do
not change when redoing (12) with the logarithms of the unemployment
rates of each educational group.
Given that unemployment of non-university graduates increased more and
from a higher level than that of university graduates, it is maybe natural
that all the candidates react only at the ﬁrst one. However, a similar logic
does not seem to hold for the gender-speciﬁc unemployment rates since
male unemployment increases markedly, too31. The evidence for catering to
group interests is mixed as it only holds for non-university graduates and,
to some degree, women.
2.7 Conclusions
An increase in the municipal unemployment rate makes the candidates run-
ning for the municipal council more willing to prioritize employment over
environmental protection. While there is some heterogeneity across political
aﬃliations, there is an overall tendency to increasingly prioritize employ-
ment. The results hold also for alternative measures of unemployment and
for controlling for the candidate’s own approximated unemployment risk.
With higher municipal unemployment, the vote share of the employment-
ﬁrst candidates increases but so does their share out of all the respondents.
When scaling the vote share of such candidates with their number, the point
estimates suggest that the relative popularity increases of the conservative
candidates. However, the estimates are imprecise, so this evidence for the
existence of the electoral incentives is only tentative.
31The median municipal unemployment rate for the university graduates increased from
3.8% to 4.5% between 2008 and 2012 while the median municipal unemployment rate
of the people without a university degree increased from 11.1% to 12.4%. The median
male municipal unemployment rate increased from 11% to 12.7% between 2008 and
2012 while the median female municipal unemployment rate increased very little,
from 9.2% to 9.4%
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The candidates that I hypothesize to have the strongest electoral incen-
tives to target the voters’ preferences as precisely as possible do not behave
diﬀerently from the others. Thus, the results are consistent with the candi-
dates being policy-motivated, which would be in line with the low monetary
returns to municipal politics, despite its role as an entry point to national
and EU politics. The evidence on whether the candidates are catering to
their group interests is inconclusive as this seems to be the case only for the
candidates without a university degree.
As the voting aid application respondents seem to be more successful and
skilled politicians than the non-respondents, the results may well overstate
the impact of unemployment on the overall policy positions of all the can-
didates. Nevertheless, to the extent that the respondents are more skilled
politicians, they may well have a disproportionate impact on the policy out-
comes, which is why the results are still interesting despite possibly weak
external validity.
As the municipalities have limited powers to decide upon environmental
policies, the direct economic implications of a decreasing weight placed on
environmental protection are probably small. However, the results provide
some evidence consistent with a re-optimization process in the face of an
economic downturn in the same vein as in Kahn and Kotchen (2010). More-
over, this change of heart at the municipal level could provide a signal to the
national level as parties’ grassroots activists are often active in municipal
politics.
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of environmental attitudes
Note: A higher number indicates a lower willingness to agree with the
statement “I am willing to compromise on the standard of living in order
to alleviate pollution and environmental problems.”
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of the environment vs. jobs replies
Figure 2.3: Change in the environment vs. jobs replies
Note: A larger number means increased willingness to priori-
tize employment.
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of municipal unemployment rates
68
Figure 2.5: Predicted probabilities using ordered logit
Note: In total, 1177 candidates become one step more employment-ﬁrst, 723 candi-
dates become two steps more employment-ﬁrst, 221 candidates become three steps
more employment-ﬁrst, and 33 candidates become four steps more employment-ﬁrst.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
Note: In total, 888 candidates become one step more environmentally friendly, 540
candidates become two steps more environmentally friendly, 171 candidates become
three steps more environmentally friendly, and 33 candidates become four steps more
environmentally friendly. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
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Figure 2.6: Predicted probabilities of no change using ordered logit
Note: 4058 candidates do not change their positions. Standard errors clustered at the municipality
level.
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Figure 2.7: Predicted probability of being elected
Note: The red lines mark the cut-oﬀ values for the sure losers (less than a 10% winning probability)
and for the sure winners (higher than a 90% probability of being elected).
71
Table 2.1: Environmental attitudes, being unemployed and other socio-
economic variables
Dependent variable Standard of life more important than environment
Being 0.061** 0.050**
unemployed (0.024) (0.024)
Female -0.268***
(0.011)
University -0.140***
graduate (0.013)
Young -0.015
(0.014)
Old 0.042***
(0.014)
Observations 22,034 22,034
R-squared 0.024 0.058
Note: The data source is the Eva surveys for the citizens. The dependent variable is the
survey participant response to the statement “I am willing to compromise on standard
of living in order to alleviate pollution and environmental problems.” A larger number
indicates stronger agreement. The survey data does not include the exact age but an
age category, based on which I construct the age dummies. At most 30 years old are
classiﬁed as young until 2006 after which at most 25 years old are classiﬁed as young.
The equivalent age limits for being old are at least 61 years old and at least 56 years old,
respectively. Both speciﬁcations control for the province and the year eﬀects. Robust
standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.2: Average willingness to prioritize employment over environment
by party
2008 2012
Center 1.43 1.44
(1.19) (1.14)
SDP 1.13 1.19
(1.11) (1.12)
Nat.Coal. 1.32 1.46
(1.17) (1.18)
Greens 0.32 0.35
(0.63) (0.65)
Note: A larger number means
increased willingness to prior-
itize employment. The three
main parties are the National
Coalition, the Centre Party,
both conservative, as well as
the leftist SDP.
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics for the municipal unemployment rate
2008 2012
Mean 8.4% 9.7%
(3.4) (3.2)
25th percentile 5.9% 7.5%
Median 8.1% 9.5%
75th percentile 10.5% 11.8%
Note: The unemployment rate is
calculated as an average of the
monthly municipal unemployment
rates during 12 months before the
election.
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Table 2.5: Unemployment rate and share of employment-ﬁrst candidates
in the municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Employment-ﬁrst respondents among:
Sample any party rightists leftists Greens
Unemployment 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.017 -0.020
rate (0.006) (0.008) (0.025) (0.037)
Observations 597 576 446 48
R-squared 0.761 0.755 0.804 0.999
Median of dep.var. 0.25 0.29 0.21 0.09
Note: An employment-ﬁrst respondent agrees strongly or somewhat with
the statement “We should compromise on environmental protection if
it increases employment.” Their share is deﬁned as their total num-
ber relative to the number of all the voting aid application respondents(
number of employment-ﬁrst respondents
number of all respondents mt
)
. All the speciﬁcations control for the
municipality and election year eﬀects. An observation is an election year -
municipality pair. The number of observations in columns (2)-(4) is smaller
than in (1) because not all the municipalities have rightist, leftist or Green
employment-ﬁrst voting aid respondents. Standard errors clustered at the
municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Unemployment rate and total vote share of the employment-
ﬁrst candidates in the municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Employment-ﬁrst candidates’ vote share among:
Sample any party rightists leftists Greens
Unemployment 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.022 -0.002
rate (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.037)
Observations 597 576 446 48
R-squared 0.746 0.727 0.816 0.999
Median of dep.var. 0.25 0.28 0.17 0.04
Note: An employment-ﬁrst respondent agrees strongly or somewhat with
the statement “We should compromise on environmental protection if it in-
creases employment.” Employment-ﬁrst respondents’ vote share is their total
votes relative to all to the total votes of voting aid application respondents(
employment-ﬁrst respondents’ votes
all respondents’ votes mt
)
. All the speciﬁcations include municipality and
election year eﬀects. An observation is an election year - municipality pair. The
number of observations in columns (2)-(4) is smaller than in (1) because not all the
municipalities have rightist, leftist or Green employment-ﬁrst voting aid respondents.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Unemployment rate and total vote share of the employment-
ﬁrst candidates scaled with their number
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Employment-ﬁrst candidates’ vote share
relative to their share of candidates
Sample any party rightists leftists Greens
Unemployment 0.023 0.043 -0.006 0.318
rate (0.019) (0.027) (0.055) (0.544)
Observations 597 576 446 48
R-squared 0.605 0.579 0.669 0.964
Median of dep.var. 0.97 0.97 0.81 0.49
Note: An employment-ﬁrst voting respondent agrees strongly or somewhat
with the statement “We should compromise on environmental protection
if it increases employment.” Their share is deﬁned as their total num-
ber relative to the number of all the voting aid application respondents(
number of employment-ﬁrst respondents
number of all respondents mt
)
. The employment-ﬁrst respondents’
vote share is their total votes relative to all to the total votes of voting
aid application respondents
(
employment-ﬁrst respondents’ votes
all respondents’ votes mt
)
. The de-
pendent variable is the relative vote share divided by the relative candidate
share
(
employment-ﬁrst respondents’ vote share
share of employment-ﬁrst respondents mt
)
. All the speciﬁcations include
municipality and election year eﬀects. An observation is an election year -
municipality pair. The number of observations in columns (2)-(4) is smaller
than in (1) because not all the municipalities have rightist, leftist or Green
employment-ﬁrst voting aid respondents. Standard errors clustered at the
municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Predicted electoral strength and actual electoral outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var. Prob. of being elected Vote share(%) Within-party vote share(%)
Marginal 0.370*** 0.542*** 3.683***
(0.004) (0.024) (0.118)
Sure winner 0.925*** 2.028*** 10.730***
(0.006) (0.050) (0.205)
Observations 33,827 33,827 33,827
R-squared 0.424 0.611 0.603
Mean of dep.var. 0.27 0.84% 5.7%
(0.44) (1.14) (11.27)
Note: All the speciﬁcations control for the municipality-party and election year eﬀects. Standard
errors clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: Predicted electoral strength and actual campaigning
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var. Campaign exp. Party funding Votes relative to exp.
Marginal 0.403*** 0.047*** 0.371***
(0.078) (0.012) (0.036)
Sure winner 0.727*** 0.056*** 1.392***
(0.111) (0.015) (0.078)
Observations 16,196 17,716 16,196
R-squared 0.377 0.201 0.653
Mean of dep.var. 1.30 0.29 0.79
(0.81) (0.45) (1.11)
Note: Campaign expenditure is divided into ten categories (0-500€, 501-1000€, 1001-
2000€, 2001-3000€, 3001-5000€, 5001-7000€, 7001-10000€, 10001-15000€, 15001-20000€
and over 20000€). “Votes relative to expenditure” refers to the total vote share divided
by the expenditure category. Party funding equals one if the party was named as the
main external source of funding. All the speciﬁcations control for the municipality-party
and election year eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
78
Ta
bl
e
2.
10
:U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
,c
an
di
da
te
s’
po
lic
y
po
sit
io
ns
,a
nd
el
ec
to
ra
ls
tr
en
gt
h
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
bl
e
Sq
ua
re
d
de
vi
at
io
n
fro
m
th
e
ge
ne
ra
lp
os
iti
on
m
pt
Sa
m
pl
e
re
st
ric
tio
ns
Pa
ne
lis
ts
Pa
ne
lis
ts
,r
ig
ht
Pa
ne
lis
ts
,l
ef
t
Pa
ne
lis
ts
,G
re
en
s
M
ar
gi
na
lc
an
di
da
te
0.
06
7
0.
13
4
0.
07
4
-0
.5
33
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.3
91
)
Su
re
w
in
ne
r
0.
13
3
0.
24
9*
0.
05
0
-0
.1
48
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.1
64
)
(0
.4
69
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
7,
52
2
3,
94
6
2,
49
2
44
8
N
um
be
r
of
ca
nd
id
at
es
3,
76
1
1,
97
3
1,
24
6
22
4
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
02
2
N
ot
e:
M
ar
gi
na
lc
an
di
da
te
s’
pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
w
in
ni
ng
is
10
-9
0%
an
d
su
re
w
in
ne
rs
’p
re
di
ct
ed
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
w
in
ni
ng
ex
ce
ed
s9
0%
.A
ll
th
e
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
tio
ns
co
nt
ro
lf
or
th
e
ca
nd
id
at
e
an
d
el
ec
tio
n
ye
ar
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
le
ve
l.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
79
Table
2.11:U
nem
ploym
ent
ofthe
ow
n
and
opposite
groups
and
panelists’policy
positions,
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
D
ependent
variable
Em
ploym
ent-ﬁrst
Sam
ple
restrictions
M
en
W
om
en
U
niversity
N
on-university
graduates
graduates
U
nem
ploym
ent
rate,
0.009
0.014
m
en
(0.010)
(0.012)
U
nem
ploym
ent
rate,
0.044***
0.055***
wom
en
(0.013)
(0.014)
U
nem
ploym
ent
rate,
-0.002
-0.004
university
graduates
(0.014)
(0.011)
U
nem
ploym
ent
rate,
0.050***
0.053***
non-university
graduates
(0.014)
(0.011)
O
bservations
9,500
6,188
6,224
8,762
N
um
ber
ofcandidates
4,750
3,094
3,112
4,381
R
-squared
0.011
0.020
0.015
0.012
N
ote:
T
he
dependent
variable
is
the
candidate
response
to
the
statem
ent
“W
e
should
com
-
prom
ise
on
environm
entalprotection
ifitincreasesem
ploym
ent.”.A
largernum
berindicates
a
stronger
agreem
ent.
A
ll
the
speciﬁcations
control
for
the
candidate
and
election
year
eﬀects.
Standard
errorsclustered
atthe
m
unicipality
level.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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3 Appendix
Table A.1: Willingness of the candidates to prioritize employment over
environmental protection
Dep. var. Employment-ﬁrst
Female -0.300***
(0.013)
Age 0.002***
(0.001)
High-income -0.094***
(0.015)
Low-income 0.058***
(0.018)
Greens -0.871***
(0.031)
Soc.Democrats -0.169***
(0.025)
Nat. 0.083***
Coalition (0.025)
Swedish -0.185***
People’s Party (0.041)
Christ. -0.166***
Democrats (0.036)
Left -0.450***
Alliance (0.029)
Finns 0.303***
Party (0.040)
Observations 40,794
R-squared 0.131
Note: I classify a candidate as having “high income” if he has a managerial
position or is a senior white-collar worker. “Middle-income” is the omitted cate-
gory and refers to being a junior white-collar worker, a blue-collar worker or an
entrepreneur. Candidates with “low income” are retired, home-makers, farmers,
students or unemployed. The conservative Center Party is the omitted party
category. The Social Democrats are leftist, the National Coalition is conser-
vative, the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party are liberal, the Christian
Democrats are conservative, the Left Alliance is far left, and the Finns Party is
populist. Income groups are based on the self-reported occupational category.
The speciﬁcation controls for the municipality and year eﬀects. Standard errors
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics on the candidates, socio-economic
variables
2008 repliers 2008 non-repliers 2012 repliers 2012 non-repliers
Female 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.36
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Age 45.33 50.32 46.38 51.65
(12.79) (13.25) (13.27) (13.75)
High-income 0.24 0.19
(0.42) (0.39)
Middle-income 0.46 0.45
(0.50) (0.50)
Low-income 0.21 0.21
(0.41) (0.41)
Municipality employees 0.25 0.19
(0.43) (0.39)
University degree NA 0.38
(0.49)
Observations 20060 18241 20734 16346
Note: The data on the gender and the age comes from the electoral statistics. The data
on the occupational status and the university education (only for 2012) is self-reported
in the voting aid applications. Income groups are based on the self-reported occupation
category. I classify a candidate as having high income if he has a managerial position
or is a senior white-collar worker. Middle-income refers to being a junior white-collar
worker, a blue-collar worker or an entrepreneur. Candidates with low income are retired,
home-makers, farmers, students or unemployed.
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics on the candidates, political variables
2008 repliers 2008 non-repliers 2012 repliers 2012 non-repliers
Vote share 0.92% 0.79% 0.85% 0.77%
(1.20) (1.08) (1.15) (1.10)
Within-party 5.98% 5.24% 6.18% 5.17%
vote share (11.48) (10.92) (11.69) (10.52)
Share elected councilor 0.33 0.21 0.31 0.20
(0.47) (0.41) (0.46) (0.40)
Share elected deputy 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26
(0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
Share incumbent 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.17
councilor (0.43) (0.39) (0.41) (0.38)
Share Member of Parliament at 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001
the time of the munic. elections (0.083) (0.030) (0.081) (0.038)
Share has been councilor or 0.36 0.50
deputy earlier (0.48) (0.50)
Campaign expenditure 1.31 1.30
category (0.81) (0.81)
Share party main source of 0.35 0.23
external funding (0.48) (0.42)
Share trade union main source 0.03 0.05
of external funding (0.16) (0.21)
Share ﬁrms or industry main 0.02 0.02
source of external funding (0.15) (0.12)
Observations 20060 18241 20734 16346
Note: The data on the campaign expenditure and the funding sources is self-reported
by the voting aid repliers and the remaining data comes from the electoral statistics.
“Vote share” equals the votes of a candidate divided by the vote tally of all the
candidates in the municipality. “Within-party vote share” stands for the votes of
a candidate divided by the vote tally of all the candidates of the same party in
the municipality. “Elected” became a municipal councilor while “deputy” became a
deputy councilor. Campaign expenditure categories are as follows: 1 = 0-500€, 2 =
501-1000€, 3 = 1001-2000€, 4 = 2001-3000€, 5 = 3001-5000€, 6 = 5001-7000€, 7 =
7001-10000€, 8 = 10001-15000€, 9 = 15001-20000€, and 10 = over 20000€.
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics on the party aﬃliations of the candidates
2008 repliers 2008 non-repliers 2012 repliers 2012 non-repliers
Center Party 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.24
(0.44) (0.44) (0.41) (0.43)
National Coalition 0.23 0.16 0.22 0.14
(0.42) (0.36) (0.41) (0.35)
Social Democrats 0.18 0.23 0.17 0.21
(0.38) (0.42) (0.37) (0.41)
Greens 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03
(0.27) (0.17) (0.28) (0.17)
Finns Party 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.14
(0.17) (0.25) (0.30) (0.35)
Swedish People’s Party 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Christian Democrats 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Left Alliance 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.11
(0.29) (0.33) (0.28) (0.31)
Not a party member 0.23 0.16
(0.42) (0.37)
Observations 20118 18241 20734 16346
Note: The dummy for the party membership is self-reported while the other variables
come from the electoral statistics. The Center Party is conservative, the Social Democrats
are leftist, the National Coalition is conservative, the Greens and the Swedish People’s
Party are liberal, the Christian Democrats are conservative, the Left Alliance is far left,
and the Finns Party is populist. A candidate may run in a party’s list even without
being a member of that party.
84
Ta
bl
e
A
.5
:R
ob
us
tn
es
s
of
m
ai
n
re
su
lt
to
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
m
ea
su
re
s
of
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
M
ed
ia
n
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
bl
e
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t-
ﬁr
st
Sa
m
pl
e
Pa
ne
lis
ts
Pa
ne
lis
ts
Pa
ne
lis
ts
Pa
ne
lis
ts
Pa
ne
lis
ts
Pa
ne
lis
ts
Pa
ne
lis
ts
Lo
g
of
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
81
1*
**
ra
te
(0
.1
14
)
N
ew
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
06
9*
**
5.
5%
sp
el
ls
(0
.0
16
)
La
yo
ﬀ
sh
ar
e,
al
l
5.
37
9*
*
2.
6%
av
ai
la
bl
e
ye
ar
s
(2
.2
50
)
La
yo
ﬀ
sh
ar
e,
tw
o
ye
ar
s
6.
52
8*
**
2.
1%
be
fo
re
th
e
el
ec
tio
ns
(2
.4
04
)
En
tr
y
in
to
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
25
1*
*
0.
09
%
re
tir
em
en
t
(0
.0
97
)
Sh
ar
e
on
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
06
8
0.
8%
re
tir
em
en
t
(0
.0
44
)
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
,
0.
08
6*
**
8.
9%
we
ig
ht
ed
(0
.0
13
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
15
,6
88
15
,6
88
15
,6
88
15
,6
88
15
,6
88
15
,6
88
15
,6
88
N
um
be
r
of
ca
nd
id
at
es
7,
84
4
7,
84
4
7,
84
4
7,
84
4
7,
84
4
7,
84
4
7,
84
4
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
01
6
0.
01
1
0.
00
9
0.
00
9
0.
00
8
0.
00
8
0.
01
3
N
ot
e:
T
he
ne
w
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
sp
el
ls,
th
e
la
id
oﬀ
em
pl
oy
ee
s
in
20
06
-2
00
8
an
d
20
09
-2
01
2,
an
d
th
e
em
pl
oy
ee
s
la
id
oﬀ
w
ith
in
tw
o
ye
ar
s
be
fo
re
th
e
el
ec
tio
ns
ar
e
pr
op
or
tio
na
lt
o
th
e
m
un
ic
ip
al
la
bo
r
fo
rc
e.
T
he
la
yo
ﬀ
da
ta
st
ar
ts
fro
m
20
06
.
T
he
en
tr
ie
s
in
to
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
pe
ns
io
n
an
d
th
e
sh
ar
e
on
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
pe
ns
io
n
ar
e
pr
op
or
tio
na
lt
o
th
e
m
un
ic
ip
al
po
pu
la
tio
n.
A
ll
th
e
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
tio
ns
co
nt
ro
lf
or
th
e
ca
nd
id
at
e
an
d
el
ec
tio
n
ye
ar
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
T
he
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
tio
n
(7
)
is
we
ig
ht
ed
w
ith
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
vo
tin
g
ai
d
re
pl
ie
rs
in
th
e
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
le
ve
l.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
85
Table A.6: Robustness of main result to alternative speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Employment-ﬁrst
Sample restrictions Panelists Panelists Panelists
Unemployment 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.088***
rate (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Unemployment rate* -0.003
risk occupation2008 (0.008)
No municipalities located No municipalities located around
around the Talvivaara mine the nuclear plant construction site
Observations 15,688 15,572 14,740
Number of candidates 7,844 7,786 7,370
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.015
Note: “Risk occupation” is based on the electoral announcement about the candidate’s
occupation and/or degree in 2008 and is described in detail in 2.5.2.1 Personal unem-
ployment shock. (2) excludes three municipalities, one of which is a town. (3) excludes
15 municipalities, two of which are towns. All the speciﬁcations control for the candidate
and election year eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table
A
.8:U
nem
ploym
ent
rate,candidates’environm
entalpositions,and
electoralstrength,robustness
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
D
ep.
var.
Squared
deviation
from
the
generalposition
m
pt
A
bsolute
deviation
m
pt
Panelists
Panelists
Panelists
Panelists
Panelists
Panelists
M
arginalcandidate
0.010
-0.027
0.067
0.044
(0.100)
(0.066)
(0.084)
(0.037)
Sure
w
inner
0.049
-0.013
0.133
0.058
(0.124)
(0.082)
(0.100)
(0.044)
Strength
0.009
-0.026
(0.091)
(0.348)
Strength2
0.033
(0.308)
5-95%
cut-oﬀ
20-80%
cut-oﬀ
logit
cont.
var.
cont.
var.
10-90%
cut-oﬀ
O
bservations
7,523
7,523
7,523
7,523
7,523
7,523
N
um
ber
ofcandidates
3,762
3,762
3,762
3,762
3,762
3,762
R
-squared
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
N
ote:
In
the
speciﬁcation
(1),m
arginalcandidates’predicted
probability
ofw
inning
is
5-95%
and
sure
w
inners’predicted
probability
ofw
inning
exceeds
95%
.
In
the
speciﬁcation
(2),m
arginalcandidates’predicted
probability
ofw
inning
is20-80%
and
sure
w
inners’predicted
probability
ofw
inning
exceeds80%
.T
he
speciﬁcation
(3)
uses
logit
predictions
instead
ofprobit
predictions,w
ith
m
arginalcandidates’predicted
probability
ofw
inning
being
10-90%
and
sure
w
inners’predicted
probability
ofw
inning
exceeding
90%
.
T
he
speciﬁcations
(4)
and
(5)
use
the
continuous
variable
for
the
predicted
electoralstrength,
ˆ
E
lected
ip
,t .
A
llthe
speciﬁcations
control
for
the
candidate
and
election
year
eﬀects.
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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4 Does Political Experience
Inﬂuence Policy Positions?
Riikka Savolainen, Aalto University School of Business1
Abstract:
I investigate whether there is an incumbency eﬀect with respect to policy
positions regarding degree of the redistribution or the public sector size
in an RDD set-up. I also study if tenure makes politicians choose more
moderate policy positions or approach national party position averages,
general regional position averages or regional party position averages. I
do not ﬁnd an impact and can rule out an eﬀect larger than 20% of the
standard deviation for all the outcomes. The results suggest that being in
oﬃce does not change politicians’ policy positions.
JEL Codes: D72, H11, H23, H70, J14
Key words: candidate positioning, information, incumbency eﬀect
email: riikka.savolainen@aalto.ﬁ
4.1 Introduction
This paper examines whether politicians change their positions as they gain
experience. The research question is motivated by anecdotal evidence on
the politicians changing their initial policy positions after facing economic
or political realities. Examples include President Mitterrand’s U-turn from
expansive ﬁscal policy towards austerity (Malinvaud (1993)) and President
Obama distancing himself from the centrist positions after the debt-ceiling
1I would like to thank Manuel Bagues, Hannes Malmberg, Jaakko Meriläinen, Esa
Palosaari, Matti Sarvimäki, Janne Tukiainen, Juuso Välimäki, and the participants
at UCFS Workshop in Public Economics and Finnish Economic Association Annual
Meeting for the comments. Financial support from HSE Foundation and Yrjö Jahns-
son Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. All the remaining errors are mine.
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crisis (Cassidy (2013)). In the Finnish context, Savolainen (2015) docu-
ments that an increase in the municipal unemployment rate makes coun-
cilors across the political spectrum more prone to prioritize employment
over environmental protection. The previous literature assumes that politi-
cians’ types and positions are ﬁxed as long as they are re-electable (for a
survey see Besley (2005)). In contrast, this paper allows for the possibility
that their positions may change as they gain experience.
I investigate if political experience inﬂuences politicians’ policy positions
in the following elections. To be more precise, I study if there is an in-
cumbency eﬀect on pre-electoral policy positions in the Finnish municipal
elections in 2008 and in 2012 caused by a tenure as a municipal councilor
or as a municipal council deputy in the preceding term. For example, Ru-
ostetsaari and Holttinen (2001) ﬁnd in an exploratory survey that there are
diﬀerences between the novice councilors and the experienced ones. The
novice councilors in their data state that the lack of information compli-
cates taking a stand more often than the experienced councilors do.2 While
being elected as a municipal councilor probably does not make much of a
diﬀerence from the voter perspective except for leading politicians, I hy-
pothesize that it could make a diﬀerence for a candidate herself in terms of
gaining experience. Even a rank-and-ﬁle municipal politician is exposed to
the realities of the municipal governance to a whole diﬀerent degree than
an ordinary municipal resident.
The policy outcome variables are two summary indices describing redis-
tribution and public sector size policy positions3. I hypothesize that having
to face ﬁscal constraints at ﬁrst hand makes politicians more likely to sup-
port austerity policies. I also consider if experience makes them choose more
moderate policy positions4 or if it makes them more or less similar to other
politicians in their party or in their region.
Comparing the close winners and the close losers of the previous elections,
I fail to ﬁnd an eﬀect on their policy positions in the next elections and
can rule out an eﬀect larger than 20% of the standard deviation. When
2For some evidence on how having an experienced ﬁnance minister is associated with
lower public debt, see Moessinger (2014).
3The policy position data that I use comes from the voting aid applications of the
Finnish public broadcasting company. The purpose of a voting aid application is to
provide voters with information on the policy positions of the candidates.
4In the 2015 parliamentary election, the public broadcasting company, Yle,
compared the policy positions of voters and politicians based on a ran-
dom sample of 70,000 voting aid application visits out of 1.8 million visits.
According to this comparison, parliamentary candidates had more moder-
ate positions than voters especially in terms of more controversial questions
such as immigration, foreign policy and the ease of access to social welfare.
(http://yle.ﬁ/uutiset/suurten_massojen_tavoittelu_saa_ehdokkaat_vastaamaan_tylsasti_
vaalikoneessa/7936326).
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considering the eﬀects by political experience, councilors without earlier
political experience support a smaller public sector size in 2012 but there is
no equivalent eﬀect in 2008. There is some evidence that deputies without
earlier political experience become more aligned with average positions.
In addition to a general eﬀect, I consider municipality-level heterogenous
eﬀects with respect to the evolution of the municipality size and the mu-
nicipality ﬁnances 5. The informational treatment might be stronger in a
larger municipality since the ordinary residents can be assumed to be more
knowledgeable about the state of the municipality, smaller the municipality.
The treatment could also be weaker if the media coverage on the municipal
aﬀairs is more extensive in a larger municipality.
I hypothesize that the informational treatment is strengthened by a faster
change of the municipal ﬁnances. Because the majority of the municipal
tax revenue comes from income taxes, employment is essential for the ﬁscal
balance of a municipality. In 2008-2012, a faster change of the municipal
ﬁnances meant in practice a larger increase in the municipal unemployment
rate. Such conditions should make the municipal politics insiders relatively
more aware of increasingly binding ﬁscal constraints compared to the out-
siders. In contrast, the unemployment rates decreased or did not change
in 2004-2008 so I do this estimation only for 2012 and ﬁnd that councilors
in the municipalities with an increasing unemployment rate become more
aligned with regional as well as party average positions.
I contribute to the literature on whether the experiences may change po-
litical opinions by considering the impact of a very common-place political
experience of tenure. Washington (2008) has studied the impact of chil-
dren’s gender on politicians’ views while other studies have focused on how
voters have been inﬂuenced by randomized informational treatments (see,
for example, Cruces et al. (2013), Kuziemko et al. (2013), and Karadja et
al. (2014)).
The paper also speaks to the literature that studies the impact of in-
cumbency on various outcomes in a RDD set-up. Usually, the estimated
outcomes consist of election probabilities, vote shares, and future income
streams6. As far as I am aware, I am the ﬁrst to study if there is any impact
5Support for redistribution tends to be higher if the benefactors are similar ethnically
(Alesina and Giuliano (2011)). However, Finland is ethnically a very homogenous
country, with the few immigrants concentrated on a couple of municipalities so I do
not consider this channel.
6An incumbency eﬀect is often deﬁned as an advantage that an incumbent party or an
elected candidate will have in the following election in terms of votes. It is thought
to result from an increased access to resources, more funding, higher media visibility,
increased voter familiarity and/or increased expertise. Using data from the elections
in 2000, 2004, and 2008, Kotakorpi et al. (2014) ﬁnd that the incumbency eﬀect in the
Finnish municipality elections is small: being incumbent increases the probability of
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on policy positions as other such studies have not had access to a data that
would include policy positions also from losing candidates.
Finally, I contribute to the literature that studies the factors inﬂuencing
public policies by explicitly focusing on politicians’ positions7. The public
sector size question diﬀers from the redistribution question if we assume
that the subsidized services can also be provided by the private sector. The
discussion on the political determinants of the public sector size has mainly
focused on the bargaining power of the public sector employees and their
resulting disproportionate weight in the policy outcomes (e.g. Rattsø and
Sørensen (2004) or Enikolopov (2014)) who have an incentive to obstruct
reforms.
4.2 Institutional background
There were 304 municipalities in Finland in 2012 (excluding the 16 munic-
ipalities of the autonomous area of Åland) and they form a very important
tier of the public sector. The GDP share of the municipality level spend-
ing is approximately 18% and they employ ca. 20% of the total workforce.
The municipal sector accounts for almost two thirds of the total public
sector expenditure and investments. The largest components of municipal
expenditure are health and welfare services, approximately one half, and
education and cultural services, circa one ﬁfth. The constitution provides
the municipalities with the autonomy, which is, however, limited by various
statutory tasks and by detailed central government legislation.
The municipalities determine the municipal tax rate, the local property
tax rate, and the user fees. One half of the average municipal income comes
from income tax revenues. Operating revenues constitute almost one third
of the municipal income while the state subsidies provide one ﬁfth of the
municipal income. However, there is substantial variation in the revenue and
cost structures across the municipalities, which is not completely evened out
by ﬁscal equalization by the central state. In practice, most municipalities
operate at the minimum permissible level of service provision due to the
ﬁscal constraints. (Moisio et al. (2010))
being elected next time with 2.5%. Hyytinen et al. (2014) fail to ﬁnd any incumbency
eﬀect.
7For a survey on redistribution preferences among the population see Alesina and Giu-
liano (2011)) The redistributional preferences depend on one’s position in the income
distribution, as ﬁrst modelled by Meltzer and Richard (1981). However, this rela-
tionship places heavy informational requirements and probably only few people are
fully aware of their position. Furthermore, the mixed results on the impact of infor-
mational treatment (Cruces et al. (2013), Kuziemko et al. (2013) and Karadja et
al. (2014)) underline the context-dependence of attitude formation with respect to
redistribution.
94
Finland has a proportional electoral system with open lists, with voters
always voting for a single candidate instead of a list. The seats are allocated
according to the D’Hondt method. There are four major parties in the
parliament: the leftist Social Democratic Party, the conservative Center
Party, the conservative National Coalition Party, and the populist Finns
Party. In addition, there are four smaller parties: the liberal Greens, the
conservative Christian Democrats, the leftist Left Alliance, and the liberal
Swedish People’s Party. In the municipal elections, parties’ seat shares tend
to be very stable.
Each municipality is governed by a municipal council. Its size is a step
function of the municipality size and the average size at the time of writing
is 32 councilors. The candidates with the most votes are elected as coun-
cilors while those candidates who do not make it to the council but still get a
suﬃcient number of votes are elected as deputy councilors. Each municipal-
ity elects an equal number of councilors and deputy councilors. A majority
of the Finnish municipalities are so small that municipal candidates and
voters have a fair amount of information on each other.8
Since being a councilor is a position of trust instead of a job, councilors
do not quit their jobs. The median fee per session paid to councilors was 51
euros in a study in 2009 while the median annual number of sessions was
8 in a survey in 2007 (Kuntaliitto). Not surprisingly, the monetary returns
to the Finnish municipal politics are small.9
The municipal board is the executive body of a municipality while domain-
speciﬁc committees and civil servants prepare the proposals to be discussed
at the council. There are few statutory committees. The most common
domain of a committee is community services, such as zoning, environmen-
tal protection, building supervision, and environmental public health. The
second most common domain is education and culture. (Majoinen et al.
(2008))
Municipal committees used to act as entry points to the municipal politics
so that few ﬁrst-time councilors would enter the municipal council without
any previous experience in the municipal politics. While this practice is less
common since the 1990s, parties may still allocate committee memberships
as consolation prizes to the candidates who did not make it to the municipal
council, prioritizing deputy councilors. (Ruostetsaari and Holttinen (2001))
8In 2012, the median population was 5839.
9Becoming a municipal councilor results in an increase of 1000€ in the subsequent
annual earnings (Kotakorpi et al. (2014)).
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4.2.1 Voting aid applications
In an open-list system, voters must always choose a candidate to vote for,
which makes Finland a fertile ground for voting aid applications. They are
interactive questionnaires provided by the Finnish non-partisan main media
in the run-up to the elections. The purpose of voting aid applications is to
assist voters in choosing a candidate with similar policy preferences. Using
a voting aid application is free of charge for both candidates and voters.10
My data on the policy positions comes from the voting aid applications
of the Finnish public broadcasting company, Yle, in the municipal elections
2008 and 2012. The Yle voting aid application is open only to the candi-
dates for approximately three weeks during the pre-electoral period. During
this period, the candidates may reply to closed-ended questions focusing on
current policy issues and their replies are saved in a data base. While the re-
sponse period is pending, each candidate has access only to her own replies,
which can be modiﬁed during this time but not afterwards.11 (Naalisvaara
(2013))
Once the candidates’ response period is over, the voting aid applications
become publicly available. A voter can ﬁll in the same questionnaire online
and compare his replies to those of the candidates. If the voter ﬁnds more
matches to his answers, he may infer the information that the candidates
have similar views on speciﬁc policy issues. (Suojanen (2007))
In practice, most voters do not read every reply of every candidate but,
instead, focus on the vote recommendations provided by the voting aid ap-
plication algorithms. In essence, these recommendation algorithms match
a voter to those candidates whose positions are most similar to his, mak-
ing some assumptions on the voter utility function in order to deﬁne what
accounts as similar.
Filling in a voting aid application questionnaire is not obligatory for the
candidates. The median response rate by municipality in 2008 was 47.8 %
of the candidates and, on average, the candidates who did ﬁll in a voting
aid application questionnaire received in total 56.2% of the votes of the
10In the 2007 parliamentary elections, 13% of the representative sample had become
informed of the elections via voting aid applications while the majority had become
informed through the TV news, the magazine programs, and the newspapers. In
2007, the use of the voting aid applications correlated statistically signiﬁcantly with
the age and positively with activity and interest in politics. There was no diﬀerence
in their popularity with respect to the educational achievement, the income or the
gender. (Strandberg (2009))
11The candidate-speciﬁc user names and passwords are passed on to the candidates via
the parties’ campaign oﬃces while Yle also seeks to contact independent candidates.
Yle provided technical assistance both in 2008 and in 2012, while the detailed in-
structions, the solutions to the most common technical problems, and the helpdesk
contact information were attached to the user name and the password. (Naalisvaara
(2013))
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municipality. The equivalent ﬁgures for 2012 were 47.2% of the candidates
and 54.3% of the votes. Generally, the voting aid application repliers are
politically more successful and experienced, younger and more likely to be
women (Appendix Table A.1-Table A.3).
4.2.2 Characterizing the treatments
There are two discontinuities: one between the councilors and their deputies
and another one between the deputies and those candidates who were not
elected even as deputies. The treatment consists of the skills and experi-
ences gained by councilors relative to deputies and by deputies relative to
unelected candidates at the ﬁrst and second threshold, respectively.
At the ﬁrst threshold, the control group consists of the deputies who
got most votes among the deputies and almost made it to the council. At
the second threshold, the treatment groups consists of the deputies who
got least votes among the deputies and almost were not elected as deputies.
Because there is a deputy for every councilor, the number of deputies equals
that of the councilors. As a result, the control group of the ﬁrst threshold
does not overlap with the treatment group of the second threshold.
Councilors have a right of vote in the municipal council sessions and they
are provided with the notices of meeting, the agenda, and the motion of the
sessions. Depending on the municipality, they may also be prioritized as
the members of the domain-speciﬁc committees. (Majoinen et al. (2008))12
Deputies may also serve in the domain-speciﬁc committees (Majoinen
et al. (2008)). Thus, a deputy has probably a more narrow view on the
municipal activities than a councilor (Ruostetsaari and Holttinen (2001)).
Deputies are likelier to have a decision-making role in the council sessions in
the larger municipalities which have more councilors who are also members
of parliament and, thus, more often unable to attend the sessions. (Majoinen
et al. (2008))13
Both councilors and deputies have a right to request for information which
is not yet public but which is necessary for a position of trust. However, I
hypothesize that councilors are more aware of any relevant information and,
thus, are more likely to ask for it. Councilors are somewhat more salient to
the general public than deputies but still not very much so.
12Being a councilor is not a job and neither should being elected change the beliefs about
the future income mobility (cf. Kotakorpi et al. (2014)). Thus, this seems an unlikely
channel for any changes in the attitudes.
13A limitation of my study is that I do not have data on committee memberships or on
council absenteeism.
97
4.3 Data
The policy position data consists of the municipal elections candidate re-
sponses in the voting aid applications of the Finnish public broadcasting
company. The data on the 2008 elections is provided by the Finnish Social
Science Data Archive while Yle provides the data on the 2012 elections as an
open data in their web site (Yle 2012). In addition, I use electoral data by
the Ministry of Justice and municipality-level background variable data by
the Statistics Finland and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
The voting aid application data includes two types of questions. In one
type, the repliers are asked to which degree they agree or disagree with a
statement. The attitudes are measured on a scale from zero to four where
zero implies strong disagreement and four means strong agreement, while
the middle value of two corresponds to “Don’t know”. In another type, the
repliers are asked to choose a limited number of preferred answers from a
larger set of options.
In the 2008 voting aid application, the focus was on which municipal ser-
vice to privatize while, in 2012, the candidates were asked which municipal
services they would prioritize in terms of more funding. In both years, can-
didates were asked to choose how they would improve the ﬁscal balance of
the municipalities by choosing two measures from a list. However, this list
is mainly not overlapping across the years. (For the list of the questions,
see Appendix.)
The electoral results containing the turnout, the parties’ vote and seat
shares, and the candidates’ vote shares in each municipality are provided by
the Ministry of Justice. The data on earlier political experience in 1996 and
in 2000 comes from Kotakorpi et al. (2014). In addition, I use municipal-
level background data in order to investigate the possible heterogenous ef-
fects. This data consists of parties’ seat shares, population, age structure
of population and electorate, and unemployment rate. The unemployment
rate data is municipality-speciﬁc and provided by the Ministry of Employ-
ment and the Economy. It is based on the number of jobseekers, most of
whom are unemployed, registered at the government employment and eco-
nomic development oﬃces. I deﬁne the unemployment rate as an average
of the monthly unemployment rates of 12 months preceding the elections,
October 2007 - September 2008 and October 2011 - September 2012, re-
spectively. The data source for the remaining municipality-level variables
is the Statistics Finland.
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4.3.1 Policy indices
For each year, I construct two summary indices using a procedure described
in Anderson (2008). In addition to decreasing the multiple-testing problem,
these summary indices also allow me to study general eﬀects and, thus, in-
crease the statistical power. The indices I consider consist of a preferred
amount of redistribution and a preferred size of the municipal sector.14 Un-
surprisingly, a lower income and being female predict a stronger support for
redistribution and for a larger public sector. However, the overwhelmingly
strongest predictor is the political aﬃliation, with conservative candidates
opposing redistribution or a larger public sector (Table 4.1).
For each index, I ﬁrst switch the scales, if needed, so that a higher value
of a variable belonging to a group always implies similar preferences. For
example, a higher value of any variable grouped with the redistribution in-
dex indicates a stronger preference for more redistribution. Next, I demean
the outcomes and convert them into eﬀect sizes by dividing them with the
standard deviation of the control group. Demeaning results in a vector y˜ij
for the domain j and politician i. For councilors, the control group consists
of the deputies while the control group of the deputies are non-elected can-
didates. Finally, I create the summary index s¯ij by weighting the column
vector of demeaned outcomes as follows:
s¯ij = (1′Σˆ
−1
j 1)−1(1′Σˆ
−1
j y˜ij) (4.1)
where Σˆj is the covariance matrix and 1 is a column vector of ones.
The 2012 redistribution index consists of eight questions. Preferring more
redistribution implies wanting to balance the municipal budget by increasing
taxes and by issuing debt15 instead of cutting services or raising municipal
user fees16. It also means disagreeing with the statement that it is too easy
to gain access to social welfare, supporting a higher municipal property tax
and more progressive municipal user fees, and opposing higher health center
user fees.
The 2012 public sector size index sums up nine policy positions. Prefer-
ring a larger municipal sector implies opposing cutting services, selling oﬀ
municipal property or privatizing municipal health services. It also means
supporting an introduction of a universal right of the elderly to be admit-
ted to a retirement home as well as a universal right of the children to be
14The complete list of the voting aid application questions is in Appendix including a
note if a question contributes to an index and, if yes, which one.
15I assume that the issued debt will be disproportionately paid oﬀ with the taxes levied
on middle- and upper-class.
16User fees are based on the amount of use and, thus, are not progressive so a pro-
redistribution position implies opposing higher user fees.
99
admitted into the kindergarten even if one of its parents is a home-maker17.
In addition, it implies not wanting to forbid the nomination of the mu-
nicipal employees as members of the executive board and not wanting to
shorten the ﬁve-year long protection period against dismissal that municipal
employees currently enjoy after a municipal merger18.
The 2008 redistribution index consists of six questions. Preferring more
redistribution means opposing higher user fees or the introduction of new
user fees, supporting more progressive municipal user fees, a higher residen-
tial property tax or a higher holiday house tax rate for the municipality,
and a disagreement with the statement that it is too easy to gain access to
social welfare.
The 2008 public sector size index consists of six questions. Preferring a
larger municipal sector implies opposing any privatization and supporting
the universal right of the children to be admitted into the kindergarten even
if one of its parents is a home-maker. In addition, it means choosing tax
hikes instead of municipal services cuts, if necessary, as well as a disagree-
ment with the statement that the municipality has so many employees that
their number should be cut down. Finally, it stands for opposing selling
oﬀ municipal property or a municipality merger as a way to increase the
municipal revenue.
4.3.2 Measuring political style
As for the evolution of political style, I consider if the oﬃce-holders strive
for more ambiguity by avoiding extreme positions. In addition, I study
if they become more aligned with the national party stance, the regional
overall stance or the regional party stance.
The extremism index equals the share of the policy positions for which
the candidate has chosen “Strongly agree” or “Strongly disagree” for the
questions using the ﬁve-step scale. The main version of the moderation
index consists of the share of the policy positions for which the candidate
has either chosen “Don’t know” or has not answered.19
17A universal right to admit a child to a municipal kindergarten creates a larger demand
for the municipal labor and so would the introduction of a universal right to be
admitted to a municipal retirement home.
18At present, municipal employees have a dismissal period of ﬁve years when two or
more municipalities merge, which contrasts to the private sector dismissal periods of
3-6 months. On the other hand, the large part of the potential savings caused by a
municipality merger are due to lower personnel costs once the dismissal periods run
out, which creates a conﬂict between the municipal employees and others.
19Another version has the share of the policy positions for which the candidate has
chosen “Don’t know”. Finally, I consider the share of the policy positions for which
the candidate has chosen “Don’t know”, “Somewhat agree” or “Somewhat disagree”
or has not answered.
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Not only may experience make politicians generally more moderate, such
a behavior is incentivized in this set-up also by the structure of the voting
aid applications. Few voters bother to read through the responses of ev-
ery single respondent but, rather, focus on the top vote recommendations
provided by voting aid application algorithms. These algorithms match
responses of voters with those of politicians so that closer a candidate’s re-
sponse is to a voter’s responses, more likely she will show up as a top vote
recommendation. Then, closer a candidate is to a larger number of users,
more likely she is to be seen by them as a top recommendation.
As for the similarity with other politicians, I measure the alignment with
the positions of others by a Mahalanobis distance from party average, dis-
trict average or district-party average. A Mahalanobis distance measures
how far in terms of standard deviations a vector is from another vector,
which here contains the average policy positions. For example, the Maha-
lanobis distance from the national party average position is:
dip = (xip − μp)′Σˆp(xip − μp) (4.2)
whereby i refers to a candidate and p stands for a party. The vector xip
provides the policy positions of the candidate while the vector μp shows
the average policy positions of her party. Finally, the variance-covariance
matrix is Σˆp.
Weighting the distance between a candidate’s policy position vector and
an average policy position vector with the covariance matrix implies over-
weighting the outliers of the low-variance dimensions relative to the outliers
of high-variance dimensions. In eﬀect, it is more sensitive to positions far
from the consensus opinions than to positions for which there exists a large
variety of opinions.
4.4 Econometric strategy
Studying the impact of being in oﬃce requires a suitable control group. A
randomly drawn electoral loser is probably not a valid control for a randomly
drawn winner because there are several confounding factors. For example,
in the present data, electoral winners are older, have more earlier political
experience, are likelier to obtain ﬁnancial support from their party for the
elections campaigns and are likelier to be municipal employees than electoral
losers.
Hence, it would be problematic to simply regress the policy position on
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political experience. There is a reverse causality issue because some policy
positions would be much more popular and allow a candidate to win more
elections and, thus, to gain more experience. In addition, there is a question
of omitted variables, inﬂuencing jointly the amount of tenure and policy
positions. An obvious candidate is ageing so that older politicians tend to
have a longer tenure. A more nuanced estimation equation would include
additional variables but issues of reverse causality would still remain. For
example, since selection into political parties is not random, a certain policy
position and a change in it are very likely to cause the choice of the party
and, consequently, the party line to be followed.
I solve the identiﬁcation issue by using a regression discontinuity design,
comparing policy positions of the close winners and the close losers of the
previous elections20. RDD has been used to get around the problem of non-
random assignment into a political organ and it is based on the assumption
that, close to a determining threshold, an individual cannot exactly inﬂu-
ence if he is treated or not. In addition, only the treatment status should
change discontinuously at the threshold while other variables should be-
have smoothly around it. If these assumptions hold, two individuals close
to the threshold and on its opposite sides should not diﬀer except for their
treatment status.
4.4.1 Deﬁning the forcing variable
Any RDD strategy hinges on the deﬁnition of the forcing variable, which
measures the distance from the relevant threshold. In the sharp regression
discontinuity design, once the forcing variable is above the threshold, an
individual is treated, while those below are not.
The Finnish electoral system has proportional representation, which makes
measuring the electoral closeness more complicated than in a straightfor-
ward set-up of two candidates competing for a single seat in a majority
system. No equivalent threshold of 50% exists in a proportional represen-
tation context and various ways to deﬁne the distance measure have been
used. They can be broadly deﬁned as analytical and simulation-based so-
lutions.
Folke’s (2014) analytical solution focuses on ﬁnding the smallest vote
changes leading to seat changes between parties. If the required vote change
for a party is suﬃciently small, he deﬁnes that party as a close winner or a
20This approach was pioneered by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960). For surveys,
see Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008). Its use in political
economics has proliferated since Lee et al. (2004) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008),
especially in the study of incumbency eﬀects.
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close loser. Lundqvist (2011) applies a similar approach to individual can-
didates, utilizing the structure imposed by the Swedish closed-list system.
In her setup, a candidate is a close winner if her party would require only
one or two seats more for her to be elected while she is a close loser if her
party would need to lose only one or two seats for her not be elected.
The simulation-based approach by Kotakorpi et al. (2014), who also use
Finnish municipal elections data, deﬁnes the relevant threshold by simu-
lating elections with bootstrapping. They create a measure of how many
resampled elections a candidate wins and use it as a measure of electoral
strength, which allows candidates to potentially compete with any other
candidate in the same municipality. Freier and Odendahl (2012) base their
simulation-based approach on perturbing the realized vote vectors and by
deﬁning a party as a close loser or a closer winner if perturbations change
its electoral status suﬃciently frequently.
My threshold for winners is the within-party vote share of the ﬁrst can-
didate to be left out while the threshold for losers is the within-party vote
share of the last candidate to get in. In eﬀect, I assume that the rele-
vant competition takes place within a party, with the ideologically close
politicians being the main competitors. I believe that the assumption is
reasonable from the point of view of the electorate, so that a voter ﬁrst
chooses to a party to vote for and, then, picks a candidate within the party.
The forcing variable for the winners is:
Xipm|WINNER =
vi|WINNER − vpm,FIRST LOSER
Vpm
(4.3)
in which i refers to the candidate, p stands for the party, and m is the
municipality (for the distribution within the 7.5 percentage points from
the threshold, see Figure 4.1, and for the total distribution see Appendix
Figure A.1). The votes garnered by a candidate are vi while the total votes
won by a party in the municipality are Vpm. The losing candidate who
gets most votes receives vpm,FIRST LOSER votes. All the variables are party-
municipality speciﬁc, except when a party is electorally allied with one or
more parties, in which case the party is replaced by the alliance.
The forcing variable for the losers is:
Xipm|LOSER =
vi|LOSER − vpm,FIRST WINNER
Vpm
(4.4)
and the formula reads as in (1) except that the winning candidate with
the least votes gets vpm,FIRST WINNER votes (for the distribution within the
103
7.5 percentage points from the threshold, see Figure 4.2, and for the total
distribution see Appendix Figure A.2).
Using within-party vote shares results in an overlap in the case of ties
whereby two or more candidates of the same party have an equal number
of votes not suﬃcient for all of them to be elected. Thus, they all have the
same within-party vote share and the tie is broken with a lottery.21 In such
cases, I perturb the vote margin of zero by adding 0.00000000000001 to the
candidates who won the lottery and by subtracting the same amount from
the candidates who lost it22.
4.5 Results
I start by investigating the incumbency eﬀect in terms of re-running prob-
ability, re-election probability, total vote share, and campaigning behavior
and then proceed to study if there is an impact on policy indices described
in more detail in 4.3.1 Policy indices. Finally, I consider if there are incum-
bency eﬀects on moderation or alignment with the national party positions,
regional overall positions or regional party positions.
I pool the data from the elections in 2008 and in 2012 when studying
re-running probability, re-election probability, total vote share, and cam-
paigning behavior since the deﬁnitions of these outcomes are identical in
each year. In contrast, I do the estimations for the policy positions, mod-
eration and alignment with the average positions separately for each year
because these outcome variables summarize the policy positions that were
almost all diﬀerent across the elections.
For all the outcomes, I estimate the following equation, using the optimal
Imbens-Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidths in the main speciﬁcations:
yip = α + τD + βl · (Xipm − cp) + (βr − βl) · D · (Xipm − cp) + εimp (4.5)
in which y is an outcome, p stands for a party, m is a municipality while
l and r refer to the left and right sides of the party-speciﬁc threshold, cp.
The treatment, D, is being elected as a councilor or as deputy and the
estimated treatment eﬀect of experience is τ . The forcing variable, X, is
the within-party vote share, accounting for the electoral alliances. Notably,
there are two thresholds: one for being elected as a councilor and another
one for deputies. The speciﬁcation allows for two diﬀerent separate linear
21The same mechanism holds both at the threshold for the councilors and at the threshold
for the deputies, for more discussion see Hyytinen et al. (2014).
22There were 224-338 such cases in each elections.
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trends, βl and βr, for the both sides of the threshold.
As recommended by Gelman and Imbens (2014), I do not use higher-order
global polynomials. Furthermore, the forcing variable is very concentrated,
as illustrated by Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, so using the whole range in
inference instead of a more limited range would not increase the number of
observations very much.
The councilors who barely won are more likely to run again and this eﬀect
is 30% of the standard deviation (column (1) in Table 4.2) while there is no
equivalent eﬀect for the deputies (column (6) in Table 4.2). Importantly,
there is no equivalent jump for the repeated voting aid application usage
(columns (2) and (7) in Table 4.2).
On the face of it, there would seem to be some incumbency advantage
in being an incumbent councilor (column (3) in Table 4.2). However, this
result is not robust as using half of the optimal bandwidth reduce the coeﬃ-
cient and makes it insigniﬁcant.23 Both closer councilors and close deputies
are likelier to get funding from the party, which is slightly more pronounced
for the close deputies (columns (1) and (4) in Table 4.3).
As for the policy positions, the coeﬃcients are around zero and I can rule
out an eﬀect of larger than 20% of the standard deviation, so I do not ﬁnd
evidence for incumbency eﬀect on policies (Table 4.4). Next, I study the
pronounced eﬀect of experience by focusing on the incumbents without any
previous political experience whatsoever. For the upper threshold, I deﬁne
the relevant political experience as having been elected as a councilor in
1996 or later. For the lower threshold I deﬁne it as having been elected as
a councilor in 1996 or later or as a deputy in 2000 or later.
In 2012, incumbent councilors without earlier political experience start
supporting a smaller public sector (column (6) in Table 4.5) but not so in
2008 (column (6) in Table 4.6). There is no impact on the other policy index
(Table 4.5 for 2012 and Table 4.6 for 2008) in either year. The coeﬃcients
are rather imprecise so that I can rule out an eﬀect larger than 40%.
Next, I ﬁnd that tenure does not have an impact on policy moderation
(Table 4.7) and, for the councilors, this result is very precise as I am able to
rule out an impact larger than 10% of the standard deviation, irrespective
if I study this question by focusing on the share of the extreme responses or
on that of “Don’t know” responses. For the deputies, I can rule an impact
larger than 20% of the standard deviation.24 When comparing politicians
23All the results in Table 4.2 are for all the candidates, whether they used the voting aid
application or not but the results are robust to redoing the analysis for the voting aid
users only.
24The results are also robust to using other moderation measures discussed in more detail
in 4.3.2 Measuring political style.
105
with and without earlier political experience, I can rule an eﬀect larger than
25% of the standard deviation in 2012 (Table 4.8) and an eﬀect larger than
100% of the standard deviation in 2008 (Table 4.9).
Finally, I investigate if politicians become more prone to align with na-
tional party average positions, general regional average positions or regional
party average positions using Mahalanobis distances and again I fail to ﬁnd
an impact (Table 4.10 for 2012 and Table 4.11 for 2008). This time, I can
rule out an impact larger than 20% of the standard deviation.
When further focusing on the role of the earlier political experience, in-
experienced deputies become more aligned with the national party aver-
age positions in 2012 and this eﬀect is ca. 17% of the standard deviation
(Table 4.12). They become also more aligned with general regional average
positions as well as regional party positions but these coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcant. In 2008, inexperienced deputies become more aligned with the
general regional average positions and this eﬀect is 20% of the standard
deviation. The point estimates suggest that they also become more aligned
with the national party average position but now the coeﬃcient is not sig-
niﬁcant (Table 4.13 for 2008). For others, I can rule out an eﬀect larger
than 40% of the standard deviation (in 2012) and 100% of the standard
deviation (in 2008).
4.5.1 Heterogenous eﬀects
This general overall lack of an impact may be due to heterogeneity whereby
the opposite impacts cancel each other out. Next, I consider heterogene-
ity by the municipality features. My hypothesis is that tenure may imply
diﬀerent things depending on the characteristics of the municipality. I fo-
cus on ﬁscal constraints, which I proxy by the change in the pre-electoral
12-month municipal unemployment rate between the municipal elections. I
only do these estimations for 2012 since the unemployment rates were stable
or decreased during the term 2004-2008. In addition, I also consider if there
are diﬀerences by the size of the municipality.
In the municipalities with increasing unemployment25, councilors become
more aligned with national party average positions, regional general average
positions as well as regional party average positions (Appendix Table A.6).
In addition, there is some indication that deputies of such municipalities
support smaller public sector (Appendix Table A.4) and are less likely to
choose extreme positions (Appendix Table A.5). There are no such eﬀects
25I classify the municipal unemployment rate as increasing if its increase is in the high-
est quartile of unemployment rate percentage points change, increasing at least 2
percentage points from 2008 to 2012.
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in the municipalities with a stable or less steeply increasing unemployment
rate (Appendix Table A.4, Table A.5 and Table A.7).
As for the diﬀerences by the municipality size, I do not ﬁnd an eﬀect
(Appendix Table A.8-Table A.11 for 2012 and Table B.1-Table B.4) and,
furthermore, sample sizes for the candidates from the municipalities with
less than a medium-sized electorate are small.
4.6 Robustness checks, balance, and attrition
The McCrary tests (McCrary (2008)) investigating the smoothness of the
two forcing variables are shown in Figure 4.3 for the councilors vs. deputies
threshold and in Figure 4.4 for the deputies vs. non-elected threshold. They
work for suﬃciently small bandwidths of ±2.5% or less, such as the optimal
Imbens-Kalyanaraman ones.
The results are also robust to diﬀerent bandwidth choices. I include the
50% multiples of the optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidths in all the
main speciﬁcations as well as in the speciﬁcations investigating heteroge-
nous eﬀects and these multiples does not change the results. In addition,
Figure A.3-Figure A.8 (for 2012) and Figure B.1-Figure B.6 (for 2008) in
Appendix show that the results are robust to a wide range of bandwidths
for the both thresholds and all the outcomes. The results do not change
when using the optimal Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik bandwidths (Calonico
et al. 2014), see Appendix Table A.12-Table A.14 for 2012 and Table B.5-
Table B.7 for 2008. However, the bandwidths more than double compared
to the optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman ones even up to ±6.5% around the
upper threshold.
As for the pre-treatment policy positions, I consider redistribution and
public sector size indices, Mahalanobis distance measures from national
party average positions and general regional average positions, respectively,
as well as the share of extreme and moderate responses in 2008 conditional
on rerunning in 2012. The pre-treatment policy position balance cannot
be investigated for the candidates running in 2008 since there is no policy
position data for 2004. For the candidates running in 2012, the balance
seems generally reasonable (Appendix Table A.15, for the equivalent graphs
see Appendix Figure A.9 and Figure A.10), however, close councilor winners
are slightly more likely to have extreme responses while close deputies are
a bit more likely to have moderate responses. In both cases, the eﬀect is
10% of the standard deviation.
I also consider the balance of the socio-economic and political pre-treatment
variables in the previous elections (Appendix Table A.16 and Table A.17for
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2008 and Table B.8 and Table B.9 for 2004, for the equivalent graphs see
Appendix Figure A.9-Figure A.14 for 2008 and Figure B.7-Figure B.10 for
2004). In 2008, close councilors do have a higher campaign expenditure,
however, the overall campaign expenditure is still small for all the candi-
dates, with 82% spending 0-500 euros. Close councilors are also two years
younger, a bit less likely to be well-oﬀ or to belong to the conservative
Center Party and slightly more likely to belong to the liberal Swedish Peo-
ple’s Party. In 2004, close deputies are slightly less likely to belong to the
populist Finns Party.
To conclude, when it comes to the balance my main focus lies on the
pre-treatment policy positions and they seem to be reasonably balanced.
Policy indices and distances from national party average positions and gen-
eral regional average positions are balanced, except for a small eﬀect on the
extreme responses. In addition, my main emphasis lies on the policy posi-
tions in 2012 since the access to the pre-treatment policy positions from the
2008 elections allows for a more transparent analysis than for the candidates
running in 2008.26
Finally, I investigate if including control variables changes the results. If
the set-up is valid, the results should not change but their inclusion might
decrease the standard errors. The control variables for the policy index
changes are the variables most likely to be correlated with respective prefer-
ences according to the previous literature (cf. Alesina and Giuliano (2011)).
These include right-left aﬃliation, age, gender, approximate income group,
having a university degree27, and being a municipal employee, which are
also correlated with the policy indices in this data (see Table 4.1). The
previous literature provides less of a guideline as to which variables could
be correlated with policy moderation or alignment with average positions
so I include controls for age, gender, having a university degree, and being
a municipal employee. None of the earlier results is changed by controlling
for the above mentioned variables (see Table A.18-Table A.20 for 2012 and
Table B.10-Table B.12 for 2008).
4.6.1 Attrition
While the regression discontinuity set-up itself is cleanly identiﬁed, politi-
cians do self-select into whether or not they re-run and all the results are
conditional on running again. The main concern is selective attrition, be-
cause it might attenuate the results if those politicians who feel uncomfort-
26A deterioration in the municipal ﬁscal constraints during the term 2008-2012 should
also strengthen an informational treatment compared to the term 2004-2008.
27Not for 2008 as the data on the educational achievement starts from 2012.
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able with political climate or ﬁscal constraints do not run again. I hypoth-
esize that this selective attrition could disproportionately aﬀect councilors
because they are the ones who have to face the constraints.
Close councilors are more likely to re-run while there is no diﬀerence in
the re-running probability at the lower threshold (columns (1) and (6) in
Table 4.2). The voting aid application usage is also voluntary, which pro-
vides another potential source of attrition. However, there is no diﬀerence
in the probability of the repeated voting aid application usage (columns (2)
and (7) in Table 4.2).
Since I do not have data on why candidates re-run, I can at best study
if pre-treatment variables predict re-running. When looking at the total
candidate population, the most important factor in predicting re-running is
the earlier electoral success: councilors are most likely to run again, followed
by the deputies (columns (1) and (2) in Appendix Table A.21 for 2012
and Table B.13 for 2008). The same result holds for the repeated voting
aid application usage (columns (1) and (2) in Appendix Table A.22). A
larger share of extreme positions in the previous elections predicts a smaller
probability of re-running or a repeated voting aid usage but its impact
is dwarfed by that of the electoral status. A preference for a larger public
sector predicts a larger probability of a repeated voting aid usage but, again,
its impact is small compared to the electoral status (columns (1) and (2) in
Appendix Table A.22).
When I limit the sample to the candidates who are close to the relevant
threshold in 2008, policy positions generally do not have power in predict-
ing the repeated voting aid application usage (Appendix Table A.23 and
Table A.24 for 2012). The sole exception is that the candidates who barely
made it as deputies in 2008 are slightly more likely to be pro-redistribution
and the eﬀect is 14% of the standard deviation.
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I study if there is an incumbency eﬀect on pre-electoral policy
positions in an RDD set-up. I investigate the impact on the policy positions
regarding redistribution and public sector size. I also consider the share of
extreme and moderate positions as well as the distances from national party
position averages, general regional position averages and regional party po-
sition averages, respectively.
Political experience does not make politicians change their positions in
terms of policy indices or position moderation nor do they become more
aligned with the average positions. In the main estimations, I can rule out
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eﬀects larger than 20% of the standard deviations. The monetary returns
to the Finnish municipal politics are low and, consequently, the incentives
may be too low-powered for the politicians to make large changes in their
positions. Selective attrition could be a further explanation but, at least in
2008, the electoral success far overwhelms other factors in predicting who
runs again in 2008.
When investigating heterogenous eﬀects, I ﬁnd that councilors without
earlier political experience support a smaller public sector size in 2012 but
not in 2008, which could be due to the fact that the economy deteriorated
over the term 2008-2012 and improved over the term 2004-2008. I also
ﬁnd some evidence that deputies without earlier political experience be-
come more aligned with average positions and that politicians living the
municipalities with an increasing unemployment rate become more aligned
with the national party average policy positions.
Due to multiple-testing concerns, the results on the heterogenous eﬀects
are rather tentative since they might be false positives. On the other hand,
since politicians’ positions do not change in political economy models, ex-
cept for lame ducks no longer constrained by re-eligibility concerns, there
are no earlier theoretical results to lean on to the best of my knowledge.
This fact complicates focusing on a selected few variables so the existence
of false negatives is also a possibility.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the forcing variable: Municipal councilors vs.
deputies
Figure 4.2: Distribution of the forcing variable: Deputies vs. non-elected
candidates
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Figure 4.3: Continuity of forcing variable: Municipal councilors vs.
deputies
Note: The McCrary statistics is -0.055 (0.047).
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Figure 4.4: Continuity of forcing variable: Deputies vs. non-elected
candidates
Note: The McCrary statistics is -0.025 (0.044).
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Figure 4.5: Incumbency eﬀects on the policy indices in 2012: Municipal
councilors vs. deputies
Note: The policy indices summarize the policy positions on redistribution and size
of public sector. A larger number indicates more support within each domain.
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Figure 4.6: Incumbency eﬀects on the ambiguity indices in 2012: Munici-
pal councilors vs. deputies
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses. Ex-
tremism refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses.
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Figure 4.7: Incumbency eﬀects on the party distance measures in 2012:
Municipal councilors vs. deputies
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respec-
tive average policy positions.
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Figure 4.8: Incumbency eﬀects on the policy indices in 2012: Deputies vs.
non-elected candidates
Note: The policy indices summarize the policy positions on redistribution and size
of public sector. A larger number indicates more support within each domain.
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Figure 4.9: Incumbency eﬀects on the ambiguity indices in 2012: Deputies
vs. non-elected candidates
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses. Ex-
tremism refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses.
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Figure 4.10: Incumbency eﬀects on the distance measures in 2012:
Deputies vs. non-elected candidates
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respec-
tive average policy positions.
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Table 4.1: Correlation of summary indices and socio-economic factors,
pooled
Dep. var. Pro-redistribution Larger public sector
High-income -0.0213*** -0.0587***
(0.0060) (0.0080)
Low-income 0.0157** 0.0178**
(0.0063) (0.0074)
Female 0.0203*** 0.0317***
(0.0046) (0.0047)
Age 0.0008*** -0.0013***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Right -0.3065*** -0.2937***
(0.0097) (0.0130)
Constant 0.1290*** 0.3002***
(0.0134) (0.0103)
Observations 37,455 38,044
R-squared 0.1140 0.1155
Note: Income groups are based on the self-reported occupational cat-
egory. I classify a candidate as having “high income” if he has a man-
agerial position or is a senior white-collar worker. “Middle-income” is
the omitted category and refers to being a junior white-collar worker,
a blue-collar worker or an entrepreneur. Candidates with “low in-
come” are retired, home-makers, farmers, students or unemployed.
“Right” refers to the National Coalition or the Center Party. Both
speciﬁcations control for the municipality eﬀects. Standard errors
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.2: Incumbency eﬀect on re-running, election probability and vote
shares, pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var. Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of being elected as: Vote share (%)t
runningt using VAAt councilort deputyt
Sample Councilors
Electedt-4 0.0124 -0.0122 0.0607** -0.0428** 0.0241
(0.0119) (0.0136) (0.0254) (0.0207) (0.0330)
Electedt-4 0.1500*** -0.0196 0.0219 -0.0484* 0.0201
(½ bandwidth) (0.0181) (0.0202) (0.0347) (0.0279) (0.0475)
Observations 24,793 20,835 7,134 9,542 7,390
Optimal bandwidth 1.987 1.492 0.806 1.147 0.839
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample Deputies
Electedt-4 0.0172 0.0000 -0.0269* -0.0342 -0.0447**
(0.0160) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0311) (0.0200)
Electedt-4 0.0009 -0.0138 -0.0274 -0.0484 -0.0491*
(½ bandwidth) (0.0213) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0398) (0.0280)
Observations 20,433 21,238 6,282 4,477 5,774
Optimal bandwidth 0.679 0.709 0.485 0.345 0.445
Note: The results refer to all the candidates in both years, not just the voting aid application
respondents. A vote share is deﬁned as a percentage and its mean is 0.82% in 2012 and 0.86% in
2008. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Observations refer to
the number of the observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.3: Incumbency eﬀect on the election campaign, pooled
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var. Funding by partyt Campaign expendituret Ext. fundingt
Sample Councilors
Electedt-4 0.0697*** 0.0990 0.0835
(0.0212) (0.0639) (0.0637)
Electedt-4 0.0623** 0.0885 0.0225
(½ bandwidth) (0.0283) (0.0803) (0.0883)
Observations 7,135 5,109 5,413
Opt. bandwidth 1.814 1.171 1.371
(4) (5) (6)
Sample Deputies
Electedt-4 0.0891** 0.0408 0.1410
(0.0370) (0.0404) (0.0956)
Electedt-4 0.1002** 0.0111 0.1987
(½ bandwidth) (0.0501) (0.0515) (0.1294)
Observations 3,534 5,661 3,506
Opt. bandwidth 0.516 1.086 0.584
Note: Funding from party equals one if the party was named as the most important external
source of funding. Campaign costs are divided into ten categories (0-500€, 501-1000€, 1001-
2000€, 2001-3000€, 3001-5000€, 5001-7000€, 7001-10000€, 10001-15000€, 15001-20000€ and
over 20000€). Exterior funding refers to the share of external campaign funding and is
divided into ﬁve categories (0%, 1-20%, 21-50%, 51-80%, 81-100%). Local linear regressions
using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Observations refer to the number of the
observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table
4.4:Incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
policy
indices
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ep.
var.
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
C
ouncilors,2008
D
eputies,2008
Elected
t-4
-0.0310
-0.0340
0.0367
0.0297
-0.0064
-0.0163
-0.0244
0.0416
(0.0337)
(0.0338)
(0.0491)
(0.0582)
(0.0224)
(0.0343)
(0.0401)
(0.0474)
Elected
t-4
-0.0628
-0.0401
0.0648
-0.0008
-0.0103
-0.0490
-0.0163
0.0776
(½
bandw
idth)
(0.0455)
(0.0422)
(0.0710)
(0.0749)
(0.0294)
(0.0452)
(0.0621)
(0.0578)
O
bservations
2,881
3,190
2,053
2,223
4,638
3,498
1,730
2,151
O
ptim
albandw
idth
2.224
2.424
0.783
0.797
4.576
2.319
0.596
0.796
N
ote:T
he
policy
indicessum
m
arize
the
policy
positionson
redistribution
and
size
ofpublic
sector.A
largernum
berindicates
m
ore
support
for
each
dom
ain.
Local
linear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernel
w
ith
the
optim
al
bandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
of
the
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table
4.6:H
eterogeneous
incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
policy
indices
in
2008:
by
politicalexperience
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ep.
var.
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
Sam
ple
Experienced
Inexperienced
C
ouncilors
D
eputies
C
ouncilors
D
eputies
Elected
t-4
-0.0054
-0.0915
0.1330
0.1835
-0.0261
0.0090
-0.0517
0.0107
(0.0377)
(0.0713)
(0.0876)
(0.1194)
(0.0421)
(0.0388)
(0.0440)
(0.0436)
Elected
t-4
-0.0203
-0.1283
0.0852
0.1484
-0.0163
-0.0108
-0.0313
0.0626
(½
bandw
idth)
(0.0429)
(0.0948)
(0.1103)
(0.1388)
(0.0541)
(0.0500)
(0.0666)
(0.0622)
O
bservations
2,136
1,163
450
505
1,901
2,269
1,465
1,848
O
pt.
bandw
idth
8.690
2.451
0.921
1.068
1.459
2.084
0.621
0.874
N
ote:
T
he
policy
indices
sum
m
arize
the
policy
positions
on
redistribution
and
size
of
public
sector.
A
larger
num
ber
indicates
m
ore
support
for
each
dom
ain.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table
4.8:H
eterogeneous
incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
m
oderation
and
extrem
ism
indices
in
2012:
by
politicalexperience
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ep.
var.
Extrem
ism
M
oderation
Extrem
ism
M
oderation
Extrem
ism
M
oderation
Extrem
ism
M
oderation
Sam
ple
Experienced
Inexperienced
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
-0.0083
-0.0020
-0.0064
-0.0010
0.0018
-0.0045
-0.0124
-0.0032
(0.0209)
(0.0074)
(0.0211)
(0.0116)
(0.0144)
(0.0092)
(0.0173)
(0.0090)
Elected
t-4
0.0252
-0.0070
-0.0224
0.0014
-0.0063
0.0040
-0.0229
0.0048
(½
bandw
idth)
(0.0266)
(0.0086)
(0.0287)
(0.0149)
(0.0196)
(0.0139)
(0.0263)
(0.0087)
O
bservations
1,397
1,619
1,117
769
2,107
1,979
2,087
1,973
O
pt.
bandw
idth
2.093
2.770
1.056
0.621
1.543
1.350
0.987
0.885
N
ote:
M
oderation
refers
to
the
share
of“D
on’t
know
”
or
em
pty
responses.
Extrem
ism
refers
to
the
share
of“Strongly
agree”
or
“Strongly
agree”
responses.
T
here
are
too
few
councilors
w
ithout
any
earlier
politicalexperience
to
estim
ate
this
for
close
w
inners
and
close
losers
for
a
councilor
position.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table
4.10:Incum
bency
eﬀect
in
2012
on
the
distance
from
:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
D
ep.
var.
Party
average
R
egion
average
Party-region
average
Party
average
R
egion
average
Party-region
average
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
-0.6602
-0.2143
-0.4773
-0.4529
-0.0070
-0.0036
(0.9768)
(1.0482)
(0.9989)
(0.9134)
(0.8738)
(0.8784)
Elected
t-4
-1.4301
-0.5200
-0.8020
-0.9436
-0.4051
-0.5941
(½
bandw
idth)
(1.3217)
(1.4187)
(1.2934)
(1.1413)
(1.0779)
(1.1561)
O
bservations
3,151
3,150
2,850
3,569
3,588
3,080
O
ptim
albandw
idth
1.574
1.530
1.406
1.462
1.422
1.250
N
ote:T
he
dependentvariablesreferto
the
M
ahalanobisdistancesfrom
the
respective
average
policy
positions.
Locallinearregressionsusing
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table 4.11: Incumbency eﬀect in 2008 on the distance from:
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var. Party average Region average Party-region average
Sample Councilors, 2008
Electedt-4 0.6717 0.4783 0.8529
(0.8765) (0.8071) (1.1449)
Electedt-4 1.7394 1.1461 2.0306
(½ bandwidth) (1.2213) (1.1021) (1.8268)
Observations 3,832 3,458 2,716
Optimal bandwidth 2.482 1.942 1.702
(4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Party average Region average Party-region average
Sample Deputies, 2008
Electedt-4 0.8847 0.5908 1.1143
(1.2191) (1.1140) (1.2739)
Electedt-4 0.7889 -1.1500 -0.0247
(½ bandwidth) (1.7622) (1.4139) (1.5882)
Observations 2,761 2,228 1,843
Optimal bandwidth 1.213 0.821 0.832
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respective average
policy positions. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth
by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
Observations refer to the number of the observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table
4.12:H
eterogeneous
incum
bency
eﬀect
in
2012
on
the
distance
from
(by
politicalexperience):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
D
ep.
var.
Party
average
R
egion
average
Party-region
average
Party
average
R
egion
average
Party-region
average
Experienced
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
-0.8790
-1.2542
-2.4218*
0.5704
0.3056
1.2053
(1.5645)
(1.6527)
(1.4285)
(1.7592)
(1.6359)
(1.6914)
Elected
t-4
-0.4249
-1.0622
-1.9042
2.3193
1.2081
2.7521
(½
bandw
idth)
(2.1704)
(2.2118)
(1.7714)
(2.1771)
(2.0264)
(2.2675)
O
bservations
1,299
1,248
1,324
975
880
875
O
ptim
albandw
idth
1.936
1.779
2.192
0.905
0.749
0.813
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
D
ep.
var.
Party
average
R
egion
average
Party-region
average
Party
average
R
egion
average
Party-region
average
Inexperienced
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
-0.7522
0.2242
0.4022
-2.4457*
-0.4867
-1.9907
(1.0840)
(1.0135)
(1.0100)
(1.3946)
(1.1515)
(1.4623)
Elected
t-4
-1.7991
0.1588
-0.1776
-4.3297**
-1.8625
-3.4923*
(½
bandw
idth)
(1.4456)
(1.3674)
(1.3073)
(1.9193)
(1.5204)
(1.9014)
O
bservations
2,033
2,259
2,093
1,401
1,858
1,240
O
ptim
albandw
idth
1.632
2.000
1.926
0.633
0.873
0.616
N
ote:T
he
dependentvariablesreferto
the
M
ahalanobisdistancesfrom
the
respective
average
policy
positions.
Locallinearregressionsusing
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
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5 Appendix
APPENDIX A
Yle voting aid application questions in 2012
If your municipality were to get a large donation in order to improve the
municipal services, which services should be mainly targeted? Choose two
from the following options:
• Social services
• Day care
• Eldercare
• Schools
• Nursing staﬀ salaries1
• Health centers
• Special health care
Which of the following options should be mainly used in order to balance
the municipal budget in your municipality? Choose two from the following
options:
• Cutting down services (Public sector size index)
• Increasing existing user fees or introduction of new ones (Redistribu-
tion index)
• Raising taxes (Redistribution index)
• Selling oﬀ municipal property (Public sector size index)
• Developing the business in the municipality
• Issuing more debt (Redistribution index)
1Nurses are the most common occupational category of the municipal employees, num-
bering 76,900 in 2013.
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Let’s assume that your municipality is ﬁnancially troubled. You must save
and there is a trade-oﬀ between the services for the elderly and the children.
What will you do?
• I cut from the services for the elderly.
• I cut from the services for the children.
• I try to cut even-handedly from both kinds of services.
• We should save but I still propose issuing more debt. (Redistribution
index)
The following questions have a ﬁve-step scaling:
• 0 = “completely disagree”
• 1 = “somewhat disagree”
• 2 = “don’t know” or empty
• 3 = “somewhat agree”
• 4 = “completely agree”
If one of the parents is at home, we should limit the right of the family to
have their child placed in daycare. (Public sector size index)
The old should have a universal right to a retirement home similar to one
enjoyed now by children with respect to day care. (Public sector size index)
Privatization of municipal health care would increase eﬃciency and lower
the costs. (Public sector size index)
We should increase the health care user fees in my municipality. (Redis-
tribution index)
My municipality should receive refugees.
Too little attention has been paid to marginalization of the children and
the youth of my municipality.
It is nowadays too easy to be admitted to social welfare.2 (Redistribution
index)
Recycling should be possible in the public trash cans in my municipality.
My municipality should spend more money in the road maintenance.
We should compromise on environmental protection if employment can
be thus increased.
2While social welfare is regulated nationally, one of its important components is income
support, access to which is determined by the case evaluation of municipal authorities.
(Moisio et al. 2010). Moreover, a municipality may in practice complicate or facilitate
information acquisition on social welfare.
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We should raise the property tax rate in my municipality. (Redistribution
index)
If my municipality were to merge with another municipality in the near
future, a consultative referendum should be held on the merger decision.
The voting age limit in the municipal elections should be decreased to 16
years [from 18 years].
The municipal user fees should be made more progressive in income. (Re-
distribution index)
Members of Parliament should not run in the municipal elections.
The ﬁve-year long dismissal period for the municipal employees in con-
junction with a municipality merger is too long. (Public sector size index)
Municipal employees should not be nominated as municipal board mem-
bers. (Public sector size index)
Yle voting aid application questions in 2008
In order to provide our municipality with more revenue, we should [choose
two]:
• increase the property tax rate for residential buildings (Redistribution
index)
• increase the property tax rate for holiday houses (Redistribution in-
dex)
• increase user fees (Redistribution index)
• sell oﬀ municipal property (Public sector size index)
• attract business with favorable conditions or ﬁnancial support
• attract new well-oﬀ taxpayers by oﬀering them building plots3
• request for more state subsidies
• consider a municipality merger (Public sector size index)
• introduce new user fees. (Redistribution index)
Which of the following services should we privatize [choose as many as you
like but at least one of the following]:
• comprehensive school
3Municipalities are big land owners and rural municipalities frequently sell building
plots at token prices in order to attract new well-to-do taxpayers.
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• health center
• eldercare
• day care
• municipal engineering
• social welfare
• substance abuse treatment and rehabilitation
• ﬁre and rescue services
• zoning
• special health care
• water utility
• none of the above (Public sector size index)
The following questions have a ﬁve-step scaling:
• 0 = “completely disagree”
• 1 = “somewhat disagree”
• 2 = empty
• 3 = “somewhat agree”
• 4 = “completely agree”
If there is no other option, we should raise the municipal tax rate rather
than cut from the municipal services. (Public sector size index)
It is nowadays too easy to be admitted to social welfare. (Redistribution
index)
The municipal user fees should be made more progressive in income. (Re-
distribution index)
We should compromise on environmental protection if employment can
be thus increased.
If one of the parents is at home, we should limit the right of the family
to have their child placed in daycare. (Public sector size index)
We should downsize the number of employees in my municipality because
there are too many of them. (Public sector size index)
If we must choose, it is better to cut funding from the health center than
schooling because there is private health care but no private schools.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of the forcing variable: Municipal councillors vs.
deputies
Figure A.2: Distribution of the forcing variable: Deputies vs. non-elected
candidates
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Figure A.3: Robustness to bandwidth in 2012: Policy indices, municipal
councilors vs. deputies
Note: The policy indices summarize the policy positions on redistribution and size
of public sector. A larger number indicates more support within each domain. Local
linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure A.4: Robustness to bandwidth in 2012: Ambiguity indices, munic-
ipal councilors vs. deputies
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses. Extrem-
ism refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses. Local
linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure A.5: Robustness to bandwidth in 2012: Distance measures, munic-
ipal councilors vs. deputies
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respec-
tive average policy positions. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel with
the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure A.6: Robustness to bandwidth in 2012: Policy indices, deputies vs.
non-elected candidates
Note: The policy indices summarize the policy positions on redistribution and size
of public sector. A larger number indicates more support within each domain. Local
linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure A.7: Robustness to bandwidth in 2012: Ambiguity indices,
deputies vs. non-elected candidates
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses. Extrem-
ism refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses. Local
linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure A.8: Robustness to bandwidth in 2012: Distance measures,
deputies vs. non-elected candidates
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respec-
tive average policy positions. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel with
the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure A.9: Continuity of predetermined policy positions: Municipal
councillors vs. deputies in 2008
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2012. The policy indices summarize
the policy positions on redistribution and size of public sector while the exact questions diﬀer
from those in 2012. The distance measures refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respective
average policy positions. Moderation refers to the share of empty responses. Extremism refers to
the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses.
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Figure A.10: Continuity of predetermined policy positions: Deputies vs.
non-elected candidates in 2008
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2012. The policy indices summarize
the policy positions on redistribution and size of public sector while the exact questions diﬀer
from those in 2012. The distance measures refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respective
average policy positions. Moderation refers to the share of empty responses. Extremism refers to
the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses.
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Figure A.11: Continuity of predetermined socio-economic variables: Mu-
nicipal councillors vs. deputies in 2008
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2012. The data on educational
achievement and socio-economic position is self-reported by the voting aid application repliers
while the age and gender data comes from the electoral statistics. Income groups are based on
the self-reported occupation category. I classify a candidate as having high income if he has a
managerial position or is a senior white-collar worker. Middle-income refers to being a junior
white-collar worker, a blue-collar worker or an entrepreneur. Candidates with low income are the
ones who are retired, home-makers, farmers, students or unemployed.
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Figure A.12: Continuity of predetermined socio-economic variables:
Deputies vs. non-elected candidates in 2008
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2012. The data on educational
achievement and socio-economic position is self-reported by the voting aid application repliers
while the age and gender data comes from the electoral statistics. Income groups are based on
the self-reported occupation category. I classify a candidate as having high income if he has a
managerial position or is a senior white-collar worker. Middle-income refers to being a junior
white-collar worker, a blue-collar worker or an entrepreneur. Candidates with low income are the
ones who are retired, home-makers, farmers, students or unemployed.
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Figure A.13: Continuity of predetermined political variables: Municipal
councillors vs. deputies in 2008
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2012. The data on the campaign
expenditure and the funding sources is self-reported by the voting aid application repliers and the
remaining data comes from the electoral statistics. The Center Party and National Coalition are
conservative, the Social Democrats (SDP) are leftist, the Swedish People’s Party is liberal, and
the Finns Party is populist. “Total vote share” equals the votes of a candidate divided by the vote
tally of all the candidates in the municipality. Campaign expenditure categories are as follows: 1
= 0-500€, 2 = 501-1000€, 3 = 1001-2000€, 4 = 2001-3000€, 5 = 3001-5000€, 6 = 5001-7000€, 7
= 7001-10000€, 8 = 10001-15000€, 9 = 15001-20000€, and 10 = over 20000€. Exterior funding
share categories are as follows: 1=0%, 2=1-20%, 3=21-50%, 4=51-80% and 5=81-100%. “Party
funding” equals 1 if a candidate names the party as her main external campaign contributor.
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Figure A.14: Continuity of predetermined political variables: Deputies vs.
non-elected candidates in 2008
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2012. The data on the campaign
expenditure and the funding sources is self-reported by the voting aid application repliers and the
remaining data comes from the electoral statistics. The Center Party and National Coalition are
conservative, the Social Democrats (SDP) are leftist, the Swedish People’s Party is liberal, and
the Finns Party is populist. “Total vote share” equals the votes of a candidate divided by the vote
tally of all the candidates in the municipality. Campaign expenditure categories are as follows: 1
= 0-500€, 2 = 501-1000€, 3 = 1001-2000€, 4 = 2001-3000€, 5 = 3001-5000€, 6 = 5001-7000€, 7
= 7001-10000€, 8 = 10001-15000€, 9 = 15001-20000€, and 10 = over 20000€. Exterior funding
share categories are as follows: 1=0%, 2=1-20%, 3=21-50%, 4=51-80% and 5=81-100%. “Party
funding” equals 1 if a candidate names the party as her main external campaign contributor.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics on the candidates, political variables
2008 repliers 2008 non-repliers 2012 repliers 2012 non-repliers
Vote share (%) 0.92 0.79 0.85 0.77
(1.20) (1.08) (1.15) (1.10)
Share of within- 5.97 5.24 6.18 5.17
party votes (%) (11.48) (10.92) (11.69) (10.52)
Share elected councilor 0.33 0.21 0.31 0.20
(0.47) (0.41) (0.46) (0.40)
Share elected deputy 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26
(0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
Share incumbent 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.17
councilor (0.43) (0.39) (0.41) (0.38)
Share Member of Parliament at 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001
the time of the munic. elections (0.083) (0.030) (0.081) (0.038)
Share has been councilor or 0.36 0.50
deputy earlier (0.48) (0.50)
Campaign expenditure 1.31 1.30
category (0.81) (0.81)
External funding share 1.82 1.64
category (1.22) (1.05)
Share party main source of 0.35 0.23
external funding (0.48) (0.42)
Observations 20060 18241 20734 16346
Note: The data on the campaign expenditure and the funding sources is self-reported
by the voting aid application repliers and the remaining data comes from the electoral
statistics. “Vote share” equals the votes of a candidate divided by the vote tally of all
the candidates in the municipality. “Share of within-party votes” stands for the votes
of a candidate divided by the vote tally of all the candidates of the same party in the
municipality. “Elected” became a municipal councilor while “deputy” became a deputy
councilor. Campaign expenditure categories are as follows: 1 = 0-500€, 2 = 501-1000€,
3 = 1001-2000€, 4 = 2001-3000€, 5 = 3001-5000€, 6 = 5001-7000€, 7 = 7001-10000€,
8 = 10001-15000€, 9 = 15001-20000€, and 10 = over 20000€. Exterior funding share
categories are as follows: 1=0%, 2=1-20%, 3=21-50%, 4=51-80% and 5=81-100%.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics on all the candidates, socio-economic
variables
2008 repliers 2008 non-repliers 2012 repliers 2012 non-repliers
Female 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.36
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Age 45.35 50.32 46.38 51.65
(12.79) (13.25) (13.27) (13.75)
High-income 0.24 0.19
(0.42) (0.39)
Middle-income 0.46 0.45
(0.50) (0.50)
Low-income 0.21 0.21
(0.41) (0.41)
Municipality employees 0.25 0.19
(0.43) (0.39)
University degree NA 0.38
(0.49)
Observations 20060 18241 20734 16346
Note: The data on the gender and the age comes from the electoral statistics.
The data on the occupational status and the university education (only for
2012) is self-reported in the voting aid applications. Income groups are based
on the self-reported occupation category. I classify a candidate as having high
income if he has a managerial position or is a senior white-collar worker. Middle-
income refers to being a junior white-collar worker, a blue-collar worker or an
entrepreneur. Candidates with low income are the ones who are retired, home-
makers, farmers, students or unemployed.
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics on all the candidates, socio-economic
variables
2008 2012
Redistribution 0.03 0.03
index (0.48) (0.50)
Public sector 0.11 0.11
index (0.51) (0.52)
Share moderate 0.02 0.05
positions (0.09) (0.10)
Share extreme 0.33 0.35
positions (0.24) (0.19)
Distance from 24.99 33.00
party average (16.57) (13.79)
Distance from 24.99 32.99
regional average (13.64) (12.46)
Distance from regional 32.87
party average (12.48)
Note: The policy indices summarizing the policy po-
sitions on redistribution and size of public sector con-
sist of diﬀerent questions in 2008 and in 2012.
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Table
A
.5:H
eterogeneous
incum
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eﬀect
on
the
m
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and
extrem
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indices,by
change
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(2)
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(6)
(7)
(8)
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var.
Extrem
ism
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oderation
Extrem
ism
M
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Extrem
ism
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oderation
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ism
M
oderation
Sam
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Increasing
m
unicipalunem
ploym
ent
rate
Stable
m
unicipalunem
ploym
ent
rate
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
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-0.0759**
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0.0088
-0.0134**
0.0054
0.0023
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0.557
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2.404
2.838
0.864
0.944
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Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
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Table
A
.7:H
eterogeneous
incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
distance
from
(by
change
in
the
localeconom
y):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
D
ep.
var.
Party
avg.
R
egion
avg.
Party-region
avg.
Party
avg.
R
egion
avg.
Party-region
avg.
Sam
ple
Stable
m
unicipalunem
ploym
ent
rate
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
0.3842
1.3973
0.5415
-0.9463
-0.2273
0.3209
(1.1455)
(1.2148)
(1.1630)
(1.2404)
(1.1600)
(1.0478)
Elected
t-4
0.2264
1.6473
0.9651
-1.4841
-0.7412
-0.4076
(½
bandw
idth)
(1.4805)
(1.5612)
(1.4205)
(1.6170)
(1.5000)
(1.3990)
O
bservations
2,285
2,203
1,970
2,127
2,187
1,897
O
pt.
bandw
idth
1.564
1.432
1.269
1.102
1.116
0.991
N
ote:Iclassify
them
unicipalunem
ploym
entrateasincreasing
ifitsincreaseisin
thehighestquartileofunem
ploym
entratepercentage
pointschange,increasing
atleast2
percentage
points.T
he
dependentvariablesreferto
the
M
ahalanobisdistancesfrom
the
respective
average
policy
positions.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
of
the
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table
A
.9:H
eterogeneous
incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
m
oderation
and
extrem
ism
indices,by
size
ofthe
m
unicipality:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ep.
var.
Extrem
ism
M
oderation
Extrem
ism
M
oderation
Extrem
ism
M
oderation
Extrem
ism
M
oderation
Sam
ple
A
t
least
m
iddle-sized
Sm
all
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
-0.0025
-0.0024
-0.0066
-0.0031
0.0192
-0.0185
-0.0500
-0.0210
(0.0134)
(0.0068)
(0.0134)
(0.0056)
(0.0232)
(0.0192)
(0.0463)
(0.0145)
Elected
t-4
0.0012
0.0089
-0.0163
0.0008
0.0556*
-0.0387
-0.0711
-0.0158
(½
bandw
idth)
(0.0180)
(0.0094)
(0.0196)
(0.0071)
(0.0296)
(0.0324)
(0.0612)
(0.0185)
O
bservations
2,711
2,636
3,030
3,591
864
770
290
525
O
pt.
bandw
idth
1.500
1.419
1.053
1.653
3.111
2.540
1.230
3.763
N
ote:Iclassify
a
m
unicipality
assm
allifitselectorate
num
berslessthan
5500
persons.M
oderation
refersto
the
share
of“D
on’tknow
”
orem
pty
responses.Extrem
ism
refers
to
the
share
of
“Strongly
agree”
or
“Strongly
agree”
responses.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,
**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table
A
.11:H
eterogeneous
incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
distance
from
(by
size
ofthe
m
unicipality):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
D
ep.
var.
Party
avg.
R
egion
avg.
Party-region
avg.
Party
avg.
R
egion
avg.
Party-region
avg.
Sam
ple
Sm
all
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
1.7014
1.3075
1.0332
4.0963
3.0376
2.1989
(1.7539)
(1.4645)
(1.6575)
(3.2993)
(2.9935)
(3.0551)
Elected
t-4
0.4157
0.9768
0.0635
5.6685
3.9524
3.7875
(½
bandw
idth)
(2.4154)
(1.9894)
(2.4291)
(4.3621)
(3.7070)
(4.8050)
O
bservations
895
1,014
865
265
268
287
O
pt.
bandw
idth
3.663
4.484
3.556
1.178
1.171
1.348
N
ote:
I
classify
a
m
unicipality
as
sm
all
if
its
electorate
num
bers
less
than
5500
persons.
T
he
dependent
variables
refer
to
the
M
ahalanobis
distances
from
the
respective
average
policy
positions.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
al
bandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
164
Table A.12: Sensitivity to the choice of optimal bandwidth: Incumbency
eﬀect on the policy indices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Redist. Size Redist. Size
Sample Councilors, 2012 Deputies, 2012
Electedt-4 -0.0099 -0.0442 0.0386 0.0184
(0.0280) (0.0272) (0.0426) (0.0416)
Observations 3,634 4,014 2,648 2,939
Optimal bandwidth 4.160 4.730 1.284 1.395
Note: The policy indices summarize the policy positions on redistribution
and size of public sector. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel
with the optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Observations refer to
the number of the observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.13: Sensitivity to the choice of optimal bandwidth: Incumbency
eﬀect on the moderation and extremism indices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Extremism Moderation Extremism Moderation
Sample Councilors, 2012 Deputies, 2012
Electedt-4 -0.0082 -0.0073 -0.0093 -0.0038
(0.0082) (0.0046) (0.0105) (0.0055)
Observations 4,917 4,912 4,064 3,912
Optimal bandwidth 4.223 4.211 1.797 1.594
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses. Extremism
refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses. Local linear re-
gressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Observations refer
to the number of the observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table
A
.14:Sensitivity
to
the
choice
ofoptim
albandw
idth:
Incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
distance
from
:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
D
ep.
var.
Party
average
R
egion
average
Party-region
average
Party
average
R
egion
average
Party-region
average
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2012
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
-0.7770
-0.6650
-1.0502*
-0.4109
-0.0131
0.1892
(0.6164)
(0.6154)
(0.5840)
(0.8449)
(0.7961)
(0.7822)
O
bservations
5,003
5,112
4,921
3,807
3,935
3,481
O
ptim
albandw
idth
5.620
5.743
6.527
1.781
1.853
1.723
N
ote:
T
he
dependent
variables
refer
to
the
M
ahalanobis
distances
from
the
respective
average
policy
positions.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
C
alonico,
C
attaneo
and
T
itiunik
(2014).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
of
the
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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fro
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th
e
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sit
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ns
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M
od
er
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io
n
re
fe
rs
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th
e
sh
ar
e
of
“D
on
’t
kn
ow
”
or
em
pt
y
re
sp
on
se
s.
Ex
tr
em
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re
fe
rs
to
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
“S
tr
on
gl
y
ag
re
e”
or
“S
tr
on
gl
y
ag
re
e”
re
sp
on
se
s.
Lo
ca
ll
in
ea
r
re
gr
es
sio
ns
us
in
g
a
tr
ia
ng
le
ke
rn
el
w
ith
th
e
op
tim
al
ba
nd
w
id
th
by
Im
be
ns
an
d
K
al
ya
na
ra
m
an
(2
01
2)
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
le
ve
l.
O
bs
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va
tio
ns
re
fe
r
to
th
e
nu
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r
of
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
w
ith
in
ea
ch
ba
nd
w
id
th
.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
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Table
A
.16:Balance
ofthe
pre-determ
ined
variables:
politicaland
socio-econom
ic
characteristics
in
2008
A
ge
Fem
ale
Low
inc.
M
iddle
inc.
H
igh
inc.
Totalvote
share
Party
funding
Expend.
Ext.
funding
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2008
Elected
t-4
-1.8598*
-0.0398
0.0178
0.0536*
-0.0622**
0.0453
0.0331
0.0795
-0.0135
(0.9930)
(0.0280)
(0.0257)
(0.0296)
(0.0241)
(0.0374)
(0.0247)
(0.0762)
(0.0959)
Elected
t-4
-2.8800**
-0.0269
-0.0068
0.0586
-0.0437
0.0521
0.0288
0.2153*
0.0525
(½
bandw
idth)
(1.3580)
(0.0344)
(0.0330)
(0.0379)
(0.0316)
(0.0523)
(0.0339)
(0.1178)
(0.1332)
O
bservations
2,548
3,436
3,270
3,500
3,529
2,149
3,568
2,454
2,292
O
pt.
bandw
idth
1.357
2.571
2.298
2.683
2.783
1.038
2.869
1.498
1.418
Sam
ple
D
eputies,2008
Elected
t-4
-0.0966
0.0300
-0.0160
0.0179
-0.0085
0.0173
-0.0265
0.0311
0.1276
(1.0250)
(0.0484)
(0.0358)
(0.0345)
(0.0481)
(0.0141)
(0.0442)
(0.0744)
(0.0938)
Elected
t-4
0.6072
0.0574
-0.0549
0.0486
-0.0131
0.0098
-0.0336
0.0373
0.0952
(½
bandw
idth)
(1.4396)
(0.0586)
(0.0480)
(0.0484)
(0.0676)
(0.0200)
(0.0564)
(0.1131)
(0.1449)
O
bservations
2,251
1,997
2,186
2,428
2,054
2,225
2,609
1,961
2,005
O
pt.
bandw
idth
0.787
0.677
0.757
0.885
0.700
0.769
1.007
0.730
0.792
N
ote:
T
he
estim
ations
are
done
only
forthe
subsam
ple
running
also
in
2012.
T
he
data
on
educationalachievem
entand
socio-econom
ic
position
isself-reported
by
the
voting
aid
application
repliers
w
hile
the
age
and
gender
data
com
es
from
the
electoralstatistics.
Incom
e
groups
are
based
on
the
self-reported
occupation
category.
I
classify
a
candidate
ashaving
high
incom
e
ifhe
hasa
m
anagerialposition
orisa
seniorw
hite-collarworker.
M
iddle-incom
e
refersto
being
a
juniorw
hite-collarworker,
a
blue-collar
worker
or
an
entrepreneur.
C
andidates
w
ith
low
incom
e
are
the
ones
w
ho
are
retired,hom
e-m
akers,farm
ers,students
or
unem
ployed.
“Totalvote
share”
equals
the
votes
ofa
candidate
divided
by
the
vote
tally
ofallthe
candidates
in
the
m
unicipality.
“Party
funding”
equals
1
ifa
candidate
nam
es
the
party
as
her
m
ain
externalcam
paign
contributor.
C
am
paign
expenditure
categories
are
as
follow
s:
1
=
0-500€,2
=
501-1000€,3
=
1001-2000€,4
=
2001-3000€,5
=
3001-5000€,
6
=
5001-7000€,7
=
7001-10000€,8
=
10001-15000€,9
=
15001-20000€,and
10
=
over
20000€.
Exterior
funding
share
categories
are
as
follow
s:
1=
0%
,2=
1-20%
,
3=
21-50%
,4=
51-80%
and
5=
81-100%
.
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Table
A
.18:Sensitivity
to
controlvariables:
Incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
policy
indices
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
D
ep.
var.
M
ore
redistribution
Larger
public
sector
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2012
Elected
t-4
-0.0459
-0.0451
-0.0467
-0.0454
-0.0451
-0.0424
-0.0419
-0.0452
-0.0407
-0.0391
(0.0313)
(0.0314)
(0.0316)
(0.0313)
(0.0314)
(0.0306)
(0.0307)
(0.0305)
(0.0306)
(0.0310)
Sam
ple
D
eputies,2012
Elected
t-4
0.0348
0.0327
0.0326
0.0324
0.0317
0.0198
0.0210
0.0212
0.0212
0.0207
(0.0452)
(0.0454)
(0.0452)
(0.0457)
(0.0456)
(0.0529)
(0.0530)
(0.0532)
(0.0532)
(0.0518)
R
ight-left
aﬃ
liation
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
A
ge,gender
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Incom
e
X
X
U
niversity
degree
X
X
X
X
M
unicipalem
ployee
X
X
N
ote:
T
he
policy
indices
sum
m
arize
the
policy
positions
on
redistribution
and
size
ofpublic
sector.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
al
bandw
idth
by
Im
bensand
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errorsclustered
atthe
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservationsreferto
the
num
berofthe
observationsw
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table A.19: Sensitivity to control variables: Incumbency eﬀect on the
moderation and extremism indices:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Extremism Moderation
Sample Councilors, 2012
Electedt-4 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0065 -0.0062
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Sample Deputies, 2012
Electedt-4 -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.0022 -0.0020
(0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0065) (0.0064)
Age, gender X X X X
University degree X X
Municipal employee X X
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses.
Extremism refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” re-
sponses. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal
bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Standard errors clustered
at the municipality level. Observations refer to the number of the observa-
tions within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.20: Sensitivity to control variables: Incumbency eﬀect on the dis-
tance from:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Party average Region average Party-region average
Sample Councilors, 2012
Electedt-4 -0.7836 -0.7701 -0.3519 -0.3270 -0.5926 -0.5687
(0.9721) (0.9778) (1.0354) (1.0428) (0.9962) (1.0026)
Sample Deputies, 2012
Electedt-4 -0.3416 -0.3657 0.0604 0.0419 0.1440 0.1198
(0.8982) (0.9005) (0.8615) (0.8624) (0.8641) (0.8624)
Age, gender X X X X X X
University degree X X X
Municipal employee X X X
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the
respective average policy positions. Local linear regressions using a triangle
kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Observations refer to the
number of the observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table A.21: Correlation of attrition and other variables in 2008
(1) (2)
Dep. var. Prob. of running again in 2012
Sample VAA repliers, 2008 All, 2008
Redistribution -0.0083
index (0.0081)
Public sector 0.0159
size index (0.0101)
Distance from -0.0003
the party avg. (0.0003)
Distance from -0.0009**
the region avg. (0.0004)
Share extreme -0.0366**
positions (0.0162)
Elected as 0.2547*** 0.2932***
councillor (0.0116) (0.0078)
Elected as 0.1166*** 0.1327***
deputy (0.0115) (0.0073)
Center -0.0824***
Party (0.0190)
Soc. -0.0071
Democrats (0.0149)
Nat. -0.0669***
Coalition (0.0168)
The 0.0360
Finns (0.0244)
Swedish -0.0676**
People’s Party (0.0261)
Greens -0.0758***
(0.0201)
Christ. -0.0238
Democrats (0.0215)
Age 0.0028*** 0.0022***
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Female -0.0740*** -0.0656***
(0.0074) (0.0051)
High-income
Low-income
Constant 0.4065*** 0.2809***
(0.0264) (0.0134)
Observations 17,332 38,301
R-squared 0.0866 0.0798
Note: The omitted party category is the Left Alliance,
a micro-party or an electoral association. The omitted
income category is middle income. All the speciﬁcations
control for the municipality eﬀects. Standard errors clus-
tered at the municipal level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table A.22: Correlation of attrition in the voting aid application usage
and other variables in 2008
(1) (2)
Dep. var. Prob. of using VAA again in 2012
Sample VAA repliers, 2008
Redistribution -0.0050 0.0005
index (0.0083) (0.0082)
Public sector 0.0179* 0.0214**
size index (0.0093) (0.0089)
Distance from -0.0005 -0.0004
the party avg. (0.0003) (0.0003)
Distance from -0.0003 -0.0004
the region avg. (0.0005) (0.0004)
Share extreme -0.0456*** -0.0302*
positions (0.0161) (0.0155)
Elected as 0.2723*** 0.2654***
councillor (0.0112) (0.0114)
Elected as 0.1244*** 0.1190***
deputy (0.0111) (0.0112)
Center -0.0446**
Party (0.0183)
Soc. -0.0058
Democrats (0.0144)
Nat. -0.0048
Coalition (0.0162)
The 0.0625**
Finns (0.0247)
Swedish -0.0225
People’s Party (0.0255)
Greens 0.0052
(0.0166)
Christ. 0.0102
Democrats (0.0204)
Age 0.0005* 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Female -0.0550*** -0.0570***
(0.0073) (0.0072)
High-income 0.0383***
(0.0089)
Low-income -0.0456***
(0.0094)
Constant 0.3235*** 0.3132***
(0.0243) (0.0182)
Observations 17,332 17,332
R-squared 0.0799 0.0810
Note: The omitted party category is the Left Alliance,
a micro-party or an electoral association. The omitted
income category is middle income. All the speciﬁcations
control for the municipality eﬀects. Standard errors clus-
tered at the municipal level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table A.23: Correlation of attrition and other variables in 2008 for the
close winners and losers at the upper threshold
(1) (2)
Dep. var. Prob. of using VAA again in 2012
Sample Close councilors, upper threshold Close deputies, upper threshold
Redistribution -0.0327 0.0277
index (0.0205) (0.0212)
Public sector 0.0152 0.0154
size index (0.0231) (0.0199)
Distance from -0.0019* 0.0006
the party avg. (0.0010) (0.0009)
Distance from 0.0008 -0.0014
the region avg. (0.0012) (0.0012)
Share extreme -0.0687 -0.0127
positions (0.0469) (0.0409)
Center -0.1126* -0.0025
Party (0.0574) (0.0554)
Soc. -0.0480 0.0587
Democrats (0.0515) (0.0514)
Nat. -0.0917* 0.0666
Coalition (0.0550) (0.0548)
Finns -0.0666 0.0420
Party (0.0923) (0.0957)
Swedish -0.0159 0.0125
People’s Party (0.0784) (0.0626)
Greens -0.1065* 0.0421
(0.0631) (0.0549)
Christ. -0.1101 0.1054
Democrats (0.0881) (0.0752)
Age -0.0014* 0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Female -0.0769*** -0.0819***
(0.0210) (0.0181)
High-income -0.0118 0.0397*
(0.0227) (0.0227)
Low-income -0.0424 -0.0542**
(0.0272) (0.0228)
Observations 2,925 3,507
R-squared 0.1526 0.1156
Note: For the higher threshold between close councilors and close deputies, the optimal
bandwidth is ±2.18%. The omitted party category is the Left Alliance, a micro-party or
an electoral association. The omitted income category is middle income. All the speci-
ﬁcations control for the municipality eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the municipal
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.24: Correlation of attrition and other variables in 2008 for the
close winners and losers at the lower threshold
(1) (2)
Dep. var. Prob. of using VAA again in 2012
Sample Close deputies, lower threshold Close non-elected, lower threshold
Redistribution 0.0659** 0.0016
index (0.0291) (0.0166)
Public sector -0.0103 0.0255
size index (0.0257) (0.0195)
Distance from 0.0004 0.0002
the party avg. (0.0011) (0.0008)
Distance from -0.0023 -0.0002
the region avg. (0.0015) (0.0010)
Share extreme 0.0122 -0.0450
positions (0.0506) (0.0411)
Center -0.0080 -0.0793
Party (0.0597) (0.0481)
Soc. 0.0730 -0.0382
Democrats (0.0572) (0.0362)
Nat. 0.0630 -0.0586
Coalition (0.0527) (0.0473)
Finns 0.1857** 0.0071
Party (0.0932) (0.1060)
Swedish -0.0708 0.0073
People’s Party (0.0716) (0.0986)
Greens 0.1252* 0.0195
(0.0658) (0.0453)
Christ. 0.1444 -0.0572
Democrats (0.0899) (0.0672)
Age 0.0003 0.0017**
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Female -0.0792*** -0.0637***
(0.0225) (0.0201)
High-income 0.0270 0.0136
(0.0292) (0.0219)
Low-income -0.0860*** -0.0309
(0.0283) (0.0238)
Observations 2,226 2,997
R-squared 0.1764 0.0953
Note: For the lower threshold between close deputies and close non-elected, the optimal
bandwidth is ±0.60%. The omitted party category is the Left Alliance, a micro-party or
an electoral association. The omitted income category is middle income. All the speci-
ﬁcations control for the municipality eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the municipal
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B: Results for 2008
Figure B.1: Robustness to bandwidth in 2008: Policy indices, municipal
councilors vs. deputies
Note: The policy indices summarize the policy positions on redistribution and size
of public sector. A larger number indicates more support within each domain. Local
linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure B.2: Robustness to bandwidth in 2008: Ambiguity indices, munic-
ipal councilors vs. deputies
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses. Extrem-
ism refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses. Local
linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure B.3: Robustness to bandwidth in 2008: Distance measures, munic-
ipal councilors vs. deputies
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respec-
tive average policy positions. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel with
the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure B.4: Robustness to bandwidth in 2008: Policy indices, deputies vs.
non-elected candidates
Note: The policy indices summarize the policy positions on redistribution and size
of public sector. A larger number indicates more support within each domain. Local
linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure B.5: Robustness to bandwidth in 2008: Ambiguity indices,
deputies vs. non-elected candidates
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses. Extrem-
ism refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses. Local
linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure B.6: Robustness to bandwidth in 2008: Distance measures,
deputies vs. non-elected candidates
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the respec-
tive average policy positions. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel with
the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure B.7: Continuity of predetermined socio-economic variables: Mu-
nicipal councillors vs. deputies in 2004
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2008. The data comes
from the electoral statistics.
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Figure B.8: Continuity of predetermined socio-economic variables:
Deputies vs. non-elected candidates in 2004
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2008. The data comes
from the electoral statistics.
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Figure B.9: Continuity of predetermined political variables: Municipal
councillors vs. deputies in 2004
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2008. The data comes
from the electoral statistics. The Center Party and National Coalition are con-
servative, the Social Democrats (SDP) are leftist, the Swedish People’s Party is
liberal, and the Finns Party is populist. “Total vote share” equals the votes of a
candidate divided by the vote tally of all the candidates in the municipality.
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Figure B.10: Continuity of predetermined political variables: Deputies vs.
non-elected candidates in 2004
Note: The graphs show only the subsample running also in 2008. The data comes
from the electoral statistics. The Center Party and National Coalition are con-
servative, the Social Democrats (SDP) are leftist, the Swedish People’s Party is
liberal, and the Finns Party is populist. “Total vote share” equals the votes of a
candidate divided by the vote tally of all the candidates in the municipality.
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Table
B
.1:H
eterogeneous
incum
bency
eﬀect
in
2008
on
the
policy
indices,by
size
ofthe
m
unicipality:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ep.
var.
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
R
edist.
Size
Sam
ple
A
t
least
m
iddle-sized
Sm
all
C
ouncilors,2008
D
eputies,2008
C
ouncilors,2008
D
eputies,2008
Elected
t-4
-0.0127
-0.0109
-0.0040
0.0343
-0.0084
-0.0396
-0.0858
0.0449
(0.0340)
(0.0413)
(0.0358)
(0.0492)
(0.0652)
(0.0648)
(0.0931)
(0.1148)
Elected
t-4
-0.0239
-0.0426
-0.0053
0.0656
-0.0314
-0.0446
-0.1162
0.0812
(½
bandw
idth)
(0.0418)
(0.0523)
(0.0546)
(0.0602)
(0.0859)
(0.0880)
(0.1100)
(0.1331)
O
bservations
2,606
2,580
1,949
2,131
717
921
301
220
O
pt.
bandw
idth
2.125
2.085
0.770
0.881
2.045
3.043
1.667
1.152
N
ote:
I
classify
a
m
unicipality
as
sm
allifits
electorate
num
bers
less
than
5500
persons.
T
he
policy
indices
sum
m
arize
the
policy
positions
on
redistribution
and
size
ofpublic
sector.
A
larger
num
ber
indicates
m
ore
support
for
each
dom
ain.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,
**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table
B
.3:H
eterogeneous
incum
bency
eﬀect
in
2008
on
the
distance
from
(by
size
ofthe
m
unicipality):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
D
ep.
var.
Party
avg.
R
egion
avg.
Party-region
avg.
Party
avg.
R
egion
avg.
Party-region
avg.
Sam
ple
A
t
least
m
iddle-sized
C
ouncilors,2008
D
eputies,2008
Elected
t-4
1.0718
0.0171
0.2710
1.0426
0.5575
0.1828
(1.1443)
(0.7922)
(1.0260)
(1.4144)
(1.2220)
(1.5706)
Elected
t-4
2.3625
1.0304
1.3546
0.9556
-1.0521
-0.2614
(½
bandw
idth)
(1.6175)
(1.0779)
(1.5530)
(2.0816)
(1.5465)
(1.8757)
O
bservations
2,671
3,189
2,698
2,321
1,839
1,185
O
pt.
bandw
idth
1.854
2.615
2.669
1.028
0.694
0.521
N
ote:
I
classify
a
m
unicipality
as
sm
all
if
its
electorate
num
bers
less
than
5500
persons.
T
he
dependent
variables
refer
to
the
M
ahalanobis
distances
from
the
respective
average
policy
positions.
Locallinear
regressions
using
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
al
bandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table B.5: Sensitivity to the choice of optimal bandwidth in 2008: Incum-
bency eﬀect on the policy indices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Redist. Size Redist. Size
Sample Councilors, 2008 Deputies, 2008
Electedt-4 -0.0074 -0.0250 -0.0017 0.0247
(0.0251) (0.0299) (0.0313) (0.0403)
Observations 4,223 4,191 2,916 2,885
Optimal bandwidth 3.558 3.472 1.423 1.378
Note: The policy indices summarize the policy positions on redistribution
and size of public sector. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel
with the optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Observations refer to
the number of the observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.6: Sensitivity to the choice of optimal bandwidth in 2008: Incum-
bency eﬀect on the moderation and extremism indices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Extremism Moderation Extremism Moderation
Sample Councilors, 2008 Deputies, 2008
Electedt-4 -0.0043 -0.0024 0.0127 -0.0024
(0.0113) (0.0033) (0.0150) (0.0046)
Observations 4,950 5,063 2,991 3,604
Optimal bandwidth 3.661 3.921 1.161 1.838
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses. Extremism
refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” responses. Local linear re-
gressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014). Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Observations refer
to the number of the observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table
B
.8:Balance
ofthe
pre-determ
ined
variables
in
2004
A
ge
Fem
ale
Totalvote
share
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2004
Elected
t-4
-0.0747
-0.0280
-0.0418
(0.4988)
(0.0267)
(0.0302)
Elected
t-4
-0.1164
-0.0187
-0.0324
(½
bandw
idth)
(0.6540)
(0.0343)
(0.0426)
O
bservations
7,961
6,539
3,809
O
pt.
bandw
idth
2.510
1.757
0.858
Sam
ple
D
eputies,2004
Elected
t-4
-0.2074
0.0087
0.0106
(0.7666)
(0.0267)
(0.0162)
Elected
t-4
-0.1463
0.0221
-0.0082
(½
bandw
idth)
(1.0497)
(0.0358)
(0.0212)
O
bservations
4,843
5,519
3,951
O
pt.
bandw
idth
0.792
0.945
0.621
N
ote:
T
he
estim
ations
are
done
only
for
the
subsam
ple
running
also
in
2008.
A
llthe
data
com
es
from
the
electoral
statistics.
“Totalvote
share”
equals
the
votes
ofa
candidate
divided
by
the
vote
tally
ofallthe
candidates
in
the
m
unicipality.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table
B
.10:Sensitivity
to
controlvariables:
Incum
bency
eﬀect
on
the
policy
indices
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ep.
var.
M
ore
redistribution
Larger
public
sector
Sam
ple
C
ouncilors,2008
Elected
t-4
-0.0094
-0.0089
-0.0088
-0.0090
-0.0168
-0.0153
-0.0126
-0.0145
(0.0203)
(0.0203)
(0.0205)
(0.0203)
(0.0319)
(0.0316)
(0.0318)
(0.0315)
Sam
ple
D
eputies,2008
Elected
t-4
-0.0255
-0.0243
-0.0221
-0.0254
0.0441
0.0464
0.0482
0.0449
(0.0449)
(0.0450)
(0.0453)
(0.0439)
(0.0453)
(0.0453)
(0.0447)
(0.0447)
R
ight-left
aﬃ
liation
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
A
ge,gender
X
X
X
X
X
X
Incom
e
X
X
M
unicipalem
ployee
X
X
N
ote:
T
he
policy
indicessum
m
arize
the
policy
positionson
redistribution
and
size
ofpublic
sector.
Locallinearregressionsusing
a
triangle
kernelw
ith
the
optim
albandw
idth
by
Im
bens
and
K
alyanaram
an
(2012).
Standard
errors
clustered
at
the
m
unicipality
level.
O
bservations
refer
to
the
num
ber
ofthe
observations
w
ithin
each
bandw
idth.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1
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Table B.11: Sensitivity to control variables: Incumbency eﬀect on the
moderation and extremism indices:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Extremism Moderation
Sample Councilors, 2008
Electedt-4 0.0032 0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0015
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Sample Deputies, 2008
Electedt-4 0.0137 0.0111 -0.0093 -0.0094
(0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0078) (0.0079)
Age, gender X X X X
Municipal employee X X
Note: Moderation refers to the share of “Don’t know” or empty responses.
Extremism refers to the share of “Strongly agree” or “Strongly agree” re-
sponses. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel with the optimal
bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Standard errors clustered
at the municipality level. Observations refer to the number of the observa-
tions within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.12: Sensitivity to control variables: Incumbency eﬀect on the dis-
tance from:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Party average Region average Party-region average
Sample Councilors, 2008
Electedt-4 0.6351 0.6601 0.4699 0.5499 0.8569 0.8130
(0.8751) (0.8872) (0.7963) (0.8054) (1.1451) (1.1722)
Sample Deputies, 2008
Electedt-4 0.9087 0.9318 0.6795 0.7901 1.2049 1.2198
(1.2331) (1.2250) (1.1305) (1.1136) (1.2934) (1.2732)
Age, gender X X X X X X
Municipal employee X X X
Note: The dependent variables refer to the Mahalanobis distances from the re-
spective average policy positions. Local linear regressions using a triangle kernel
with the optimal bandwidth by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Standard er-
rors clustered at the municipality level. Observations refer to the number of the
observations within each bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.13: Correlation of attrition and other variables in 2004
(1)
Dep. var. Prob. of running again in 2008
Sample All, 2004
Elected as 0.2998***
councillor (0.0078)
Elected as 0.1287***
deputy (0.0073)
Center 0.0236
Party (0.0146)
Soc. 0.0611***
Democrats (0.0157)
Nat. 0.0343**
Coalition (0.0153)
The 0.0760***
Finns (0.0244)
Swedish 0.0047
People’s Party (0.0223)
Greens 0.0371**
(0.0185)
Christ. 0.0465***
Democrats (0.0167)
Age 0.1172***
(0.0150)
Female 0.0026***
(0.0002)
Constant -0.0568***
(0.0052)
Observations 39,745
R-squared 0.0888
Note: The omitted party category is the Left Alliance, a micro-
party or an electoral association. All the speciﬁcations control
for the municipality eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.14: Correlation of attrition and other variables in 2004 for the
close winners and losers at the upper threshold
(1) (2)
Dep. var. Prob. of running again in 2008
Sample Close councilors, upper threshold Close deputies, upper threshold
Center -0.0419 -0.0069
Party (0.0382) (0.0129)
Soc. 0.0019 0.0069
Democrats (0.0370) (0.0133)
Nat. 0.0151 -0.0361***
Coalition (0.0431) (0.0120)
Finns 0.0778 -0.0207
Party (0.1573) (0.0223)
Swedish -0.0884 -0.0025
People’s Party (0.0695) (0.0217)
Greens 0.0764 -0.0502***
(0.0751) (0.0165)
Christ. -0.0588 -0.0313*
Democrats (0.0731) (0.0170)
Age 0.0001 0.0031***
(0.0008) (0.0003)
Female -0.0978*** -0.0425***
(0.0185) (0.0064)
Observations 3,801 21,898
R-squared 0.1168 0.0378
Note: For the higher threshold between close councilors and close deputies,
the optimal bandwidth is ±1.18%. The omitted party category is the Left
Alliance, a micro-party or an electoral association. All the speciﬁcations control
for the municipality eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.15: Correlation of attrition and other variables in 2004 for the
close winners and losers at the lower threshold
(1) (2)
Dep. var. Prob. of running again in 2008
Sample Close deputies, lower threshold Close non-elected, lower threshold
Center -0.0827*** -0.0075
Party (0.0229) (0.0139)
Soc. -0.0027 -0.0212
Democrats (0.0242) (0.0151)
Nat. -0.0261 -0.0394***
Coalition (0.0248) (0.0129)
Finns -0.1687** -0.0803**
Party (0.0794) (0.0313)
Swedish -0.0952* -0.0354
People’s Party (0.0506) (0.0242)
Greens -0.0190 -0.0379
(0.0421) (0.0242)
Christ. -0.0810** 0.0093
Democrats (0.0409) (0.0237)
Age 0.0034*** 0.0031***
(0.0005) (0.0003)
Female -0.0533*** -0.0680***
(0.0121) (0.0076)
Observations 7,846 22,585
R-squared 0.0878 0.0434
Note: For the lower threshold between close deputies and close non-elected,
the optimal bandwidth is ±1.24%. The omitted party category is the Left
Alliance, a micro-party or an electoral association. All the speciﬁcations control
for the municipality eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
198

 A
a
lto
-D
D
 17
1
/2
0
1
5
 
9HSTFMG*agfhei+ 
ISBN 978-952-60-6574-8 (printed) 
ISBN 978-952-60-6575-5 (pdf) 
ISSN-L 1799-4934 
ISSN 1799-4934 (printed) 
ISSN 1799-4942 (pdf) 
 
Aalto University 
School of Business 
Department of Economics 
www.aalto.fi 
BUSINESS + 
ECONOMY 
 
ART + 
DESIGN + 
ARCHITECTURE 
 
SCIENCE + 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
CROSSOVER 
 
DOCTORAL 
DISSERTATIONS 
R
iik
k
a S
av
o
lain
en
 
E
ssay
s o
n
 E
m
p
irical P
o
litical E
co
n
o
m
ics 
A
a
lto
 U
n
ive
rs
ity 
2015 
Department of Economics 
Essays on Empirical 
Political Economics 
Rikka Savolainen 
DOCTORAL 
DISSERTATIONS 
